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Based on the meta-theoretical approach of eclecticism, and drawing on the insights of structural 
realism and constructivism, this study comparatively analyses Nigeria and South Africa’s 
intervention roles in Africa, with a special focus on the conflict episodes in Sierra Leone (1991-
1998) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1997-2005). The study finds that Nigeria 
and South Africa’s conflict intervention behaviour in Sierra Leone and the DRC was 
significantly dictated by the structural constraints and incentives imposed on them by their 
dominant positions in their subregion, and the regional complexes in which they operate. 
However, their identities as African actors, forged by their de-colonisation and anti-apartheid 
struggles, and the existing values and bond that they share with their contiguous states also shape 
their intervention roles significantly. Through the two case studies, the study illustrated the 
advantages of a multi-perspective, eclectic approach that is sensitive to the relative explanatory 
weight both approaches offer on Nigeria and South Africa interventions role in Africa. Overall, 
the thesis makes a contribution to the literature by looking at the two actors simultaneously and 
comparatively, and by illustrating the value of an eclectic approach to foreign policy analysis, 
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Several decades after the emergence of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and the 
political transition of many countries from colonialism to independence in the 1960s, the African 
continent continues to be a theatre of violent conflicts and civil strife. From Congo in 1960 to 
Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013, the story has remained almost the same. 
Understandably, this has not been without consequences; a development most visible in terms of 
gross human rights violations, economic underdevelopment, a diminishing or virtually non-
existent social infrastructural base, and threatened socio-political and economic structures. More 
specifically, between 1960 and 2000, nearly 20 African countries or 40 per cent of the states in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have experienced at least one period of civil war, with the conflict 
episodes in Sierra Leone (1991-1998) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1997-
2005), being some of its deadliest. Due to the severity and attendant consequences of these two 
conflicts, some scholars have described them as Africa’s First World War and the Blood 
Diamond war.1 
As a consequence, efforts have been by an amalgam of state and non-state actors towards finding 
a way out of these crises. In Africa, these efforts have most notably been championed by Nigeria 
and South Africa, as seen in Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone, and the DRC.2 Scholars, 
while interpreting these leadership roles, often point to the hegemonic tendencies embedded in 
the foreign policy and conflict intervention behaviour of both states.  In a recent study, Jason 
Warner in his article, “Nigeria and “Illusory Hegemony” in foreign and security policymaking: 
Pax-Nigeriana and the challenges of Boko Haram”, argued that while Nigeria possesses 
                                                          
1 Trefon, T. (2005). “The Social Cost of Conflict in Congo”. In Chabal P, Engel, U, and Gentili, A.M. (Eds.) Is 
violence Inevitable in Africa? Theories of conflict and Approaches to Conflict Prevention. Vol. 1. Boston: Brill 
Leiden, p.129. 
2 Adebajo, A. and Mustapha, R. (Eds.) (2008). Gulliver’s troubles: Nigeria’s foreign policy after the Cold War. 
Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; Alden, C. and Le Pere, G. (2009). “South Africa in 




the realist attributes of a hegemon, given its military power, economic strength, and a large 
population, it lacks the liberal attributes of a hegemon (the legitimacy for rightful rule).3 In 
exercising its leadership roles in Africa, Nigeria, as Warner contends, is guilty of “illusory 
hegemony” or foreign and security policy prevarication.4 This pursuit of illusory hegemony, as 
Warner agues, has an opposite unintended effect of undermining, rather than improving 
Nigeria’s perception of rightful rule in Africa.5 Olusola Ogunnubi and Ufo Uzodike have asked 
if Nigeria can be Africa’s next hegemon.6 Nigeria, as they argued, remains an important regional 
power on the continent, but continues to be hindered by several factors in playing a hegemonic 
role.7 To assert this claim, they highlighted issues such as: economic capacity, texture of its 
polity, international public image, among others, as conditions capable of increasingly deflating 
Nigeria’s capacity to play a meaningful hegemonic role in Africa.8 
Commenting on Nigeria’s seeming exhibition of this benign hegemon tendencies, Ogunmola and 
Badmus, drawing references from the hegemonic stabilization theory examined Nigeria's self-
imposed leadership role, as enunciated in its foreign policy, and uncovers the dilemma of 
preventive diplomacy versus an insurgent/irregular conflict scenario by a non-neutral party9 
Similar attempts have been made by scholars to interrogate South Africa’s leadership role in 
Africa. For example, Cyril Obi has highlighted how South Africa’s membership of BRAZIL, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) forum, places it in a prime position to lead the 
rest of Africa.10  
Relatedly, Alexandrof Alan has attempted to provide answers to the question of how and where 
South Africa fits in a complex global order.11 He argued that given South Africa’s membership 
                                                          
3 Warner, J. (2017). “Nigeria and “Illusory Hegemony” in Foreign and Security Policymaking: Pax-Nigeriana and 
the Challenges of Boko Haram”. Foreign Policy Analysis, 13(3), Pp.638–661. 
4 Ibid., p.638. 
5 Ibid., Pp.638–661. 
6 Ogunnubi, O. and Uzodike, U.O. (2016). “Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon?” African Security Review, 25(2), 
Pp.110-128. 
7 Ibid., Pp.110-128. 
8 Ibid., Pp.110-128. 
9 Ogunmola, D. and Badmus, I.A. (2006). “Nigeria's intervention in the Sierra Leonean civil war: the dilemma of a 
benign hegemon”. Africa Insight, 36(3-4), Pp.76-94.  
10 Obi, C. (2015). “Repositioning South Africa in global economic governance: a perspective from Nigeria.” South 
African Journal of International Affairs, 22(2), Pp.165-184. 
11 Alexandrof, A. (2015). “South Africa in a complex global order: How and where to fit in?” South African Journal 




of the G-20 and the BRICS, the country has the capacity to leverage on the benefits of its 
‘multiple identities’ as a foreign policy strategy, to provide leadership for Africa.12  Alexandrof’s 
argument appears to have been motivated by Maxi Schoeman’s earlier classification of South 
Africa as an ‘emerging middle power’, in view of its role in the international system and its 
regional position in Africa.13 In his contribution to the discourse, Paul-Henri Bischoff went a 
notch higher than Schoeman’s “middle power classification”, by highlighting the need to 
recognise South Africa’s power preponderance 14 Bischoff argues that given South Africa’s 
possession of three important political resources: 1) a recognition of its geo-political position and 
importance as a democratic yardstick and reformer; 2) its acceptance of a transnational, neo-
liberal elite alliance and 3) recognition of its leadership role from forces wishing to challenge 
Africa’s political establishment, the country has a role to play in providing leadership for the rest 
of Africa.15 
Daniel Flemes in particular has made a case for South Africa to be recognised as a regional 
power in Africa given its fulfilment of the four pivotal criteria: claim to leadership, power 
resources, employment of foreign policy instruments, and acceptance of leadership, expected of 
a regional power.16  He adds however, that while South Africa appears ready to bear the cost of 
co‐operative hegemony (such as capacity building for regional institutions and peacekeeping), 
the regional acceptance of South Africa's leadership is constrained by its historical legacy”.17 
There have also been studies demonstrating how regional powers can serve as facilitators of 
                                                          
12 Ibid., p.249. 
13 Schoeman, M. (2000): “South Africa as an emerging middle power”. African Security Review, 9(3), Pp.47-58. 
14 Bischoff, P. (2003). “External and domestic sources of foreign policy ambiguity: South African foreign policy and 
the projection of pluralist middle power”. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 30(1), Pp.183-201. 
15”. Ibid., Pp.183-201. 
16 Flemes, D. (2007). “Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African 
Case”. GIGA Working Paper No.53, Pp.1-60. 




peace and stability,18 and how effective regional leadership could potentially lead to a well-
ordered global governance structure,19 despite the challenges of regional institutionalisation.20  
Similar attempts have been made to assess the foreign policies of regional actors on an individual 
basis.21 While these studies and many more have highlighted Nigeria and South Africa’s 
capacity to lead the rest of Africa, there has been no study which comparatively assesses this 
capacity from a demonstrated point of view and more importantly, from an analytic eclecticism 
theoretical construct. Put differently, there is a dearth of foreign policy and intervention 
behaviour literature which comparatively assesses the international relations approach(es) within 
which the conflict intervention roles and foreign policy behaviour of regional actors in Africa 
can be located.  
Accordingly, this contribution assesses Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict intervention roles in 
Africa as crucially influenced by their regional hegemonic interests and their subscription to the 
notion of collective identity. For the sake of this study, and following Terry Nardin, 
“intervention” is defined as the exercise of authority by one state within the jurisdiction of 
another state, not necessarily with the permission of the other state.22 As the discussion of 
intervention in chapter one will clarify, intervention has different purposes and different 
modalities. Here, we are particularly interested in why and how Nigeria and South Africa 
became involved in what can be broadly classified as “humanitarian intervention” in Africa; that 
is, their exercise of authority in another African state with the purpose of mitigating civil 
violence and the resultant humanitarian suffering in that state.  
                                                          
18 Ikenberry, G. and Kupchan, C. (1990). “Socialization and Hegemonic Power”. International Organization 44(3), 
Pp.283-315; Hurrell, A. (2005). “Hegemony and Regional Governance in the Americas”. In Fawcet, L. and Serrano, 
M. (Eds.) Regionalism and Governance in the Americas: Continental drift. London: Palgrave/Macmillan, Pp.185-
207. 
19 Wang, H. and French, E. (2013). “China’s Participation in Global Governance from a Comparative Perspective”. 
Asia Policy, No.15. Pp.89-114. 
20 Pedersen, T. (2002). “Cooperative hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration”. Review of 
International Studies, 28(4), Pp.677-696. 
21 Okolo, J.E. (1988). “Morality and Realism in Nigerian Foreign Policy”. World Affairs, 151(2), Pp.67-83; Van 
Wyk, J. (2004). “South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy: A constructivist analysis”. Politeia, 23(3), p.124. 




Drawing on the theoretical insights of structural realism and social constructivism respectively, 
the study examines Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict roles in Sierra Leone (1991-1998) and 
the DRC (1997-2005). The purpose of this study is to explore the relative merits of these two 
approaches in explaining the motives and intervention behaviour of these two states. Our basic 
assumption is that more than one theoretical perspective is required to adequately grasp the 
complexity of intervention decisions and behaviour. In this vein, this study draws inspiration 
from the 1971 study of Graham Allison on state decision-making in the 1962 Cuban missile 
crisis,23 and on the current revival of interest in “eclectic theorising” in the discipline of 
International Relations. 
Allison shows the value of using different theoretical perspectives to illuminate different 
dimensions of the complex process of decision-making on the part of the US and the Soviet 
Union government before and during the crisis. By using different analytical perspectives, 
Allison reveals dimensions of complex processes that would otherwise have been ignored if one 
relied only on a rational-actor understanding of the two main actors involved. Similarly, Rudra 
Sil and Peter Katzenstein celebrate the value of using more than one approach in analytically 
exploring political behaviour.24  
Analytical eclecticism has three defining characteristics: one, in contrast to much of the current 
practice in International Relations where analytics are largely employed to bolster a preferred 
grand theory, analytical eclecticism is pragmatically inclined, and explores a range of approaches 
to enrich the analytical process.25 Two, it chooses to address issues that have wider scope than 
the narrow confines of specific research approaches, which in principle, can “incorporate more 
of the complexity and messiness of particular real-world situations”.26 Three, by constructing 
substantial arguments to trace various dimensions of a complex event, eclecticism drops the 
excessive reliance on “parsimony” (which has come to be an almost unassailable precondition 
                                                          
23 Allison, G.T. (1971). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Little, Brown and Company, 
Pp.1-82. 
24 Sil, R. and Katzenstein, P. (2008). “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems 
and Mechanisms across Research Traditions”. Perspectives on Politics, p.412. 
25 Ibid., p.412. 




for “scientific” analysis) in appreciation of the different types of causal mechanisms involved in 
real-world social situations.27  
In a recent study, Albert Domson-Lindsay undertook a scholarly assessment of South Africa’s 
foreign policy behaviour by examining the debate between Parsimony and Eclecticism.28 As he 
notes, the literature on South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour is marked by a clash of concepts, 
arguments and normative convictions—between two dominant intellectual traditions: realism 
and liberalism.29 Works based on each of the perspectives, as Albert Domson-Lindsay argues, 
“inclines towards particular preferences, values and prescriptions–a single vision or a 
universalising organising principle guides the framing of policy problem, interpretation of 
empirical observations and prescriptions”.30  
Making a case for the adoption of  the eclectic approach in the analysis of South Africa’s foreign 
policy behaviour in particular, and those of a number of African states in general, he argues that 
“neither of the two dominant perspectives ‘comprehensively and persuasively’ explain their 
foreign policy behaviour and practice”.31 Albert Domson-Lindsay thus advocates for the 
application of analytic eclecticism to the study of the foreign policy behaviour of African states, 
given its ability to integrate ideas and variables associated with different theoretical 
perspectives.32 The analytic eclecticism approach is therefore preferable, because it ensures that a 
scholarly endeavour is sufficiently close to the experience of real world actors, leads to deeper 
insights into policy behaviour and holistically deals with the problems associated with it.33 
Its application to International Relations (IR) discourses therefore is imperative given that 
scholars have attempted “to self‐consciously forego metatheoretical and methodological battles 
in favour of approaches that explicitly seek to explore the interfaces between, and build bridges 
across problematics and analyses originally constructed within seemingly incommensurable 
                                                          
27 Ibid., p.412. 
28 Domson-Lindsay, A.K. (2017). “Scholarship on South Africa’s Foreign Policy Behaviour: Parsimony versus 
Eclecticism”. Politikon, 44(3), Pp.370–386. 
29 Ibid., p.370. 
30 Ibid., p.370. 
31 Ibid., p.370. 
32 Ibid., p.370. 




research traditions”.34 These research traditions, according to Katzenstein and Sil, are typically 
founded on metatheoretical principles that are distinct from those informing competing 
traditions, each intrinsically favouring some types of scholarly endeavours over others.35 These 
include—the selection and framing of research puzzles, the representation and interpretation of 
relevant empirical observations, the specification of evidentiary standards, and the attention to 
certain causal mechanisms at the expense of others.36 
This seeming lack of consensus on such fundamental issues has necessitated the employment of 
the eclectic approach in this study, particularly given its capacity to define and explore 
substantive problems in ways that provide deeper understanding of the phenomenon under 
investigation. The eclectic approach is thus useful for this study because it represents a major 
shift from a paradigm‐driven research which has become all too familiar within the IR discourse 
and, because unlike other ways of theorising, it does not emphasise the utility of one approach 
over the other; rather, it offers a multidimensional platform to examine a research question from 
different perspectives.37  By its adoption, the eclectic approach affords us an opportunity to pay 
detailed attention to the central question posed in the study, and engage the question fruitfully, 
thereby making the study’s contribution problem-driven.38 
Conscious of the fact that the study’s hypothesis is generated on the basis of the explanatory 
weight that structural realism and social constructivism brings to bear on Nigeria and South 
Africa’s conflict intervention roles and foreign policy behaviour, the eclectic approach provides 
us a broader platform to understand the extent to which these IR approaches explain both 
countries’ foreign policy behaviour, and what other possible ways of analyses and interpretation 
exist. The relevance of this approach to the study shall be further explored in chapter 8. This 
study aligns itself squarely with this understanding of analytical eclecticism, in an attempt to 
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arrive at a nuanced understanding of Nigeria and South Africa’s intervention behaviour in Africa 
in general alongside Sierra Leone (Nigeria) and the DRC (South Africa) in particular.  
Given their relative power preponderance in sub-Saharan Africa, and their extensive intervention 
profiles, the choice of Nigeria and South Africa as our analytical focus demands little 
justification. The choice of these two country-case studies is informed by a number of 
considerations. First, as state actors within the West African and Southern African sub-regions, 
Nigeria and South Africa have been significantly involved in a number of efforts aimed at 
resolving conflicts on the African continent. Also, Nigeria and South Africa are actively 
involved in conflict intervention initiatives of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), in their respective 
sub-regions. Lastly, there appears to be a dearth of literature which comparatively assesses the 
international relations theory within which Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict intervention roles 
and foreign policy behaviour in Africa can be situated.  
The choice of the Sierra Leone and the DRC conflict case studies was equally informed by a 
number of reasons. First, both episodes remain one of the unfortunate examples of conflicts 
where grave human rights violations have occurred, and one in which the international 
community displayed considerable apathy towards their resolution. Second, and as a 
consequence of this apathy, a considerable degree of pressure was imposed on (sub) regional 
institutions in Africa to resolve the conflicts, with the weight of this responsibility falling on 
Nigeria and South Africa, given the strategic and lead position they occupy in ECOWAS and 
SADC. Lastly, the selection of both conflict episodes affords us the privilege to comparatively 
assess Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles from a 
sub-regional perspective. 
What is less obvious than the selection of our case studies, though, is the choice of the two 
analytical approaches that this thesis explores and uses to highlight variety of dimensions of the 
behaviour of these states. The field of International Relations (IR) is well-populated by a variety 
of theories, ranging from the well-established rationalist realism and liberalism that still 
dominate the field, across various sociological theories that include varieties of constructivism, 
to explicit critical theories such as world-systems theory and post-colonial theory. Liberalism as 




it tells us very little about Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour apart from stating 
the obvious point that the two contribute to some degree to the provision of regional public 
goods. An approach that largely ignores the significant power differentials in the contexts where 
the two operate, and has little to say about the role of their identities as African actors, is prima 
facie of less relevance.  
Ideally, a full treatment of the foreign policies of these two actors would have to consider a range 
of theoretical perspectives – which is exactly the point of an eclectic approach, however, we will 
focus here on two approaches which, in the literature on Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign 
policies, have proven to be particularly productive, namely structural realism and social 
constructivism.39 Without necessarily assuming that these two approaches contribute equally to 
an understanding of the behaviour of these two states under review, the rest of the study hopes to 
show how each in its own right is useful in unravelling the complexities of the foreign policy 
behaviour of the two states.  
It is possible that one of the two approaches might be better/more suited at explaining a 
particular set of behaviour, but it is not the main purpose of this study to pass judgement on the 
overall merits of the one versus the other. Instead, the study explores the contributions that both 
can make in an even-handed way as possible, without ignoring that one might be more useful 
than the other for the purposes of understanding a specific aspect of behaviour. Based on this 
realisation that the thesis argues that Nigeria and South Africa’s relative power positions within 
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their immediate neighbourhoods, plus their identities as African actors, forged by de-colonisation 
and anti-apartheid struggles, and the existing values and bonds that they share with their 
neighbours, all play a crucial role in their intervention behaviour. Thus, structural realism, with 
its focus on material structure and the pursuit of relative gains, and a constructivist focus on 
identity and how interests are shaped by this are both required to develop a substantive 
understanding of the behaviour of these two regional powers.  
  
1.2 Research design and methodology 
 
The overall research design of the study is structured to generate empirical insights deduced from 
an exploration of the explanatory potential of structural realism and social constructivism. The 
insights relate to the intervention behaviour of two powerful states, namely Nigeria and South 
Africa. As explained above, the approach taken is analytical eclecticism. Conscious of the 
complex and elusive nature of the phenomenon under investigation, the thesis employs a 
qualitative research methodology based on two broad assumptions. The first is an ontological 
assumption that the two states respectively are unified actors with discernible single foreign 
policies. The second is an analytical approach which uses a broad interpretive strategy to 
expatiate on specific behaviour in terms of both the meaning attributed to the behaviour by the 
actors, and the significance that these actions have for us as observers. This is achieved through a 
theory-guided content analysis of published materials on Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict 
intervention and foreign policy behaviour in Sierra Leone and the DRC, and a number of other 
conflict episodes. 
Viewed as such, the research design falls squarely within the qualitative approach in the social 
sciences. There is no attempt here to generate hypotheses that are then subjected to empirical 
tests. Rather, the purpose is to generate interpretive insights based on the application of the 
theoretical perspectives to the raw material of published accounts and documentary evidence of 
foreign policy behaviour. Relying substantially on interpretive readings of such sources, there is 
an element of theoretical pre-selection at play. However, one of the benefits of an analytical 
eclectic approach is that by being willing to consider a range of interpretations, it reduces the 




Scholars have argued that the utility of the content analysis approach is inherent in the relative 
ease it provides when accessing past literature and the avenue the qualitative approach provides 
in building on what has been previously done. The content analysis approach, as Shank observes, 
“allows for a relatively easy access to data and also provides the researcher with the prerogative 
of deciding what to use, how to use it and where to use it”.40 The qualitative method of research 
is appropriate when the phenomena being examined are complex, and social in nature, and not 
easily quantifiable.41 This much is evident in a study such as this, where the objective is to 
examine the conflict intervention behaviour of Nigeria and South Africa from a foreign policy 
perspective. Furthermore, the qualitative research methodology celebrates the richness, depths, 
nuances, contexts, multi-dimensionality and complexity of the phenomena under investigation. 
Instead of editing these elements out of the research, the qualitative research methodology factors 
them directly into its analysis and explanations.42 
Employing the qualitative method in a research facilitates an in-depth understanding of the world, 
particularly through the eyes of the people being studied.43 Useful to note that the adoption of a 
qualitative research method in the study enabled this researcher to explore the phenomena 
(Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour, their interventions in Sierra Leone and the 
DRC, and how this can be explained within the theoretical constructs of structural realism and 
social constructivism). The approach also provided the researcher the analytical platform to 
describe the variation in the foreign policies of Nigeria and South Africa, the similarities and how 
their historical experiences have redefined their conflict intervention roles and behaviour as 
deduced from existing literature. 
This is essentially a literature-based study and the secondary data were gathered through an 
extensive review of academic materials, including books, journal articles, policy documents, and 
commissioned reports. Content analysis and process-tracing were employed in analysing the 
data, considering the nature of the information required and the available literature. Both of these 
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tools assisted in the narrative reconstruction of the behaviour of the two states in general but also 
in the specific cases of intervention. The content-analysis approach enabled the researcher to 
analyse and review the existing literature used at different stages of the thesis, including the 
employment of, and textual analysis with, tabular illustrations.  
More than anything else, the textual analysis helped in the discussion of the gathered data in 
human communications such as speeches or public addresses, correspondences, and policy 
statements available to the researcher. This approach has been described by Barbie as “any 
technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified 
characteristics of the messages”.44 The approach equally encompasses “the study of recorded 
human communications such as books, websites, paintings and laws”.45 Process tracing, on the 
other hand, “is a research method which traces causal mechanisms using detailed, within-case 
empirical analysis of how a causal process plays out in an actual case”.46  
As a method of data analysis, is often used for case studies seeking to gain a greater 
understanding of the causal dynamics which produced the outcome of a particular historical case 
and to shed light on generalizable causal mechanisms linking causes and outcomes within a 
population of causally similar cases.47 The analytical added value of process tracing is that, it 
enables strong causal inferences to be made about how causal processes work in real-world cases 
based on studying within-case mechanistic evidence.48 In a study which seeks to assess the utility 
of applying an eclectic approach to the understanding and interpretation of Nigeria and South 
Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles as this, process tracing  
contributed significantly in achieving the study’s central research objective in a number of ways.   
First, it afforded us the opportunity to thoroughly engage what structural realism and social 
constructivism tells us about Nigeria and South Africa’s role in Sierra Leone (1991-1998) and 
the DRC (1997-2005). This was achieved by soaking and probing the fundamentals of both IR 
approaches, particularly how they singularly, and/or collectively explain both countries’ 
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intervention mechanisms in the conflicts. Second, it allowed us to comprehensively review the 
relevant literature related to the study, thus gaining clues about the strength and limitations of 
both IR approaches, and the ‘danger’ in adopting one at the expense of the other. Lastly, having 
exposed us to the explanatory weight of both approaches in our country and conflict case studies, 
process tracing provided us the platform to mitigate the effects of their limitations, by combining 
the strength of both approaches to analyse and interpret Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign 
policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in the conflicts in particular, and Africa in 




The thesis is divided into nine chapters, with this chapter serving as the introduction. The main 
analytical work is done in Chapter eight, where the relative contributions of structural realism 
and constructivism in our understanding of Nigeria and South Africa’s roles are adumbrated and 
contextualised. To get there, though, a range of preparatory work has to be done. Chapter one 
provides a summary of the focus and approach of the study. Chapter two discusses the concept of 
intervention, and in particular the practice of humanitarian intervention. This focus is required as 
it is the intervention behaviour of the two states that are investigated in the rest of the study. 
Chapter three provides a broad description of the two competing international relations theories 
that will provide the analytical lenses employed in the chapters that follow.  
The focus then turns to the two states and their behaviour. In Chapter four, Nigeria’s foreign 
policy passes the revue with a specific focus on its conflict intervention behaviour in Africa. 
Chapter five analyses the role played by Nigeria in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 1998. In 
chapter six, South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour, and its conflict intervention in Africa is 
examined. Chapter seven analyses and evaluates South Africa’s role in the DRC. Finally, 
Chapter eight unifies the theoretical, analytical and case-study materials generated up to that 
point. The behaviour of the two states is assessed and, based on the two theoretical perspectives 
employed, points to the value (and limitations) of an eclectic approach. Chapter nine concludes 
by offering a restatement of the research question; key findings in relation to this question, and a 








As stated in the previous discussion, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the different 
debates surrounding the notion of intervention, in order to prepare the ground for how Nigeria 
and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in Africa can be 
situated conceptually. To achieve this, the chapter discusses the definitional issues related to the 
concept of intervention and its variants, the differences and similarities between these variants, 
particularly the distinguishing features between unilateral and multilateral humanitarian 
intervention, and the legal debates surrounding both types of intervention. Overall, the central 
objective is not to provide an exhaustive discussion of the concept of intervention, but to provide 
a broad interpretive map within which Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict intervention roles in 
Africa can be located and appreciated. The chapter concludes by showing the relevance for 
Africa of the conceptual and behavioural dimensions reviewed. 
 
2.2 Delineating the concept of intervention international politics 
Scholars are divided on a generally-acceptable definition of the concept of intervention, despite 
its being immanent in world politics.49 Terry Nardin defines intervention “as the exercise of 
authority by one state within the jurisdiction of another state but without its permission, but it 
becomes an armed intervention, when the exercise involves use of force”.50 For an armed 
intervention to qualify as humanitarian, Nardin contends that “its aim is to protect innocent 
people who are not nationals of the intervening state from the violence perpetrated or permitted 
by the government of the target state”.51 For Vincent, intervention refers to the “deliberate 
incursion into a state without its consent by some outside agency in order to change the 
                                                          
49 Patman, R.G. (1990). The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge University Press, p.4. 
50 Nardin, T. and Williams, M. (2006). Humanitarian Intervention. NOMOS XLVII. New York University Press, 
p.1. 




functioning, policies, and goals of government, and achieve effects that favour the intervening 
agency”.52 
Some other scholars have avoided the definitional issues associated with the concept of 
intervention, preferring to contribute to the discourse from a behavioural perspective. For 
example, Rosenau sees it as “a form of behaviour which constitutes a sharp break from existing 
forms, particularly, when directed at changing or preserving the structure of a political authority 
in a target society”.53 It is worth noting that Rosenau’s behavioural approach to the 
understanding of intervention has been criticised for having a built-in bias towards the 
examination of military intervention, given its emphasis on “existing patterns of behaviour which 
are directed towards the authority structure of targeted states”.54 
Pointing out the inherent deficiency in Rosenau’s ‘‘biased’’ interpretation, Patman argues that “it 
is not always clear when a conventional mode of behaviour has been broken or whether 
constituted authorities are the target of what Rosenau denotes as unconventional behaviour”.55 
Activities like foreign aid, as he mentions, can be excluded from consideration, although they 
can fall within the boundaries of his definition.56 The arms deal between Czechoslovakia (a 
Soviet ally) and Egypt (a United States ally) in 1955, represents a sharp break with the existing 
norms of behaviour, but whether it was targeted at changing the political authority in Cairo (as it 
eventually did), can only be verified by assessing the motives of Soviets decision-makers—an 
aspect which Rosenau’s definition excludes.57 
Inferable from the foregoing is that, though the concept of intervention lacks an overwhelmingly-
acceptable definition, there is a general consensus on the fact that its enforcement does not 
require the consent of the parties to a conflict, and it often involves the use of force. By way of 
classification, the normative (non-armed) and the physical perspective (armed intervention) have 
been identified as the most useful ways of understanding the concept, and their meanings are 
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often interchangeably used.58 When discussed from the normative or prescriptive perspective, 
emphasis is placed on the non-forcibility of the action on the warring parties, as was the case of 
former President Mandela’s intervention in the Burundian crisis of 2003. 
In other words, under the normative setting, the role of the intervener in a conflict is largely 
persuasive and mediatory, and the currency of negotiation or bargaining power is the amount of 
soft power the intervener wields. On the other hand, a physical or armed intervention, occurs 
when “party “C” (Nigeria in the case of its intervention in Sierra Leone) engages in a conflict 
between opposing parties “A” (Revolutionary United Front led by Foday Sankoh) and “B” (the 
government of Sierra Leone)”.59Furthermore, and as Lieblich contends, “whenever a state 
engages parties to an internal armed conflict, using forcible or non-forcible measures, legally or 
illegally, such a state is believed to have intervened physically in the conflict”.60  
Oftentimes, approval for this class of intervention requires approval of a supra-national authority 
(UN). However, there are instances when the concept can assume a different connotation, 
particularly when it is perceived by the international community as an “unlawful and coercive 
interference or encroachment on the territorial integrity or internal political affairs of another 
state”.61 A case in point was Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda to oust Idi Amin in April 1979. The 
other issue linked to intervention, as Damrosch argues, is that it is difficult to establish if the 
intervention (when it does take place) is relatively less acute when executed under the 
instrumentality of forcible intervention, as compared to when carried out under the daunting 
challenge associated with non-forcible intervention.62 
This, according to Lieblich, is because “a physical intervention is mainly identified by the fact 
that it breaks significantly from the status quo; and military interventions are the most dramatic 
and clear-cut departures from existing patterns.”63 This suggests that interventions can indeed 
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occur without the prerequisite backing or consent of the affected state or that of the international 
community, as in the case of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Kosovo in 1999. It 
is imperative to note that for an intervention (armed or non-armed) to occur, there must be the 
existence of an intra-state civil strife,64 or a violent dispute where the ensuing violence occurs 
primarily within the boundaries of a single state”.65 
These types of conflict, according to Falk, often erupt in the form of “sustained, large scale 
violence between two or more factions, seeking to challenge in whole or in part, the maintenance 
of governmental authority in a particular state”.66 Notably, however, there is a caveat attached to 
the definition of armed conflicts, particularly the issue of what does not constitute an internal 
armed conflict. According to Article 1(2) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 
(Additional Protocol II),67 which views the concept as a non-internal armed conflict, issues such 
as internal disturbances, riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar 
nature, do not necessarily constitute an internal armed conflict because these types of crises are 
easily resolvable once the underlying problems have been addressed and, are as such, 
temporary.68 
A third perspective offers us some criteria that be must be fulfilled before an action can be 
termed as an intervention. The first argues that an intervention situation exists when an actor 
responds to an intervention stimulus. The second contends that when conflict develops between 
the units in a bifurcated actor, and creates a potential transformation, intervention has occurred. 
The third claims that when a party maintains a relationship with one side of a bifurcated actor, 
intervention has occurred, just as maintaining a relationship with both sides of a bifurcated actor, 
                                                          
64 Ibid., p.339.  
65 Brown, M.E. (1996). “Introduction”. In Brown, M.E. (Ed.) The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p.3. 
66 Falk, R.A. (1993). “Introduction”. In Damrosch, L.F.  (Ed.) Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in 
Internal Conflicts. Council on Foreign Relations Press: New York, Pp.4-5. 
67 See the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the protection of victims of Non Internal Armed 
Conflict (Protocol II), as amended on June 8, 1977.  
68 Falk, R.A. (1971). “Introduction”. In Falk, R.A. (Ed.) The International Law of Civil War. Baltimore and London: 




is seen as a non-intervention response.69 It is noteworthy also that Little’s definition has been 
criticised for being “too narrow and too broad”.70 
As Patman comments, the linkage of the act of intervention to conflicts within a bifurcated target 
state as argued by Richard Little, makes the definition too narrow, because activities such as the 
Israeli-French-British operation against Egypt in 1956, would not be considered as an 
intervention, as Egypt was not a bifurcated actor at that time.71 Little’s criteria has equally been 
considered “too broad” because it fails to distinguish between interventionary behaviours from 
other forms of international action, and couches intervention in terms of response, thus leading 
us to ask: what type of “response” can be considered interventionary?72 These definitional 
debates notwithstanding, scholars are unanimous that there are features peculiar to the discourse 
on intervention, regardless of one’s point of view. These include: 
1. If a state (for example, Nigeria or South Africa) exercises authority in the affairs of 
another, it wants to achieve some political, moral or legal objective(s); 
2. The power relationship between the intervening state and the target society is perceived 
to be unequal. The intervener believes its power to be superior to that of the object of the 
intervention, or displays a paternalistic attitude towards the other; 
3. Intervention represents a clear departure from the existing pattern of relations both for the 
intervener, and the target society; 
4. From the perspective of the intervener, intervention is intended to be limited in scope and 
time; 
5. An external intervention can occur with or without a conflict within the target state; 
6. The objective of the intervener is often not connected with changing or preserving the 
structure of the political authority in the target society, and its aspiration may or may not 
involve the use of force, and lastly; 
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7. The dividing line between intervention and non-intervention is not marked by an 
objective criterion; the difference thus rests on intention.73 
The forgoing, when related to Nigeria and South Africa’s intervention role in Sierra Leone and 
the DRC, leads us to the following conclusions. First, Nigeria and South Africa’s intervention in 
these conflict episodes was meant to achieve a combination of political and legal objectives 
which we shall explore further in chapter five and seven respectively. Second, Nigeria and South 
Africa’s military and economic might were far superior to that of the RUF in Sierra Leone, and 
that of the M23 and other rebel groups in eastern DRC. Third, both interventions marked a clear 
departure from the foreign policy behaviour of Nigeria and South Africa towards Sierra Leone 
and the DRC. Lastly, both interventions involved the use of force, were limited in scope and, 
from both interveners’ point of view, had a clear exit strategy.  
Against the background of these features, it is instructive to note that interventions do not just 
happen; there must be a motive and an opportunity to do so.74 These motives are shaped by a 
broad range of interests premised along the lines of domestic and external levels.75 At the 
domestic level are issues such as defence, ideological and economic interests.76 The defence 
focuses on the need to protect the state from any conceivable physical aggression from the 
outside. The ideological bothers on the preservation of set of values which the people of a state 
share, while the economic interest stems from the desire of a state to acquire or preserve access 
to resources.77 At the external level, an intervention may be motivated by a strategic or world-
order interest, particularly the need to maintain a state’s security in the context of the global 
distribution of power, and by regional interests such as concern for contiguous areas perceived as 
having a bearing on a state’s well-being.78 
Structural realists attribute this motivation for intervention to the concept of the 3s—Statism, 
Self-help, and Survival.79 However, some legal requirements are expected to be fulfilled before 
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an intervention can occur.80 These are: (1) the possession of a recognisable power—the ability to 
affect the will and mind of others irrespective of their wishes,81 as evident for example in 
Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone (1991) and South Africa’s in the DRC (1997). (2) The 
dependency factor shows the reliance of the target state on the intervening state, and its 
possession gives some form of psychological impetus for the intervening state,82 as witnessed 
during South Africa’s invasion of Lesotho in 1998. (3) The existence of a political crisis 
categorised along overt and latent lines in the target state.83 
By overt crisis, we mean a situation where “rival political forces have arisen and are able to use 
violence,”84 without being strong enough, individually, to give the government decisive support 
or to overthrow it.85 Under such scenarios, legitimate authority is absent, and force becomes the 
norm for implementing decisions.86 The Sierra Leone government under Momoh in 1991 is a 
classic example in this regard. Latent crisis, on the other hand, refers to a situation where a 
political or social minority rules in a way detestable to the mass populace, but are too weak to 
effect a change of government, as evident in South Vietnam in 1959.87 
Our last point of consideration is the legitimacy of the intervener. Policymakers, according to 
Patman, “may be inclined towards intervention if they believe it would be popularly received in 
the target society”.88 However, it has been noted that there are a few factors which may equally 
affect the reputation on the part of the intervener. These are: (1) [if there is] a history of existing 
cultural, religious, ethnic or ideological links between the intervener and the intervened, such 
relationship or intervention may be deemed “special” by the intervener. (2) A belief on the part 
of the intervener that the ruling government in the target society is unpopular may serve as 
further motivation for intervention, and (3) where there is a perception of an identity of interests 
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between the intervener and then target state, the intervener may view its role as that of a messiah 
or “liberator”.89 
 
2.3 Conceptualising humanitarian intervention in international politics 
The debate on humanitarian intervention, as Arbour contends, began to crystallise in the 1970s 
when humanitarian reasons were either offered or assumed as part of the rationale for the 
intervention of India in East Pakistan (1971), Vietnam in Kampuchea (1978) and Tanzania in 
Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin (1979), as well as for the French government’s support for the 
coup against Jean-Be´del Bokassa in Central Africa Republic (1979).90 The concept of 
humanitarian intervention is dependent on the existence of the obligations erga omnes partes, 
i.e., the obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole.91 For example, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that “such obligations derive from the outlawing of acts 
of aggression, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human 
person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination”.92 
It is in the event of material breaches of such obligations that every other state may lawfully 
consider itself legally injured and entitled to resort to counter-measures against the perpetrator. 
By definition, humanitarian intervention refers to ‘‘the threat or use of force across state borders 
by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of 
the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission 
of the state within whose territory force is applied”.93 Others define it as “a short-term initiative, 
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aimed only at stopping massive and on-going human rights violations. Once the violations cease, 
it is no longer justified”.94  
Though this definition does not embrace regime change (as this should not be the central 
objective of humanitarian intervention), some observers have noted that “it would make no sense 
to invade a state which is committing serious crimes against its people, only to pull out and leave 
the oppressive government to finish the job”.95 At the same time, as they argue, “humanitarian 
intervention must be clearly distinguished from intervention in the name of democracy, 
sometimes called pro-democratic intervention”.96 Obvious from both definitions is that the 
humanitarian-intervention debate in IR raises the tension between ethics and politics, thus 
subjecting the narrative to a two-sided discussion among scholars.97 
While proponents of humanitarian intervention view it as a very potent force capable of restoring 
human dignity, the opposing school of thought sees it as a concept which violates the principle of 
the legal sovereignty of independent states.98 Leading the arguments for proponents of 
humanitarian intervention is Holzgrefe, who defines the concept as “the threat or use of force 
across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and 
grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, 
without the permission of the state in whose territory force is been applied”.99 
Teson, lending support to Holzgrefes’ argument for the necessity of humanitarian intervention in 
times of crisis, portrays it as the “proportionate international use or threat of military force, 
undertaken in principle by a liberal government or alliance, aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy, 
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welcomed by the victims, and consistent with the doctrine of double effect”.100 In the opinion of 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, the concept of intervention should encompass both “forcible” and 
“non-forcible” humanitarian interventions.101 And it must be constrained to the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the civilian population, and where inevitable, without the blessings of 
United Nations (UN) or the consent of the targeted government.102 
The argument surrounding the legal basis for humanitarian intervention is defined along the 
camps of the “Restrictionists” and “Counter-restrictionists”.103 The Restrictionists, in justifying 
their stance against the notion, anchor their arguments on the Westphalian principle of 
sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention.104 Making allusions to Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, they argue that military humanitarian intervention is bound to be illegal since the 
Charter forbids interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state.105 Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter states that “all members shall refrain in the international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”.106 
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The Restrictionists premise their argument on the provisions of Article 2(7) which states that 
“nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”.107 Therefore, they 
argue, the conferment and recognition of legal sovereignty – that is, the right to act as final law-
giver in a territory and for a specific population - must be respected. Restrictionists stress the 
importance of the preservation of the international legal order established by the Charter which 
avers that: 
Whatever may be the idealistic rhetoric by which military actions are justified, the system of norms 
ensuring the peaceful coexistence among nations-what has been known essentially as the “international rule 
of law”-will not only be gradually undermined but will finally collapse if an equivalent to the old jus ad 
bellum is introduced into international relations. This fact cannot be denied, whether the principle is 
introduced under the pretext of “crisis response operations”, or of outright “humanitarian intervention”.108 
They contend that “legalizing humanitarian intervention, without Security Council authorization, 
would only result in the weakening of the restraints on the recourse to force and fragmentation 
and regionalization of the international security system”.109 Therefore, any interference in the 
internal affairs of the sovereign state in the name of “humanitarianism,” according to the 
Restrictionists, is an affront on the UN Charter. Humanitarian intervention, on the basis of all 
available definitions, as the Restrictionists argue, “would be an instrument wide open to abuse, a 
rule allowing humanitarian intervention is a general license to vigilantes and opportunists to 
resort to hegemonic intervention”.110 
Admittedly, the issue of abuse and the often selective nature of humanitarian intervention are 
capable of damaging the fragile issue of legality and legitimacy; however, this should not deter 
the international community from enforcing humanitarian intervention when a government 
commits grave atrocities against its own citizens. As Wheeler and Bellamy ask—what would 
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happen if governments use “sovereignty as a license to kill?”111 It is the answer to this question 
that has motivated the “Counter-restrictionists” support for humanitarian intervention.  
They argue that the UN Charter does not ban the use of force in cases where a state abuses 
human rights on a massive scale. And that where a tyrant “should inflict upon his subjects such a 
treatment as no one is warranted in inflicting,” other states may exercise a right of humanitarian 
intervention”.112 Teson argues that the belief that international law in general bars the use of 
force should not deter the international community from intervening in situations where it is 
proven that serious violations of international law, such as genocide and crimes against 
humanity, have occurred.113 Teson further notes that, regardless of whatever action we take or 
tolerate in the face of the violation of some fundamental rule of international law, we are indeed 
left with only two choices: “we either intervene or put an end to the massacres, or we abstain 
from intervening, in which case we will be tolerating the violation by other states of the general 
prohibition of gross human rights abuses”.114  
It is the need to prevent the occurrence of this situation that often motivates the support of 
Counter-restrictionists for the inevitability of military intervention in the face of glaring human 
rights violations. Therefore, and as Stone contends, “Article 2(4) does not exclusively forbid the 
threat or use of force simpliciter; except when directed against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state.115 Stone adds that so long as a “genuine humanitarian intervention 
does not result in territorial conquest or political subjection; it may amount to a distortion of facts 
to argue that humanitarian intervention is prohibited by article 2(4)”.116  
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This explains Murphy’s definition of humanitarian intervention as “the threat or use of force 
across state borders by a state or group of states to end widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental rights of civilians”.117 When a legal basis is used as a criterion for distinction, there 
are two basic types of humanitarian intervention, multilateral and unilateral.118 Multilateral 
humanitarian intervention is broader in scope and operations, and it is authorised by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter to deal with conflicts that could potentially result in 
humanitarian catastrophes or genocide.119 To provide a mandate for such interventions, the 
Security Council classifies humanitarian catastrophes as a “threat to the peace,” pursuant to 
Article 39 of the Charter.120 Such multilateral interventions include those of the UN in Somalia 
(1992), Haiti (1994), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), and in DRC (1999).  
On the other hand, unilateral humanitarian intervention also covers situations in which more than 
one state is involved in the use of force, except that such interventionary acts often lack the 
backing of United Nations Security Council (UNSC).121 Examples of this type of intervention 
are the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia (1990-91) and Sierra Leone (1991-1998), the United 
States’ operations in Iraq (1991), and the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO). It is worth mentioning that there are a number of similar and 
distinguishing features between multilateral and unilateral interventions.  
A common denominator for both is the use of military force, and the fact that the intervening 
force(s) is/are usually more than one state, while the key to distinguishing between them lies in 
the approving or sanctioning authority. For an intervention to be considered multilateral, its 
mandate, scope and operation must be backed by the UN through a UNSC resolution, but a 
unilateral intervention does not necessarily need the approval of the UNSC, as the intervening 
force(s) do so in their capacity as members of a sub-regional bloc, or in some cases, as interested 
state-actors.   
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It is noteworthy that, for the rest of the study, our assessment of Nigeria and South Africa’s 
intervention role in conflicts shall be viewed from the lenses of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention, given that both interventions lacked the backing of UNSC, albeit, under the concept 
of peacekeeping. It is pertinent to mention however that there are controversies surrounding the 
concept of humanitarian intervention, most notably, issues surrounding the legality and illegality 
of such interventions. Here, five opinions exist. The first, according to Rogers, is that unilateral 
humanitarian intervention finds no support in current international law.122  
According to this view, the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter must be 
interpreted restrictively as allowing no exceptions except the right of self-defence according to 
Article 51 of the Charter, together with Security Council actions under Chapter VII.123 The 
opponents of this intervention equate its legalisation to the “opening of a Pandora Box”.124 They 
make reference to the ICJ’s half-century-old dicta from the “Corfu Channel case”,125 and 
contend that intervention would be reserved for the most powerful states.126 They further warn 
against the danger of abuse of the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention, and are sceptical 
about any use of force invoking humanitarian reasons.127 And that no authority for unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is found in customary international law either, because Article 2(4) of 
                                                          
122 Rogers, A.P.V. (2004). “Humanitarian Intervention and International Law”. Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy, 27(3), Pp.725-729. 
123 Chesterman, S. (2001). Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, xxviii. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
124 Köchler, H. (2001). “The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics: Is the 
Revival of the Doctrine of “Just War” Compatible with the International Rule of Law?” International progress 
Organization Studies in International Relations, XXVI. Vienna, p.305, 
125 On 22 October 1946 in the Corfu Strait, two British destroyers struck mines in Albanian waters and suffered 
damage, including serious loss of life. On 22 May 1947, the Government of the United Kingdom filed an application 
instituting proceedings against the Government of the People's Republic of Albania seeking a decision to the effect 
that the Albanian Government was internationally responsible for the consequences of the incident and must make 
reparation or pay compensation. Albania, on its part had submitted a counter-claim against the United Kingdom for 
having violated Albanian territorial waters. On 9 April 1949, the Court found that Albania was responsible for the 
explosions and for the resulting damage and loss of human life suffered by the United Kingdom. 
126 Kritsiotis, D. (1998). “Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention”. Michigan Journal of 
International Law, Volume 19(4), Pp. 1005-1021. 
127 Valek, P. (2005). “Is Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Compatible with the U.N. Charter?” Michigan 




the Charter replaced all existing customary international rules regulating the use of force and has 
not been modified by any new customary international rule.128 
The second opinion, according to Orford, holds that unilateral humanitarian intervention is 
“illegal but legitimate,” given the unique circumstances of a particular humanitarian 
catastrophe.129 And it is the inevitability of situations where the international community must 
act outside positive law in ways that are legitimate because of the demands of morality and 
justice.130 This school of thought premises their arguments on justice, morality, or necessity.131 
They ask: If we start to create exceptions, would we really be able to talk about something like 
the international rule of law?132 Nevertheless, as Valek notes, the approach remains one of the 
possible ways of resolving the legal dilemma between human rights protection and the Charters’ 
rules on the use of force.133 
The third opinion hinges the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention on the assumption 
that customary international rules allowing self-help survived the Charter and exists in parallel 
with it, and that treaty-law and customary international law “retain a separate existence”.134 
Scholars have however described this theory as “not very convincing”.135 They note that “all 
customary international law regulating the use of force in contradiction with Article 2(4) and 
other Charter provisions ceased to exist after the Charter had been adopted”,136 and that 
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unilateral humanitarian intervention was clearly part of the pre-Charter customary international 
law.137 
The fourth opinion deploys customary international law to defend the legality of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, albeit, on a new emerging rule.138 It argues that “in theory, the 
Charter could be changed by a new rule of customary international law which conforms to the 
general maxim of lex posterior derodat priori”.139 As developed by Wallace, such a rule derives 
its legal basis from the possession of two elements: (i) a material (state practice) and (ii) 
psychological (opinio juris).140 The notion that unilateral humanitarian intervention is legal when 
viewed from the material sense holds that such acts can take place as long as the underlying 
motive is purely humanitarian. 
However, in the history of the 20th century, it is very hard to find any undisputed case of 
unilateral intervention with purely humanitarian objectives.141 The 1999 Kosovo intervention, 
the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 
1978, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1979, Nigeria’s intervention in Chad in 1980, and 
South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho in 1998, among others, remind us of instances where 
objectives, other than humanitarian grounds, served as key motivations. Like material element, 
scholars have noted that “opinio juris is even harder to prove”,142 because no state would accept 
the argument that its affairs could be subjected to the intervention of another state legally or 
illegally.  
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The last legal opinion on unilateral humanitarian intervention claims that this type of 
intervention is compatible with Article 2(4) of the Charter, because such intervention does not 
violate the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, since its objective is to 
stop the atrocities and not to annex part of the state’s territory or create a dependent colonial 
government.143 They admit that it is true that the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention 
could be abused. Nevertheless, any right can be abused. A very good example, as they note, is 
the right of self-defence, which was subject to abuses by states in the last century. They ask:  is 
the possibility of abuse a reason for abolishing this right?144 
Deducible from the foregoing is that the legality of the concept of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention is complicated and controversial, and it raises a number of questions. First is the 
question of whether a unilateral humanitarian intervention can occur without a regime change 
since the fundamental essence of intervening is to terminate widespread atrocities and possible 
genocide. Second, in the eventuality of a regime change, would the action not lead to a violation 
of the territorial integrity or the political independence of the target state? 
In this context, I would argue that the possibility or otherwise of a regime change in the event of 
a unilateral humanitarian intervention is dependent on the party committing the perceived 
atrocities. If the human right crimes are being perpetrated by a government (Party A) against its 
people, as it was the case in Uganda in 1978, regime change would at some point feature in the 
game plan of the intervening force(s). Therefore, since every regime change creates a power 
vacuum, a temporary authority has to be installed to take over the control of government, and for 
this authority to succeed; it needs the support of the intervening force(s). In effect, it is the 
provision of this support that ultimately leads to the loss of territorial integrity and/or the 
political independence of the target state, as found in Iraq in 2003.  
To mitigate widespread criticism that accompanies regime change, and demonstrate to the 
international community that unilateral humanitarian intervention is not a violation of the 
international law of non-interference, or at least, a clear-cut case of non-humanitarian use of 
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force, unilateral interveners point to the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine.145 The R2P 
doctrine advocates possible remedies, including military intervention, to avoid or to put an end to 
massive violations of human rights committed by a state towards its own citizens or in situations 
where state authorities critically lack effectiveness.146  
The doctrine argues that any wait for states’ consent to a limitation to their sovereignty while 
massacres occur, without being able to intervene, has clearly appeared morally unsatisfactory.147 
And it is believed to be in response to the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s question: 
“if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica–to gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
affect every precept of our common humanity?”148 
Termed the 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS), the report addresses the question of possible remedies to avoid massacres in civil wars, 
insurrections, acts of state repression and failed states by first changing the nominal label of the 
problem, namely by posing the question in terms of responsibility to protect rather than in terms 
of humanitarian intervention.149 The report further argues (in para. 2.4) that the language of past 
debates arguing for or against a “right to intervene” by one state on the territory of another state 
is out dated and unhelpful”.150  
The intention of the ICISS (as contained in para. 6.17) was to promote – and hence to do so as 
effectively as possible – a new international law regime capable of solving a no-longer evadable 
problem.151 The reports’ central idea is that “in today’s globalized world, sovereignty as control 
(typical of the so-called Westphalian system), must give way to sovereignty as responsibility, 
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both external towards other states, and internal towards citizens,  as a result of the dramatically 
growing impact of international norms on human rights, and the concept of human security.152 
As it is the case with other arguments against unilateral humanitarian intervention, critics have 
argued that the “R2P doctrine” suffers from a number of deficiencies.153 As they note, “the 
opposition between control and responsibility is neither clear, nor does it appear coherent within 
the report, and it underscores in various points that sovereignty (as control) is still necessary 
inter alia to respect and ensure respect for human rights.154 Second, they oppose the reports’ 
claim (in para. 1.34) that “a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be 
achieved through the cooperation of effective states, confident of their place in the world, than in 
an environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities, and its 
emphasis on the need for sovereignty to be limited”.155  
They contend that “state sovereignty has always been limited in one way or another, the problem 
being to determine what different and new limits it has today rather than theoretically contrasting 
an old concept to another which is supposed to reach more consensus”.156 Third, they fault the 
reports’ submission (in para. 2.27) that there is a large and accumulating body of law and 
practice which supports the notion that whatever form the exercise of that responsibility may 
take, members of the broad community of states do have a responsibility to protect both their 
own citizens and those of other states as well.157 
Opponents of the R2P doctrine argue that “clearly, if no problems arise in respect of existing 
treaty norms on human rights and international humanitarian law, the appeal to natural law can 
hardly go unnoticed and raise doubts, because States are not inclined to accept natural law as a 
source of international law”.158 Lastly, they contest the claim made by the R2P doctrine that “the 
new concept of sovereignty, understood more as responsibility than control, gives rise to three 
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types of responsibility, or tasks or duties—of both individual states and the international 
community as a whole: the responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild”.159 
As a response, they argue that “the duty to protect is in the first place vested with the state in 
whose territory the violation of human rights is occurring, and that it is only when this state 
proves unable or unwilling to discharge the duty to prevent that the international community’s 
duty to react as a whole would set off”.160 They submit that “this duty should preferably be 
discharged by peaceful measures, ranging from early warning mechanisms through development 
assistance to economic sanctions, but can ultimately also take the form of military 
intervention”.161 In sum, whichever side  the argument for unilateral intervention is examined 
from, it appears there will be no consensus on the justifiability or otherwise for humanitarian 
intervention in general, and unilateral intervention in particular. Rather, it is the desirability, 
relevance, degree of acceptability, and the extent of its enforceability in the target state that 
determines the legitimacy or otherwise of humanitarian intervention. 
In Africa, the legal basis justifying the necessity for intervention in conflicts is embedded in 
Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000). This Act authorises the AU to 
“intervene in a member state, pursuant to the decision of its Assembly of Heads of State and 
Heads of Government in situations where ‘grave atrocities’, such as, war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity are being committed against the citizens”.162 By way of classification, 
diplomatic and military interventions have been noted as the two most common types of 
intervention.163  
While the former refers to the use of other persuasive tools in negotiating for peace among 
warring parties as seen in former President Mandela’s peace efforts in Burundi in 2003, and that 
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of former President Obasanjo in Sao Tome and Principe in 2003,164 the latter involves the actual 
deployment of military troops as peacekeepers, as Nigeria and South Africa did in Sierra Leone 
(1991-1998) and the DRC (1997 and 2005) respectively. Peacekeeping refers to the deployment 
of military and sometimes civilian personnel under international command and control, usually 
after a ceasefire has been achieved and with the consent of the parties. Others view the concept 
as a form of conflict control that restores and maintains peace.165  
Another school of thought refers to the concept as a host of third-party interventions and actions, 
which ranges from preventative diplomacy to humanitarian assistance and military enforcement 
of agreements or UN mandates.166 By unilateral humanitarian intervention, this study refers to 
Nigeria and South Africa’s intervention acts under the auspices of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) in the case of Nigeria in Sierra Leone, and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), in the case of South Africa in the DRC. 
It is imperative to note that the African continent has a long history of being anti-intervention, 
given its experience with colonialism and the hard-fought independence process most of its 
states went through.  Scholars have in fact noted that “Africa, after an initial period of political 
quarrelling over the concept of unity, African governments emerged as the most enthusiastic 
supporters of the ‘pluralist’ conception of international society—that is, a society of sovereign 
states”.167 Independence, as Mayall observes, was as seen as an end in itself; it was, therefore, 
self-evident that African rights would be better protected under indigenous than under alien 
and/or racist rule, and, one of the main reasons for establishing the OAU in 1963, was to reduce 
the vulnerability of African states to external intervention.168 
Africa’s principled commitment to territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs 
was buttressed by the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU's) adoption in1964 of the principle 
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of uti possidetis, ita possideatis: ‘‘as you possess so you may possess’’.169 Despite the maxim’s 
Latin American origin, and dating back to the 19th century, African states revived this principle 
in the 20th century, before it was accepted by the international community as a whole in the 
efforts to confine self-determination to European decolonisation and deny the legitimacy of 
secession. Nonetheless, scholars have argued that there are at least four reasons Africa has been, 
and seems likely to continue to be the testing ground for the theory and practice of humanitarian 
intervention.170  
The first, Africa has accounted for at least 30 civil wars since 1970, with the vast majority of 
them intra-state in origin.171 In 1996 alone, a year in which the discussion on humanitarian 
intervention was particularly pertinent, 14 of the 53 (now 54) countries of Africa were afflicted 
by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and 
resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons.172 Second, and as 
Mayall states, “in many parts of the continent, the state itself is in crisis. Most African states are 
extremely fragile, partly because control of state institutions is regarded as a prize in a ferocious 
competition, where the stakes are high and the players employ ruthless methods”.173  
The experiences of Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and at present, South Sudan, bear witness to 
this question of state fragility in Africa, and why proponents of humanitarian intervention are 
winning the argument in Africa. Third, the disturbing absence of fit between Western interests 
and African needs after the cold war ended meant that the majority of sub-Sahara African 
countries featured less in the geostrategic priorities of the West; despite the support its leaders 
gave to international stability.174 This apathy towards Africa compelled local powers to be more 
interested in containing the spillover of local conflicts, resulting in the enactment of Article 4(h) 
by the African Union to contain most of these spillovers.175 
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The enactment of Article 4(h) meant that the African Union can (and has been called upon) to 
intervene “in respect of grave crises namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity’’, while Article 4(j) gives the member-states the “right to request intervention from the 
Union in order to restore peace and stability”.176 This is evident in the AU’s intervention role in 
the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 1995 and African-led Intervention Support in Mali 
(AFISMA) in 2013. Finally, the absence of strong external interest meant that Africa remains a 
testing ground for the evolving theory and practice of humanitarian intervention, and these 
efforts will continue to be dominated by the UN, and sub-regional institutions, such as 
ECOWAS and the SADC.177 In the chapters that follow, particularly from chapters’ four to 
seven, we will explore the extent to which Nigeria and South Africa discharged these self-
imposed interventionary responsibilities, by focusing on both countries’ foreign policy behaviour 





This chapter has examined the essential issues embedded in the concept of intervention. In 
particular, the key focus has been on the distinguishing characteristics between the two main 
types of intervention in international politics: unilateral and humanitarian. To achieve this, the 
chapter reviewed the definitional issues, its various classifications, and the legal and moral 
debates surrounding the intervention debate. As the literature review on the concept has shown, 
the chapter finds that Nigeria and South Africa’s intervention in Sierra Leone (1991-1998) and 
the DRC (1997-2005), can be contextualised within the framework of unilateral intervention. In 
the succeeding chapter, a broad description of structural realism and social constructivism, two 
competing IR approaches which serves as the analytical lenses for our assessment of Nigeria and 
South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in Africa is in focus. 
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As highlighted in the introductory chapter, the nature and significance of Nigeria and South 
Africa’s conflict intervention roles in Africa are relatively underexplored. To the extent that the 
literature pays attention to these roles, a limited theoretical palette is employed. To rectify this, 
this thesis deliberately employs more than one theoretical perspective to highlight a wider variety 
of perspectives on a complex phenomenon and tries to determine the relative merits of the 
different theoretical approaches employed. As the term implies, different “perspectives” allow 
the analyst, on the one hand, to highlight and profile a variety of dimensions that may remain 
obscure if only one “view” is explored. On the other hand, the term “perspective” also implies a 
view from a specific point of observation.  
In the case of foreign policy analysis, theoretical constructs provide relevant points of 
observation. It is the purpose of this chapter to present the main features of the two theoretical 
perspectives presented in the introduction, to be particularly relevant to the study of Nigeria and 
South Africa’s respective policies towards the rest of Africa—structural realism and social 
constructivism. Structural realism and social constructivism both have a long and distinguished 
pedigree, and it is impossible exhaustively to treat both in a short chapter like this. Rather than 
focusing on the genealogy of these theories, this chapter focuses on their main analytical 
contributions, highlighting their potential contribution to understanding the variety of 
constituents of foreign policy behaviour in general, and conflict intervention in particular.  
The central theme that emerges in the pages that follow is how the two perspectives deal with 
crucial concepts: national interests, relative gains, and national identity. To pre-empt the 
discussion that follows, structural realism emphasises that the relative position a state occupies in 
structural relationships that are primarily determined by the distribution of material power 
resources, determines the state’s national interests and role conceptions. It could be inferred that 




“national interests” to a secondary, derivative position. Pride of place in the explanatory stakes 
goes to “identity”; that is, a set of shared meanings that are socially-constructed within a society 
as well as in interactions that transcend national borders.  
In their own right, these shared meanings form structural constraints on, and provide incentives 
for action, particularly the identification and articulation of national interests. Ontologically 
speaking, meaning (identity) precedes interests. Thus, while social constructivism shares a focus 
with structural realism on the structural determinants of behaviour, the two perspectives differ 
diametrically about the nature and constituents of the relative structures. This chapter’s major 
focus is to present the major concepts and arguments related to structural realism and social 
constructivism, with a view to setting the stage for the examination (in chapter 8) of the extent to 
which their applications, as IR approaches, explain Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict 
intervention roles and foreign policy behaviour in Africa. 
 
3.2 Structural Realism 
Historically, realism is not a theory that can be defined by an explicit set of assumptions and 
propositions.178 While some view it as a general orientation and philosophical disposition179, to 
others, it is a set of normative emphases which shapes theory.180 Another school of thought views 
it as an attitude of the mind with a distinctive and recognisable flavour.181 As such, it remains one 
of the most relevant theories in explaining the nature of the international system and the 
behaviour of significant actors in it.182 Its defenders claim that realism views the world from an 
empirical point of view, rather than from a normative context. It claims to see the world the way 
it is and not how it should be.183 According to Jackson and Sorensen, realism is cynical in nature 
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owing to the fact that it emphasises the recurrent patterns of power politics, as manifested by 
recurring conflicts, rivalries and wars.184 
Taliaferro et al. have identified three first principles and core assumptions of realism as a general 
approach in politics.185 First is the notion that human beings cannot survive as individuals, but 
rather as members of larger groups that command their loyalty and provide some measure of 
security from external enemies.186 Tribalism, as they argue, remains an immutable fact of 
political and social life, thus all variants of realism are inherently group-centric.187 The second 
assumption is that politics is a perpetual struggle among self-interested groups under conditions 
of general scarcity and uncertainty. These scarce commodities, as they note, could be over 
material capabilities, or social resources, such as prestige and status.188 This implies that groups 
face pervasive uncertainty about one another’s present and future intentions.189  
The third assumption is that power is a necessary requirement for any group to secure its goals, 
regardless of whether those goals are universal domination or simply self-preservation.190 
Structural Realism in IR applies these three general ideas to the world of international politics, 
which by definition it sees as anarchic, that is, without effective centralised power. For structural 
realists, the state represents the most important political reference point. Secondly, and given the 
nature of the international system, states are relatively secure or insecure depending on the actual 
positions that they occupy in the structures formed by the distribution of power resources. This 
implies, thirdly, that decision makers acting on behalf of states are compellingly motivated by a 
desire to maximise the relative power positions of their states.  
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This compulsion to achieve relative power preponderance as a precondition for security does not 
necessarily mean, as classical Realists assumed, that people are motivated by what Morgenthau 
referred to as animus dominandi,191 the desire for power per se. What motivates decision makers, 
a structural realist such as Kenneth Waltz would argue, are the incentives and constraints that 
flow from their state’s relative position within international (and regional) complexes of power. 
In his contribution to realism, Morgenthau presents the state as a collective reflection of political 
man’s lust for power and the unit which carries out its impulses at the international stage.192 The 
state, according to Morgenthau, is the object and agent pursuing power in international politics 
and, anarchy, “is not the deep cause of power competition but a vital permissive force”.193 
Morgenthau notes that, in a hierarchical order, the pursuit of power would be abolished as and 
will be constrained by a global leviathan.194 To be sure, Morgenthau’s approach has been 
criticised by other schools of thought, particularly the Waltzian school, which calls him “a first 
image theorist”, and criticises his arguments on three accounts.195 
First, Waltz argues that Morgenthau’s account of human nature is entirely hypothetical as it is 
impossible to empirically verify what the true human nature is, thus making the validity of his 
thesis impossible to assess.196 Second, Waltz critiques Morgenthau’s essentialist conception that 
human nature is problematic, for a constant cannot explain variation.197 Put differently, and as 
Waltz argues, accepting Morgenthau’s claim would mean accepting that “if human nature was 
the cause of war in 1914, it was by the same token, the cause of peace in 1910”.198  Lastly, Waltz 
contests Morgenthau’s reductionist attempt to explain the whole by the sum of its parts, and 
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argues that reductionism is inadequate in explaining why the patterns of international politics 
constantly reoccur, even though the actors and their character are in a constant change199 
Waltz, in his theoretical response to Morgenthau’s work, posits that the anarchical international 
system inevitably leads to the logic of self-help and power politics, and when states struggle for 
power, they are simply following the dictates of the international system in order to survive in an 
international order where there is no global leviathan to offer them protection.200 Evolving from 
Waltz’ thesis is an attempt to restrict himself to the systemic level and avoid reductionism, but 
this attempt in itself is not without shortcomings given his theory’s dependence on the unit-level 
in order to function. As some scholars note, “Waltzian structuralism presupposes state 
preferences, given that international anarchy cannot possibly impel states to struggle for power if 
they do not share any ambitions.201  
It seems Waltz is well aware of this point, hence his interference at the second level of analysis 
by assuming that states pursue strategies for survival, in order to operationalise his theory.202 
Waltz’ argues further that to structural realists, “ideology, form of government, peacefulness, or 
bellicosity” matters less in the scheme of things”, what does, is the ‘distribution of power and 
capabilities” as a state can choose to intervene in a conflict in furtherance of its pursuit for 
relative power. Like other variants of realism, structural realism holds a number of assumptions. 
First, that politics is a perpetual struggle for power among different states for material power and 
security in a world of scarce resources, and pervasive uncertainties.203  
Second, anarchy is seen as the absence of a universal sovereign or worldwide government, and it 
is the permissive cause of international conflict. Lastly, systemic forces create incentives for all 
states to strive for greater efficiency in providing security for themselves.204 Structural realism 
emphasises the role of state actors in foreign policy-making, particularly, how domestic 
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considerations shape a state’s behaviour, and leads to outcomes at the system level.  Structural 
realists believe that the systemic account of world politics as contained in structural realism is 
incomplete and supplementing the approach with other unit level variables such as how power is 
perceived and how leadership is exercised is crucial to understanding the workings of the 
international system.205 
Classical (human-nature) and neo-classical (structural) realism are the two main types of realism 
prevalent in modern international relations discourses. Embedded in classical realism is the 
assumption that politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature and 
that international politics can be best understood when, viewed from the perspective of interests, 
defined in terms of power.206 On the other hand, neoclassical realism argues that the scope and 
ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven by its relative material power, and that systemic 
pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ 
perceptions and state actions.207 By way of distinction, scholars contend that there are at least 
four distinguishing features between classical and neoclassical realism.208 
First, while classical realism locate the roots of international conflict and war in an imperfect 
human nature, neoclassical realism maintain that its deep causes are found in the anarchic 
international system.209 Second, the state is ontologically superior to the system in classical 
realism, in contrast to neoclassical realism, allowing more space for agency in the former 
approach.210 Third, classical realism differentiates between status-quo powers and revisionist 
powers, while neoclassical realism regards states as unitary actors.211 Lastly, while neoclassical 
realism attempts to construct a more rigorous and scientific approach to the study of international 
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politics, heavily influenced by the behaviourist revolution of the 1960s, classical realism limits 
its analyses to subjective valuations of international relations.212 
According to Powell, the division between two of the most influential approaches to the study of 
international relations theory (neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism) is traceable to 
the importance attached to absolute and relative gains by both schools of thought.213 Neoliberal 
institutionalists focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains 
of others. In other words, neo-liberals claim that “whether cooperation results in a relative gain 
or loss is not very important to a state so long as it brings an absolute gain”.214 By interpretation, 
the “absolute gain” theory measures the total effect, comprising power, security, economic, and 
cultural effects of an action, and is thus indifferent to relative gains, referring to it instead, as a 
non-zero-sum game. In contrast, the structural realist is single-minded in emphasising that what 
matters, ultimately, are “relative gains” and how these affect the balance of power. 
Since international interaction is a zero-sum game, with no recourse to a higher authority, states 
have to compete with each other to increase their own benefits, no matter whether all sides 
involved will be better off collectively. The policy advice that realists thus give is that states 
should be cautious of their collaborators and keep track of relative gains.215 Present allies 
strengthened by greater relative gains, according to realists, might turn out to be enemies in the 
future and the worries of aiding potential foes through cooperation constitute another 
fundamental barrier to cooperation.216 In reality, states always keep an eye on each other, even 
during the honeymoon period of bilateral relations. Thus, in line with this logic, regardless of the 
absolute gains, a relative loss or smaller relative gain (relative to those of the competitors) can be 
regarded as a loss for states.217  
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Structural realism also contends that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the action of 
states,218 because a state can choose to intervene in a conflict based on interests, as seen for 
example, in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Ukraine in 2014, and the invasion of Iraq by the 
United States in 2003. However, a state can also intervene against its own interests, when issues 
such as support for norms and humanitarian intervention, as evident in the US intervention in 
Somalia in 1993. Noteworthy is the fact that structural realism as a framework for understanding 
world politics is characterised by a stiff competition for power mainly among a small number of 
powerful states.  
These competitions could either be for the purpose of creating a hegemonic status for itself, for 
the regulation of the balance of power in the international system, or out of fear or suspicion that 
a state could be attacked by a more powerful state, as we  saw under Hitler’s Nazi Germany, 
Mussolini’s Fascist Italy, and Stalin’s Soviets Union. In structural realism, changes in the 
structure of the system, according to Waltz, are distinct from changes at the unit level, and 
changes in polarity also affect how states provide for their security.219 Significant changes as 
Waltz contends, take place when the number of great powers reduces to two or one and, when 
more than two states rely for their security both on their internal efforts and alliances they may 
make with others.220 Competition in multipolar systems is more complicated than competition in 
bipolar ones because uncertainties about the comparative capabilities of states multiply as 
numbers grow, and estimates of the cohesiveness and strength of coalitions are hard to make. 
Structural realism equally focuses on the objective nature of the international system, and its 
view of a state behaviour from the vantage point of individual states (including national 
attributes, national interests and domestic politics).221 The approach holds that the international 
system is anarchic, although this does not mean the permanent existence of chaos and perpetual 
conflict, but the absence of permanent or universal authority in the international system 
                                                          
218 Morgenthau, H. (1954). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (2nd edition.). New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, p.9.  
219 Waltz, K. (2000). “Structural Realism after the Cold War”. International Security, 25(1), p.5. 
220 Ibid., p.5. 
221 Morgenthau, H. (1954). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (2nd Edition). New York: 




regulating states’ behaviour.222 At the heart of structural realism is the notion that state actions 
and behaviours are stirred by national interests, and can override certain international values and 
norms such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.223 
According to structural realists, the interests of nation-states changes from time to time as they 
modify their policies and transform their means of engagement to adjust to the unchangeable 
anarchical structure of the  international system.224 Structural realism is thus fundamentally 
premised on the pillars of “statism, self-help and survival”, all of which will be applied in 
chapter 8 to explain the motivating factors underpinning Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign 
policy behaviour and their intervention roles in Africa. The point has to be made however that 
the advent of globalisation has considerably redefined the way state actors intervene in conflicts. 
Increasingly, globalisation has become what Igor Ivanov calls an “ever more influential architect 
of the new international security agenda”,225 but its impact on the evolution of the relations 
among states in this key area is contradictory. 
On the one hand, globalisation contributes to accelerated development of productive forces, 
scientific and technological progress and ever more-intensive communication among states and 
peoples. Through globalisation, the resource base and the intellectual potential for ensuring 
international security at a qualitatively new level has been strengthened  Similarly, there has 
been a growing interdependence of both state and non-state actors in the generation of new 
political approaches aimed at creating democratic multilateral mechanisms of managing the 
international system and hence reliable solution to the security problems. 
While both Nigeria and South Africa, each in their own way, confront the challenges presented 
by globalisation, the most important contexts for their foreign policies are the respective regions 
in which they operate. In terms familiar to structural realists, these two states find themselves in 
a regionally defined struggle for relative gains against potential rivals, and it is this regional 
context, rather than any other consideration, that must be employed to understand their foreign 
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policy behaviour. As argued by Fawcett, regions, given their potential socio-economic and 
political benefits, have grown to become an important concept in the discourse on how the global 
order is constituted as they provide a significant complementary layer of governance.226  
For Mansfield and Milner, a region represents an arrangement between independent states, made 
more feasible by the existence of close geographical proximity and very strong cultural, 
economic, linguistic, or political ties.227 Although Fawn has argued that a region does not 
necessarily need to have institutional forms to be one, how a region moves from using its shared 
identifiers to more formalised interactions and even institutionalisation deserves some 
mention.228 By accident of history and geography, Nigeria and South Africa are both overbearing 
presences in the regional distribution of power in West and Southern Africa.  
A case in point in this regard is the dominance of Nigeria in West Africa where it accounts for 
more than 51 per cent of the sub-region’s gross domestic product (GDP), estimated at about 
$375,771b.229 Similarly, South Africa, with a GDP of $349,419b, accounts for more than 60 per 
cent of the combined estimate of the 15-member SADC.230 Similarly, between Nigeria and South 
Africa is a combined value of at least 25 per cent of Africa’s GDP, and at least 25.7 per cent of 
Africa’s population. 231 What these statistics suggest is that Nigeria and South Africa wield 
enormous influence in their respective sub-regions, and can effectively use this soft power to 
influence the leadership direction of their subregional organisations and the African Union if 
desired. 
This possibility again reinforces the core elements of the power assumption which maintains that 
states seek power and calculate interest in terms of power either as an end in itself, or a means to 
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an end as embedded in structural realism. Another potential advantage embedded in the concept 
of regionalism, as Fawn notes, is its tendency to further the interest of realists in a subregion 
when utilised as a conflict management mechanism.232 This can be deployed in a number of ways 
to resolve crises on the grounds of the shared history, geographical contiguity, and economic 
bond which states belonging to a particular region or subregion often share.  
This was evident in the ‘‘quiet diplomacy” approach of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa 
during the 2008 disputed elections in Zimbabwe and that of former President Obasanjo of 
Nigeria in Togo in the wake of the crises that greeted its presidential elections of 2005. Equally 
important is the fact that Nigeria and South Africa, when located within the discourse on the 
structural factors shaping regionalism and regional gigantism, can at times exhibit a foreign 
policy behaviour suggestive of how structural realists think in their sub-regions. As argued by 
Muntschick, the central argument of the structural approach to the thesis of regionalism is that it 
distinguishes between several ideal types of problematic situations, which suggest various 
degrees of conduciveness to cooperation and the formation of common regulative institutions.  
In addition, the situation structural model assumes that intervening context variables can have an 
effect on the likelihood that institutionalised regional cooperation will occur.233 Consequently, 
where there is a prevailing backdrop of a strong and asymmetric extra-regional interdependence 
between regional and third actors, it is likely to impact the genuine structure inherent in a 
regional problematic situation towards a more cooperation-aversive situation.234 However, where 
there is an existence of a strong asymmetric intra-regional interdependence between states at the 
regional level, a state in a relative power position (such as Nigeria and South Africa) may be able 
to influence the institutional design and success of the regional cooperation project, and provide 
for more attractive alternative exit options for regional actors during negotiations on second-
order problems.235 
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Alternatively, such a state can also undermine the capacity of regional institutions to achieve 
effectiveness, if the deliberations or negotiations are not in its favour. This further reinforces the 
nexus between the realist leanings embedded in Regionalism, given its capacity to further the 
position of the leading (sub or) regional power as evident in the case of Nigeria through 
ECOWAS and that of South Africa through SADC. The influence of an external actor, when 
deliberately skewed in its favour, can alter an institutionalised (sub) regional cooperation, as seen 
in the case of Nigeria, which has consistently manipulated the economic framework of 
ECOWAS to reflect its national/long term economic policies/ambitions.  
A further testament to this is the ongoing debate regarding the acceptability of the country’s 
national currency (the naira) as a unit of exchange in a number of countries in the West African 
subregion, and the ongoing debate over the naira’s adoption as a mono-currency for the 
subregion. Similarly, South Africa, given its substantial contribution towards the SADC budget, 
is in an advantaged position to alter the subregional institutional arrangement in its favour when 
it deems fit. Consequently, when situated within the discourse on structural realism, and its 
nexus with regionalism, Nigeria and South Africa, to a large extent, can (and often) 
employ/enforce their gigantic socio-economic and political standing to suit their hegemonic 
dominance and ambitions in their respective sub-regions.  
The next section examines the arguments embedded in social constructivism, with a view to 
laying the background for its application as a framework for explaining Nigeria and South 









3.3 Social Constructivism 
The end of the Cold War in 1989 opened up a new space for alternative explanatory perspectives 
in international relations, leading critically-inclined scholars to move away from the hitherto 
narrowly-defined theoretical explanations critique.236 By the beginning of the 1990s, a new 
generation of young scholars emerged and initiated a new line of enquiry or speculation about 
world politics, called constructivism. Led by Friedrich Kratochwil,237 Nicolas Onuf238 and 
Alexander Wendt,239 this school of thought proposed constructivist ideas as a genuinely-radical 
alternative to conventional international relations (IR) theories.240 Their line of enquiry focused 
on rejecting the assumptions that both neorealists and neoliberals shared, in particular the 
assumption that behaviour can be ‘‘rationally” reconstructed without reference to processes of 
“meaning construction.”. 
By that, constructivists do not deny that realists and liberals sometimes focus on the role of ideas 
in explaining behaviour. What they do react against is the notion that these ideational factors are 
mere reflections of material-structural or institutional practices. For constructivists, the very 
process of the (social) construction of beliefs and how these in turn shape interests and interest-
driven behaviour should be the focus of explanation. In addition, social constructivists react 
against the assumptions of methodological individualism they perceive to underlie the narrow 
rationalism that realism and liberalism inherited from the micro-economics revolution in post-
World War II social science. Instead, constructivists emphasise the processes of collective 
meaning-creation and meaning-attribution that the alternative interpretative tradition, following 
Max Weber and phenomenological-hermeneutics, highlights.  
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Three basic forms of constructivism (systemic, unit level, and holistic) arose from these debates 
in the early 1990s. The first is systemic constructivism which follows neorealists in adopting a 
“third stage” perspective, by focusing solely on interactions between unitary state actors.241 In 
systemic constructivism, it is argued that everything that exists or occurs within the domestic 
political realm is ignored, and on account of world politics, is derived simply by theorising how 
states relate to another in the external international domain.242 Unit level constructivism explains 
external behaviour by concentrating on the domestic processes of meaning creation and how 
domestically-generated social norms and identities shape the interests and interest-driven 
behaviour of states.243  
It has been argued that this variant of constructivism does not adequately explain the similarities 
between states, and patterns of convergence in state identity and interests.244 Hence, holistic 
constructivism attempts to overcome the traditional dichotomy between the international and the 
domestic, by accommodating the entire range of meaning-creation processes that condition the 
identities and interests of states.245 To achieve this, holistic constructivists bring the corporate 
and the social together into a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and the 
international, as two faces of a single social and political order.246 They concern themselves 
primarily with the dynamics of global change, particularly, the rise and possible demise of the 
sovereign state, and focus on the mutually-constitutive relationship between this order and the 
state.247 
Consequently, the failure to explain systemic transformations that occurred in the 1990s 
encouraged this new generation of scholars to re-examine old questions and issues long viewed 
through neorealist and neoliberal lenses.248 Like all other social theories, the crux of rational 
choice is its tendency to ask some questions and not others, and treating the identities and 
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interests of agents as exogenously-given and focusing on how the behaviour of agents generates 
outcomes.249 Constructivism challenges the rationalist thinking in three important respects.250 
First, where rationalists assume that actors are atomistic egoists, constructivists treat them as 
deeply social, by showing that identities are constituted by the institutionalised norms, values, 
and ideas of the social environment in which they act.251 Second, constructivists, rather than 
treating actors’ interests as exogenously-determined prior to social interactions, consider 
interests as endogenous to interaction, and identity, learned through the process of 
communication, reflection on experience and role enactment.252 
Third, rationalists view society as a strategic realm, a place where actors rationally pursue their 
interests, while constructivists see it as a constitutive realm which transforms actors into 
knowledgeable social and political agents, and makes them who they are.253 Constructivists also 
challenge the rationalist assumptions on the unchanging reality of international politics, 
particularly the argument that anarchy is an inevitable feature of international reality, arguing 
instead that it is, “what states make of it”.254 Wendt offered a range of international anarchies 
based on variation in the ideas that states have about themselves and others.255 Wendt believes 
that “with enmity at one end and friendship at the other, and with indifference in the middle, the 
formal condition of anarchy is by itself not very informative about the behaviour of the units”.256 
Unlike the rationalist or ‘‘mainstream’’ theories of international relations which view state 
identities and interests as “given”, constructivism problematises them by taking a more 
sociological than economic approach to state theorising.257 Wendt, in Anarchy is what States 
Make of It, challenges the neorealist and neo-liberalists assumptions on the devotion to 
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a crude method of materialism.258 Wendt defines constructivism as a structural theory of 
international politics which sees: (1) states as primary actors in international politics; (2) key 
structures in the state system are inter-subjective rather than material; (3) that state identities as 
well as interests are relatively constructed by those structures, rather than exogenously by human 
nature or domestic politics.259 
Wendt argues that core concepts in the realists’ foundation such as “power politics” are social 
constructions by nature, therefore not static, and are capable of changing as a result of human 
practice, given the dynamic nature of social reality.260 Wendt premises his theorising of the 
international system on the assumption that social construction(s) shapes the environment within 
which international actors interact, and that the international system is a social construction, 
contrary to the positivist and materialist conceptualisation of IR theories by realists and 
liberalists.261 Rationalism, as Wendt notes, only offers a fundamentally-behavioural conception 
of both process and institutions, by changing behaviour, and not identities.262 
Similarly, constructivists contest the assumptions by neo-realists and neoliberals on their view of 
security in “self-interested” terms.263 Constructivists also contest neo-realists’ claim that 
anarchies are necessarily “self-help” systems, where both central authority and collective 
security are absent.264 According to constructivists, the contention by neorealists that self-help 
serves as a means of regulating state behaviour and surviving the anarchy in the system is 
because self-help is not seen as an institution that could be regulated by interaction based on a 
state’s identity.265 Constructivists therefore question neo-realists’ silence on identity and state-
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formation, and the system’s self-regulating tendency, including its ability to reduce process to 
dynamics of behavioural interaction among exogenously-constituted actors.266 
Process, as Wendt notes, is capable of generating cooperative behaviour, even in an 
exogenously-given self-help system, which neorealists argue as a consequence of the absence of 
a central authority.267 Self-help and power politics, to constructivists, “do not follow either 
logically or casually from anarchy, and if we the world finds itself in a self-help situation, it is 
due to process, not structure”.268 For constructivists, therefore, self-help and power politics are 
institutions, not essential features of anarchy.269 Anarchy, according to Wendt, is what States 
Make of It.270 Constructivists argue that states observe norms not only because it is in their self-
interest, but by internalising them in their identities, thus broadening the narrow liberalist 
framework for the study of norms.271 In this instance, foreign policy exists not only as the 
principal vehicle by which actors can instantiate and reproduce, but also as a means of changing 
identities and interests.272 
However, it is useful to note that identities are not individualistic or divorced from a social 
setting, as states exist within an international community (or society) of states.273 Rather, the 
principle (from social theory) of ‘‘reflected appraisals’’ posits that actors see themselves as a 
reflection of how they are appraised by others.274 Hence, the social world is constituted by shared 
meanings and significations, without which any community cannot exist.275 According to this 
view, change in international politics mostly occurs not because of structure, but because of 
agency when actors redefine their interests and identities.276 Constructivists equally contend that 
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identities and collective cognitions do not exist apart from each other, but are mutually 
exclusive.277  
They view institutionalisation as a process of internalising new identities and interests, not 
something occurring outside them and affecting only behaviour; socialisation is a cognitive 
process, not just a behavioural one.278 As an IR approach, constructivism is interested in how 
knowledge practices constitute subjects, and how it shares a cognitive, intersubjective conception 
of process, in which identities and interest are endogenous to interaction, rather than a 
rationalist-behavioural one, where they are exogenous.279 A fundamental principle of the 
constructivist social theory, according to Berger, is that “people act towards objects, including 
other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the world gives it.”280  Expatiating on Berger’s 
observation, Wendt notes that “each person has many identities linked to institutional roles, such 
as brother, son, teacher, and citizen”, and that same logic applies to a state with multiple 
identities, such as, “sovereign”,  “leader of the free world,” and “imperial power”.281 
The lesson to draw from the foregoing is that, for constructivists, the process of interaction 
within the international system is premised on the type of identity the state shares or has, formed 
largely from its history, or shaped by the environment or realm it operates. For example, South 
Africa’s identity is believed to be constructed along the lines of its history with apartheid, and 
the extent of solidarity it got from the rest of the world during its anti-apartheid struggles.282 
Nigeria’s on the other hand is premised on its decolonisation struggles and its military-styled 
dictatorship which shaped its statehood shortly after independence in 1960.  
While constructivists are unanimous in their view that “the commitment to and the salience of 
particular identities vary, each identity remains an inherently social definition of the actor 
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grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another, thus 
constituting the structure of the social world”.283 In Anarchy is what States Make of It, Wendt 
draws from what he calls structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology to argue that 
international institutions can transform state identities and interests, in contrast to the economic 
theorising form of systemic theory which classifies identity and interests as dependent 
variables.284  
Constructivists believe that the interests of states are shaped by their identities, while state 
identities (and interests) are subject to change in the process of interaction.285 Constructivists 
argue that identities and interests are treated as endogenous to interaction, which is produced and 
reproduced in the process of interaction.286 Constructivism further challenges the materialistic 
bases of social theory by hypothesising that structures of human associations are largely cultural 
rather than material phenomena, the result of which is identity and interest creation, and 
behaviour regulating.287 This implies that, to constructivists, material strengths (hard power) still 
matter and the people (government) are still intentional actors (state actors),288 but it is the 
ideational framework of identity and interests creation that informs the output of the actor to the 
international system.289  
As Reus-Smit observes, where neo-realists emphasise the material structure of the balance of 
power, and Marxists stress the material structure of the capitalist world economy, constructivists 
argue that systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural characteristics, and 
they exert a powerful influence on social and political actions.290 Constructivists claim that 
“material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared 
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knowledge in which they are embedded”.291 For example, Western Sahara and Algeria share 
borders with the Kingdom of Morocco. However, the realists’ argument regarding the balance of 
power is insufficient in explaining why Western Sahara is perceived by Rabat as an enemy while 
Algeria is seen as an ally.  
“Ideas about identity, the logics of ideology, and established structures of friendship and 
enmity,” as Reus-smit notes,292 is useful in explaining the radically-different meaning of the 
material balance of power between Western Sahara and Morocco on the one hand, and Algeria 
and Morocco on the other. Consequently, understanding how non-material structures condition 
actors’ identities, according to constructivists, is useful in explaining the nexus between identity, 
interests, and actions.293 Where rationalists contend that actors (individual or states) interact with 
a defined set of preferences, and neo-liberals or neo-realists focus on how actors pursue their 
goals strategically to protect their national interests, regardless of preferences, constructivists 
argue rather that understanding how actors develop their interests is vital to explaining a wide 
range of international phenomenon, which rationalists ignore or misconstrue.294  
In explaining interest formation, therefore, constructivists focus on the social identities of 
individuals or states, and argue that identities are the basis of interests.295 They argue that 
institutionalised norms and ideas “define the meaning and identity of the actor and the patterns of 
appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those individuals’.296 To 
constructivists, change in international politics occur not necessarily because of the existence of 
a structure (viewed by realists as anarchy and the distribution of power), but because of agency 
(interaction and learning), which helps actors redefine their interests and identities.297  
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Agents and structures, to constructivists, are mutually-constituted, although they add that those 
structures only exist because of the knowledgeable practices of the actors.298 Hurd refers to 
“structures” as institutions and shared meanings that make up the context of international action, 
and “agents” as any entity that operates as an actor in that context.299 Ted Hopf calls it “a set of 
relatively unchangeable constraints on behaviour”.300 These constraints, as Hopf adds, “can take 
the form of systems of material dis/incentives, such as a balance of power or a market, as 
important from a constructivist perspective is how an action does or does not reproduce both the 
actor and the structure”.301 
To illustrate this point, Hopf cites the example of how the United States’ appeasement in 
Vietnam would be considered unimaginable, because of the formers’ identity as a great power; 
indeed, military intervention, as he adds, constitutes the United States as a great power.302 
Appeasement was an unimaginable act.303 Thus, by engaging in the “enabled” action of 
intervention, the United States, according to Hopf, reproduced its own identity of great power, as 
well as the structure that gave meaning to its action.304 The United States’ intervention in 
Vietnam therefore maintained the international intersubjective understanding of great powers as 
states that use military power against each other.305 
This same logic can be applied to South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho in 1998. 
According to the constructivists’ perspective on how an action does or does not reproduce both 
the actor and the structure, any appeasement from South Africa (an actor), over its action in 
Lesotho would be deemed inconceivable, considering South Africa’s ranking as a great power 
compared to Lesotho. Consequently, by intervening in Lesotho, South Africa is restating its 
great-power identity, made possible by the strength of its hard power resources (structure), thus 
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emphasising the symbiotic relationship between agents and structures which constructivists often 
make. 
A constructivist approach to co-constitution is its argument that the actions of states contribute to 
making the institutions and norms of international life, and that these institutions and norms 
contribute to defining, socialising, and influencing states.306 Both the institutions and the actors 
can be redefined in the process.307 According to constructivists, there are three basic mechanisms 
by which normative and ideational structures shape actors’ identities and interests—imagination, 
communication and restraint.308 Through imagination, constructivists contend that non-material 
structures affect what actors see as the realm of possibility: how they think they should act, what 
the perceived limitations of their actions are, and what strategies they can imagine to achieve 
their objectives.309 
Similarly, normative and ideational structures also work their influence through communication. 
For example, when a state seeks to justify its behaviour, it appeals to established norms of 
legitimate conduct by referring to the norms of sovereignty, or in the case of intervention in the 
affairs of another state, according to international human rights norms.310 Even if normative and 
ideational structures do not affect an actor’s behaviour by framing their imagination or by 
providing a linguistic or moral court of appeal as Reus-smit notes, constructivists claim they can 
place significant constraints on the actor’s conduct.311  
Where realists argue that ideas mainly function as rationalisations, and as ways of masking 
actions motivated by the crude desire for power, constructivists claim that institutionalised norms 
and ideas work as motivators/inspirations in their own right, because of the moral force they 
have in a given context.312 The précis of our discussion is that, as an IR approach, constructivism 
offers a critique of the materialist explanation of international politics by suggesting that material 
                                                          
306 Ibid., p.172. 
307 Ibid., p.198. 
308 Ibid., p.198. 
309 Ibid., p.198. 
310 Ibid., p.198. 
311 Ibid., p.198. 




forces can be understood when viewed through the social concepts that define their meaning for 
human life.313  
Constructivism equally emphasises that state interests are socially constructed, because the 
processes leading to interest formation are social, and that a states’ foreign policy ideas are 
shaped by pre-existing dominant ideas and their relationship with experienced events.314 
Similarly, the approach teaches us that actors acquire identities, relatively stable, role-specific 
understandings and expectations about self, by participating in collective meanings.”315 And that 
agents and structures are mutually constituted, and it also offers an explanation on the multiple 
logics of anarchy. According to constructivists, anarchy only exists because states see each other 
as rivals over scarce goods, and not as friends.316 
However, our conceptualisation of constructivism in this thesis is built on Wendt’s social 
construction(s) thesis, and its emphasis on how identity shapes the environment within which 
international actors, such as South Africa and Nigeria, interact. This is because South Africa’s 
foreign policy behaviour has been significantly identity-themed since 1994 after the demise of 
apartheid, while that of Nigeria has gravitated towards an identity-based means of engagement 
since its return to democracy in 1999. In the meantime, let us briefly explore Wendt’s 
conceptualisation of identity which we will return to in chapter seven when we focus on its 
utility in explaining both countries’ foreign policy behaviour/intervention mechanism in Africa.  
In international politics and domestic environments, identities are necessary to ensure some 
minimal level of predictability and order.317 Scholars have, in fact, noted that “a world without 
identity is a world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much 
more dangerous than anarchy”.318 Within any defined society, identity, as Tajfel notes, performs 
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a number of functions—tells you who you are, tells you who others are, and, it equally tells 
others who you are.319 In telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of 
interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect 
to particular actors.320 A state’s identity, according to Eyre and Suchman, determines its 
preferences and consequent actions within the international community.321 
For example, Hopf argues that “a state understands others according to the identity it attributes to 
them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice”.322 The 
producer of the identity, according to Hopf, “is not in control of what it ultimately means to 
others, rather, it is the inter-subjective structure, which serves as the final arbiter of meaning”.323 
Nigeria has an identity within the ECOWAS bloc which her leadership does not control, but can 
only be measured by the level of support and reciprocity it garners from member-states when a 
need for a common action arises, as evident during the ECOWAS intervention in The Gambia in 
January 2017.  
In constructivism, the concept of identity is treated as an empirical question to be theorised 
within a historical context, as against the neo-realist assumption that all units in global politics 
have only one meaningful identity—that of self-interested states.324 Where constructivists 
emphasise that in the very fundamentals of international political life, the nature and definition of 
the actors cannot be theorised, neorealists, through their self-interest assumptions, presume to 
know, a priori, just what the self being identified is.325 By interpretation, neorealists view the 
state in international politics as an entity that remains unchanging and constant across space and 
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time, while constructivists contend that “the selves or identities of states are a variable, given that 
they likely depend on historical, cultural, political, and social context”.326  
For example, while neorealists argue that Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone was premised on 
the need to maintain a balance of power within its West African subregion because, to them, 
such intervention behaviour is part of the unchanging nature of state actors, constructivists 
maintain that Nigeria’s intervention was necessitated by the historical, political and social 
identity (defined by Wendt as a set of meanings a state attributes to itself while taking the 
perspectives of the other into account) Nigeria and Sierra Leone share through the ECOWAS 
bloc.    
Constructivists put great importance on identity due to the power it holds in interpersonal and 
international interactions, by focusing on the reciprocal relationship between interests and 
identity.327 They argue that interests are the product of identity; that is, having the identity “great 
power” implies a particular set of interests different from those implied by the identity European 
Union member.328 Saudi Arabia having the identity of a “great power” within the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) is a product of its interests within the bloc, but the same cannot be 
said of its identity as a member of the UN because the interests are different. Identities are 
therefore “multiple, constructivist logic which precludes acceptance of pregiven interests”.329 
Thus, “by making interests a central variable, social constructivism explores not only how 
particular interests come to be, but also why many interests do not.330 Interests are absent where 
there is no reason for them and where promised gains are too meagre”.331 Wendt views identity 
as “a subjective view of international actors which motivates a generation of behavioural 
disposition rooted in their self-understandings”.332 Identity, according to Wendt, goes beyond a 
unit or subjective level since understanding about “self also depends on others understanding and 
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representation of it”.333 This brings about an “inter-subjective or systemic” view which qualifies 
identity and the construction by both internal (self) and external structures (others).334 
Wendt, reemphasising the place of identity in constructivist thinking, calls it “the basis of 
interests, adding that actors (Nigeria and South Africa) do not have a portfolio of interests they 
carry along, but defines its interests in the process of defining solutions”.335 In essence, the 
notion of permanent identity does not exist for state actors, as they can evolve or be redefined 
based on prevailing conditions. Similarly, constructivists see institutions as a “relatively stable 
set or structure of identities and interests, codified in formal rules and norms, with a motivational 
force only in virtue of actors’ socialisation with, and participation in, collective knowledge”.336  
Institutions, as Wendt argues, “are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from 
actors’ ideas about how the world works”, and while their existence or objective is not in 
question, they remain nothing, other than beliefs. 337 Accordingly, interests are in part products 
of those identities, given that the social constitution of interests encompasses all the ways that 
actors’ interests and identities might be influenced by their interactions with others and with their 
social environment.338 This, as Hurd notes, includes the processes of socialisation and 
internalisation,339 the drive for social recognition and prestige,340 the effects of social norms on 
interests and behaviour (including the desire to create norms that legitimise one’s behaviour,341 
and the presence or absence of a sense of “community”.342  
Noteworthy is that identity and interests make up an institution, and an institutions’ rules are 
only sustainable where there is a sense of collective identity among the actors involved, 
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particularly on how institutions should function. For example, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) as an institution and its laws only exist because there is a 
collective identity among the member-states, and it is this unity of purpose that enables the 
institution to function. Without this identity and interests, as constructivists claim, there will be 
no SADC. The same applies to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
whose membership and continuing survival are hinged on the geographical bond between 
member-states.  
Wendt has identified four identities: (1) Personal or corporate (2) type identity (3) role identity, 
and (4) collective identity.343 In personal identity, the focus is on “self-organizing and balanced 
functional structures”, and it isolates (the) “self” from others, by carving out a sense of “I”, or a 
personal view.344 When denoted as corporate identity, it is captured from a state or actor 
perspective and transits to a sense of “we”, and it is often representative of a group/bloc. The 
personal or corporate identities are constituted exogenous to that ‘‘other’’.345 The second in 
Wendt’s classification, “type identity,” applies to the social category, and it is defined by 
characteristics such as outward look, mannerisms, attitudes, values, and dexterities comprising 
language, knowledge, opinions, experience, and similarity of history, among others.346 
For “type identities” to be formulated, Wendt notes that they are partially dependent on the 
understanding and perception of others.347 Situated within the discourse on international 
system/politics, the “type identity” is analogous to ‘‘regime types’’, or ‘‘forms of states’’ such as 
democratic, theocratic, authoritarian, capitalist, and communist states.348 The existence of role 
identity is defined by culture and expectations, and premised on the relational aspect with the 
others, as it cannot be constituted solely by “self” because it exists through one’s placement in a 
‘‘shared social structure’’ and under an observation of ‘‘behavioural norms’’ as postulated 
against others manifesting differing “contradicting identities”.349 Lastly, the notion of collective 
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identity utilises type and role identities through the blurring of self and others. Thus “self” and 
“other” are combined to form a single identity, and the identity of “other” is configured in part, 
as self, thus leading to a philanthropic behaviour.350  
The point being made by Wendt is that a clear identification leads to motivation of interests, and 
while identities formulate who the actors are, interests stipulate the desires of the actors. Wendt 
presupposes identity because without knowing who one is, it would be impossible for the actors 
to know what they want. Wendt further observes that identities would have differing degrees of 
cultural content and therefore translating into equally varying interests. In the presence of 
interests, as he argues, identities would have a motivational force emanating from an 
amalgamation of desire and belief.351 The forgoing leads us to ask: what does identity tell us 
about Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour? This will be explored in chapter 7, 
where we will examine the extent to which structural realism and social constructivism explain 
Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in Africa. 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the essential issues embedded in structural realism and social 
constructivism as IR approaches.  By elucidating the fundamental premises on which realism in 
general and structural realism in particular are founded, the chapter finds that the focus on 
national interests by state actors and material structures such as power, dictates how a state’s 
foreign policy is constructed and how its actual behaviour is shaped. The chapter further 
examined the linkage between regionalism and realism and established that the state-centric 
assumptions and power-projection tendencies embedded in realism equally exists in a regionalist 
order. These tendencies, as the chapter found, partly explains the motivation behind a regional 
order where a major player within the region or subregion (as evidenced in Nigeria and South’s 
Africa’s case in the West and Southern Africa) uses its soft power resources to advance its 
national interests through established subregional and national institutions.  
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The chapter also explored the social constructivism debate in international politics from the 
systemic, unit level and holistic perspectives, with a specific focus on how interests are formed 
and pursued in international politics through the construction and reconstruction of identity. The 
chapter established that, unlike structural realism where the struggle for power and the protection 
of the interest(s) determine(s) the pattern of behaviour and interaction of states the international 
scene, thus creating anarchy; constructivism argues that interests are, partially, products of those 
identities. It is this social constitution of interests which defines the way actors’ interests and 
identities are influenced in their interactions with others within their social environment. In the 
latter part of the study (chapter 8), we will explore Nigeria and South Africa’s intervention roles 





Chapter 4: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and its Conflict Intervention 
Behaviour in Africa 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter surveyed aspects of two theoretical approaches – structural realism and 
social constructivism – that are of relevance in assessing Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict 
intervention role and foreign policy behaviour. Fundamental issues such as realists’ 
interpretation of national interests and the quest for relative power, and their answer to why a 
state pursues power in international politics and its multiplier effect on foreign policy behaviour, 
formed the basis of our discussion on structural realism. In social constructivism, we appraised 
the underlying philosophy behind the constructivists’ definition of interests, and how interests 
are formed on the basis of identity and normative inter-subjectivity, and how identity and inter-
subjectively-constituted normative structures influence a state’s foreign policy behaviour.  
We will return to these theoretical concepts in chapter seven, where an attempt will be made to 
highlight the relative value of these seemingly opposed theoretical frameworks in understanding 
the behaviour of the two regional powerhouses that we are looking at. In this, and in the next 
three chapters, the focus shifts to a discussion of the general features of Nigeria and South 
Africa’s intervention role in Africa, and their specific interventions in Sierra Leone and the DRC. 
The stated insights (chapter 3) of the two theoretical perspectives act as the guiding light in terms 
of which selected aspects of Nigeria and South Africa’s roles are highlighted. No attempt is 
made to provide a comprehensive treatment of the foreign policies of these two states.  
Overall, the objective of the chapter is provide an analytical background to the case study 
undertaken in chapter five, and to prepare the ground for the ultimate purpose of the study, which 
is to assess the contributions that both theoretical perspectives can make to our understanding of 
Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention role in Africa. 
Together with this introductory remark, the chapter is divided into five parts. The second part 
examines the essential issues embedded in Nigeria’s foreign policy. In the third, Nigeria’s 




further, by interrogating how the personalised nature of Nigeria’s foreign policy making reflects 
in its conflict intervention roles in Africa. We offer our concluding thought in the final section.    
 
4.2 Nigeria’s foreign policy  
Evolving from the amalgamation of its northern and southern protectorates by the British 
colonial authorities in 1914, and its independence on October 1, 1960, the Nigerian state has 
remained arguably one of the few African states that have consistently maintained an African-
centred foreign policy orientation. This orientation is reflected in many of the foreign policy 
initiatives that we will highlight below. At the same time, as structural realist will emphasise, one 
can only understand Nigeria’s behaviour if you also foreground the fact that it is a regional 
hegemon, a “Giant of Africa” on account of its huge population, geographical size, and relatively 
large economic and human resources.352  
The narrative on Nigeria’s foreign policy points to four concentric circles, composed essentially 
of (1) the country’s contiguous states—Benin, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea); 
(2) its West African neighbours; (3) the African continent; and (4) the international community 
and the rest of the world.353 Basking in the euphoria of its oil boom of the 1970s, its 250,000-
strong army, which in 1975 was nearly four times the size of the combined armies of thirteen 
independent states in West Africa, and a 1974 gross domestic product figure of $19.7 billion, 
which was larger than the combined economies of all of black Africa, Nigeria assumed a lead 
role in West African politics, and expanded its regional influence in Africa.354  
These lead roles undertaken by Nigeria are presumably influenced by an Africa-focused foreign 
policy disposition which in turn shapes its conflict intervention roles in Africa. However, as will 
be recounted below, no account of Nigeria’s foreign policy will be sufficient if it ignores the 
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specific role of leadership attributes and ambitions. In fact, one can say that it is through the 
specific channels of leadership ambitions that Nigeria’s commitment to its African identity, and 
its preponderance as a regional hegemon, are played out.  
As outlined under the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in Section 
19, Chapter 11 of Nigeria’s 1999 constitution, Nigeria’s foreign policy is focused on the 
following objectives: (1) promotion and protection of the national interest, (2) promotion of 
African integration and support for African unity, (3) promotion of international cooperation for 
the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of 
discrimination in all its manifestations, (4) respect for international law and treaty obligations 
seeking settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration 
and adjudication, and (5) promotion of a just world economic order. 
However, on assumption of office on October 1, 1960, the government of Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa came up with a set of principles intended to guide Nigeria in the pursuance of these 
foreign objectives. These principles include: (1) respect for the independence, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity of all states, (2) principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states, (3) 
recognition of the rights to self-determination and sovereign equality of all African states, (4) 
seeking membership of international organisations as a means of promoting functional 
cooperation, and (5) a general commitment to the principle of non-alignment and a just world 
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4.2.1 Respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all states 
This principle is premised on the assumption that states are at the heart, and are primary actors of 
the international system; and that Nigeria’s strong allegiance to the defence of its sovereignty is 
only justified on the moral obligation of its respect for the territorial sovereignty of states.356 
More crucial to the definition of statehood, as argued by Jennings and Watts,357 is the sacrosanct 
place which a territory occupies and that a state without a territory is not possible.358 It could thus 
be argued that the need to respect this principle within the international system is non-negotiable. 
By way of interpretation, Nigeria has demonstrated its commitment to this principle by 
expressing its willingness and readiness to conduct its external affairs with other states according 
to civilised rules of interaction.359 
In addition, Nigeria’s commitment to this principle has been affirmed by its respect for decisions 
reached at the UN. Scholars have noted that Nigeria’s commitment to this principle and its 
respect for, and adherence to, the dictates of international law and civilised rules of behaviour is 
fundamental to ensuring the security of newly-independent and weak states in a world laden with 
intense competition between antagonistic superpowers.360 Evidence from the literature suggests 
that Nigeria’s allegiance to this commitment has remained constant, a development traceable to 
its early years of independence. For example, Prime Minister Balewa stated that “[Nigeria] shall 
never impose ourselves upon any other country and shall treat every African territory, big or 
small, as our equal because we honestly feel that it is only on that basis that peace can be 
maintained in our continent”.361 
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Balewa’s assurances to Nigeria’s neighbours and the rest of Africa were intended to prevent any 
of these nations from falling into the embrace of the progenitors of the Cold War to protect its 
hard-fought independence and those of its contemporaries from the overtures being made by 
Kwame Nkrumah, through his Pan-African movement. For Balewa, any attempt to join either of 
the camps could lead to a loss of sovereignty, thus returning Africa to the pre-colonial age, hence 
his argument that “Nigeria is certainly big enough and does not need to join others and that if 
others wish to join forces with the country, their legal standing and positions would be made clear 
to them in such a union”.362 
 
4.2.2 Principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states 
This principle expresses Nigeria readiness and desire not to interfere in any domestic dispute in 
other African countries, unless invited by a supra-national authority, and when Nigeria’s national 
interests are threatened. In international politics, the legal justification for such intervention(s) is 
today rooted in the doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).363 It is within this context 
that Nigeria’s intervention in conflicts, despite its stated foreign policy principle of non-
interference, can be understood. However, since independence in 1960, Nigeria has struggled to 
distinguish between the circumstances which necessitate intervention, and behaviours which 
amount to unjustified interference in the affairs of those states. This is of course a perennial 
dilemma for all interventions and R2P has done little to resolve it.  
Undertaking a summary of the main issues in intervention is thus useful in understanding the 
basis for Nigeria’s intervention in conflicts. In intervention, there are basically two approaches 
within which the context can be best understood—the normative and the physical perspectives. In 
the normative approach to intervention, considerable emphasis is placed on how disputes can be 
effectively resolved through various peacebuilding mechanisms and dialogue, and without the 
use of force, because of the non-forcibility of the action on the warring parties. This approach is 
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often termed peacemaking, and for this to happen, the neutral party is expected to possess some 
charismatic and political authority which must be generally respected by, and acceptable to the 
warring factions.364 
This much is evident in the mediatory efforts of former President Mandela in Burundi in 2003 
and that of former President Olusegun Obasanjo in São Tomé and Príncipe in 2003. The 
“physical” intervention perspective on the other hand, occurs when an independent party wades 
into a conflict between two parties, through dialogue or through the use of force when such 
efforts are seen as yielding no concrete result.365  
This was exemplified by Nigeria’s deployment of troops to Sierra Leone after its unsuccessful 
mediatory role in the dispute between Foday Sankoh’s RUF and the Ahmad Tejan Kabbah-led 
Sierra Leonean government. A major distinguishing factor between both approaches is that a 
“physical” intervention involves the use of force and could occur without any supra-national 
approval, particularly when such approval is not forthcoming or when the intervening state fails 
to get approval based on the motive/interest behind its intervention, as South Africa did in 
Lesotho in 1998. When this happens, it is called interference—a term defined by Pogoson as “an 
unsolicited and illegitimate intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state”.366 
But when an intervention becomes legitimated by a decision of an acceptable and recognised 
supra-national authority for the purpose of forestalling further humanitarian tragedy, it becomes 
peacekeeping.367 When located within the discourse on Nigeria’s conflict intervention role in 
Africa, the majority of these interventions fall within the precincts of peacekeeping, given that it 
is often backed by a supra-national institution. This is evidenced by Nigeria’s active role in the 
United Nations peace keeping mission in the Congo in 1960, its role in the resolution of the 
Liberian (1990-1997) and the Sierra Leonean civil wars (1991-1998), among others. 
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4.2.3 Recognition of the rights to self-determination and sovereign equality of all 
African states 
Scholars have argued that Nigeria’s commitment to this principle dates back to its emergence as 
an independent country on 1 October 1960, most notably through its rigorous campaign against 
colonisation, racial discrimination and apartheid.368 This commitment has seen Nigeria emerge as 
an advocate of self-determination and the recognition of the rights of other states to self-
governance. In December 1960, Nigeria adopted the resolution on the “Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and People” code-named “UNGA 1960”, and played a lead role in the anti-
apartheid struggles in Southern Africa through its support for liberation movements.369 
As a consequence of Nigeria’s commitment to the principle, Washington courted Nigeria, as part 
of its Africa policy; Southern Africa’s Frontline States invited Nigeria to their meetings; Lagos 
chaired the UN’s Special Committee against Apartheid for over two decades; Nigeria was 
instrumental in formulating OAU’s positions; and member-states of ECOWAS accepted 
Nigeria’s leadership in West Africa.370 Nigeria has been rewarded by the international 
community at different fora for leading the struggles which culminated in the defeat of apartheid. 
Practical examples of such recognitions are its chairmanship at different times of the United 
Nations Special Committee against apartheid which Akporode Clark, Joseph Garba, Ibrahim 
Gambari, Yusuf Maitama, and Edwin Ogbu presided over at different times. 
 
4.2.4 Seeking membership of international organisations as a means of promoting 
functional cooperation 
This principle explains Nigeria’s readiness to enter into mutual engagement and interaction with 
the international community on the assumption that it would provide some form of protection for 
its national interest, owing to the existing bipolarity in international politics at that time. Nigeria’s 
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adherence to this principle is influenced by the overriding advantage which functional 
cooperation has, over a subscription to an African political union, which at that time could not 
guarantee a certain future for the country.371 This principle therefore explains Nigeria’s 
membership of organisations such as United Nations (UN), Commonwealth of Nations, 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the African Union (AU), and Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS).  
Nearly six decades after (1960-2017), Nigeria has continued to demonstrate its support for the 
organisations, in consonance with its belief that any distortion in the international political or 
economic order should be resolved through these institutions. This belief is evident for example 
in the lead role played by Nigeria in the formation of the OAU (1963), the ECOWAS (1975), the 
setting up of the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence in 1981, the eventual 
transitioning of the OAU to the African Union in 2001, the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good governance (2001), and the 2002 
Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for 
Security and Development (PCASED), among others. 
 
4.2.5 Commitment to the principle of non-alignment and a just world order 
This principle was designed to ensure that Nigeria maintains an independent posture and 
judgment at the level of the OAU, and the United Nations Organisation (UNO) on issues 
bordering on human rights and dignity, and it is motivated by the bipolarity in world politics 
which existed at the time of Nigeria’s independence in 1960 and beyond. As Fawole argues, “the 
world was precariously bifurcated into two antagonistic ideologies of capitalism, as supported by 
the United States (US) and communism, which was championed by the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR)”.372 Mindful of this situation, and informed by the desire to protect 
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its nascent independence, Nigeria opted to be non-partisan in the power play between the East 
and the West. 
However, scholars have argued that this principle was respected in theory, more than in practice. 
It bears mentioning that the Tafawa Balewa government which conceived the idea did little to 
respect it, as his administration was rabidly pro-British and concomitantly pro-Western.373 
Balewa adopted a conservative and a pro-Western policy, making the policy of non-alignment 
the guiding principle of his engagement with the rest of the world but showed little commitment 
to it.374 Cases in point in this regard were the signing of the 1961 Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact 
which granted Britain ‘‘unrestricted’’ flying and air rights in Nigeria,375 Nigeria’s failure to abide 
by the Addis Ababa December 3, 1965 resolution over the Rhodesian rebellion of 1965,376 the 
granting of funds to Western missions in Lagos while communist countries were prevented from 
obtaining even accommodation for same, and the rejection of communist literature and 
scholarship awards from Eastern Europe.377  
The point must be made however, that Balewa’s inability to detach himself from British 
imperialism is understandably so, in view of the imported structures, ideas and models of 
government bequeathed to Nigeria by colonialism. Thus, the immediate post-colonial Nigerian 
leadership was not able to radically extricate itself from the appendages of colonialism, even in 
foreign relations. The next section examines Nigeria’s foreign policymaking process. The next 
section focuses on Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour towards Africa, with a view to ascertaining 
how its self-confessed Afro-centric foreign policy disposition reflects in its conflict intervention 
roles in Africa.  
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4.3 Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour towards Africa 
As argued in chapter one, Nigeria’s intervention role in Africa, is largely categorised under the 
broader spectrum of unilateral intervention—defined by Teson, as the “proportionate 
international use or threat of military force, undertaken in principle by a liberal government or 
alliance, aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy, welcomed by the victims,378 and consistent with the 
doctrine of double effect.”379 It is useful to note that Nigeria rarely performs a normative role 
while intervening in a conflict. In other words, Nigeria, less often employs persuasive tactics or 
mediatory mechanisms as its currency of negotiation, or its abundant soft power resources in its 
West African sub-region. Nigeria employs a physical or armed intervention in conflicts between 
opposing parties.  
A physical intervention, as we argued in chapter one, involves the use of force,380 in resolving a 
sustained, and large scale violence between two or more factions, challenging the maintenance of 
governmental authority in a particular state.381 Implicit in the foregoing is that Nigeria’s conflict 
intervention mechanism in Africa falls within the purview of Terry Nardin’s definition of what 
constitutes an armed humanitarian intervention. That is, an intervention intended to protect 
innocent people who are not nationals of the intervening state from the violence perpetrated or 
permitted by the government of the target state”,382 albeit under the auspices of a supra-national 
institution.  
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When backed by a supra-national authority, Nigeria’s interventionary role in Africa aligns with 
Petr Valek’s definition of a unilateral humanitarian intervention,383 given that all of its 
interventions have had more than one state involved, none has been without the use of force, and 
a number of its interventions have lacked the backing of United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC).384 Prominent examples in these regard include Nigeria’s involvement in: Liberia, (1990-
1997), Sierra Leone (1991-1998), Guinea Bissau (1998-1999), and in The Gambia in January 
2017. 
Similarly, in Nigeria’s conflict intervention history, there have been instances where its 
intervention roles have assumed a multilateral dimension. Worth noting, and as we argued in 
chapter one is that a multilateral intervention shares nearly all the features of unilateral 
intervention, except that its mandate, scope and operation must be backed by the UN through a 
Security Council resolution. For example, and as the table depicting some of Nigeria’s conflict 
intervention roles in Africa below suggests, classifying Nigeria’s conflict intervention roles in 
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Table 4.1 Nigeria’s conflict intervention episodes in Africa 
S/N Country Conflict 
Type 
Intervention Mode Date Regime Type Outcome 
1 Congo Civil War Troop deployment 1960 Civilian Partially Successful 
2 Congo  Civil unrest Troop deployment 1964 Civilian Successful 
3 Tanganyika  Civil unrest Troop deployment 1964 Civilian Successful 
4 Chad Civil War Troop deployment 1979 Civilian Partially Successful 
5 Chad Civil War Troop deployment 1981 Civilian Successful 










Civil War Troop deployment 1998-
1999 
Civilian  Partially Successful 
9 Sudan Civil War Troop deployment 2004 Civilian Partially Successful 
10 Gambia  ECOMOG Troop deployment 2017- 
2018 
Civilian Ongoing  
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Obvious from the table above is that Nigeria’s intervention mechanism is largely subsumed 
under the auspices of peacekeeping, although some scholars have argued that the act of 
peacekeeping may not necessarily qualify as an intervention.385 To be sure, it is pertinent to note 
that Nigeria’s intervention role in Sierra Leone (1991-1998) in particular, and in all the conflicts 
it has intervened, same as South Africa’s in the DRC (1997-2005), meets what Raymond Vincent 
                                                          




identifies as the basic requirements to be met for an act to qualify as intervention.386 First, by 
intervening in the affairs of other states through peacekeeping, Nigeria is exercising its authority 
with the intent of achieving some political, moral or legal objective.  
Second, the power relationship between Nigeria as an intervening state, and the target state, is 
often unequal, as we saw in Sierra Leone. Lastly, most of Nigeria’s interventions are limited in 
scope and time, as the example of Sierra Leone and Liberia has shown. It is imperative to note 
also that Nigeria’s seeming preference for the “use of force” to resolve conflicts, particularly in 
its West African subregion, is not without antecedence. First, Nigeria’s long experience with 
military rule meant that its leaders at that time saw every opportunity to intervene in conflicts as 
an avenue to further Nigeria’s relative power pursuit, and as a platform to project their image as 
fearless leaders in West Africa (we shall get back to this in the later part of the chapter). 
Second, Nigeria’s experience with colonialism, particularly the British indirect rule system, 
played an influencing role in its Africa-centred foreign policy focus, which was targeted at 
weakening the after effects of the divide and rule legacy of colonialism. Third, Nigeria’s conflict 
intervention role in Africa is often seen by successive Nigerian leaders as an expression of a 
philosophy known as Pax Nigeriana, coined by Bolaji Akinyemi to imply how Nigeria’s 
demographic preponderance, its economic and natural endowments, and its staggering human 
resources can be utilised to provide leadership for Africa.387 
Finally, Nigeria’s conflict intervention role in Africa appears to have been motivated by the role 
played by the British in influencing its foreign affairs as early as 1958 with the recruitment of the 
first batch of Nigerian foreign services personnel,388 which placed Britain in a position to infuse 
her prejudices and her nuances into the character and orientation of the Nigeria’s external 
relations.389 Thus, after the attainment of independence, these prejudices continued to exert 
pressures on Nigeria’s relations with the outside world. As the literature suggests, Nigeria’s 
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foreign policy under the Balewa government was focused on ensuring that Nigeria followed an 
independent foreign behaviour founded on its interest, and consistent with moral and democratic 
principles, and in line with its constitution.390  
Balewa had stated inter alia: 
It is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all nations and to participate actively in the work 
of the United Nations Organisations. Nigeria, by virtue of being the most populous country in West Africa 
has absolutely no territorial or expansionist ambitions. We are committed to uphold the principles upon 
which the United Nations is founded. Nigeria hopes to work with other African countries for the progress of 
Africa and to also assist in bringing all African countries to a state of independence.391 
To Balewa’s credit, Nigeria committed itself to the liberation struggles in South Africa, although 
Nigeria never sent an expeditionary force in that struggle, it generally offered more than rhetoric 
to the African National Congress (ANC), by taking a committed tough line against the regime in 
Pretoria.392 Similarly, the Congo crisis of 1960 afforded Balewa the opportunity to demonstrate 
his government’s commitment in this direction. Balewa made spirited diplomatic efforts to 
organise the African group at the United Nations and sent a contingent of Nigerian troops as part 
of the UN forces in the Congo.393 In 1964, when the Congo crisis flared up once more, Nigerian 
troops returned to the Congo under the aegis of the United Nations.394  
The Tanganyika army rebellion in 1964 against the Nyerere government presented another test 
case for the Balewa administration, which acted on the February 1964 resolution of the OAU 
Council of Ministers, and dispatched a battalion of troops which resolved the conflict in 
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Tanganyika’s favour.395 Thus under Balewa, between 1962 and 1965, Nigeria’s foreign policy, at 
a stroke, achieved three things: It demonstrated its willingness and capability to sustain the 
authority of the new continental organisation; it assisted sister-states in mortal danger of civil war 
and disintegration; and it demonstrated that Nigeria was solidly committed against neo-colonialist 
influences in Africa, by word and deed.  
These three principled issues have remained consistent in Nigeria’s foreign policy. Balewa was 
toppled by a Major Kaduna Nzeogwu-led coup on 15 January, 1966, which lasted just six months 
before the Yakubu Gowon-led counter-coup of 27 July, 1966. During the Nigerian civil war 
between 1967 and 1970, Israel and France’s support for the secessionist Biafra group, Britain’s 
hesitant support for Nigeria, and America’s condescending dismissal of Nigeria as a “British 
sphere of influence”, led Nigeria to a more activist, less naïve post-war foreign policy.396 
Gowon’s foreign policy focus was made relatively predictable as a consequence of the oil 
windfall of the 1970s, which strengthened the regime’s capacity to fully implement Nigeria’s 
non-aligned stance and position of neutrality in international events.  
By implication, Gowon had the enablement to exercise a relatively-hegemonic authority within 
the West African subregion and Africa. His regime’s severance of diplomatic ties with Israel and 
France over their support for secessionist Biafra, thus lent credence to Gowon’s structural realist 
orientation, and indicates why and how states seek power and calculate interests in terms of 
power. By sanctioning both the Israeli and French governments, Gowon improved Nigeria soft 
power capabilities, thus enhancing Nigeria’s image within the committee of nations. At the 
regional front, the regimes’ foreign policy behaviour reaffirmed Nigeria’s foreign policy 
priorities established at independence.  
Nigeria participated in several UN-led initiatives, advocated for pan-African solidarity through 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), supported regional cooperation and anti-colonial and 
liberation movements besides adopting a policy of non-alignment in the East-West conflict.397  
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Also in 1975, Nigeria and the government of Benin Republic provided the platform for the 
formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).398 Under Gowon, oil 
which was Nigeria’s mainstay, was discounted at subsidised rates for those the regime considered 
friendly to Nigeria, with Togo getting a petroleum refinery and a presidential palace in Lomé at 
Nigeria’s expense, and Niger Republic had electricity supplied to its citizens from Nigeria’s 
Kainji dam.399 
When juxtaposed with what Gambari argues as “Balewa’s timid and mostly moderate foreign 
policy perspective, the foreign policy behaviour of the Gowon regime appears relatively more 
activist and influential in the early 1970s”.400 Gowon was overthrown in a coup led by General 
Murtala Mohammed on 30 July, 1975. The Mohammed-Obasanjo regime is credited for setting 
for Nigeria a well-defined, articulate, coherent, and explicit policy for Africa that was neither 
tainted with fear nor deference to any bloc or country. Delivering a fiery speech at the 1975 
General Assembly of the OAU in Addis Ababa, Mohammed gave notice of Nigeria’s direction 
and position on Africa under his leadership, arguing that Africa has come of age; it is no longer in 
the orbit of any continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country however 
powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or mar”.401 
Under his leadership, Nigeria called the bluff of the Unites States over the latter’s support for the 
União Nacional para a Independência total de Angola (UNITA) rebels, against the OAU-backed 
“Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA).402 The regime made it clear that 
Nigeria’s national interest would not be negotiated or sacrificed in the articulation of its foreign 
policy posture towards Africa. To demonstrate Nigeria’s commitment to this cause, the Murtala 
regime acted swiftly against South Africa when it invaded Southern Angola over the ownership 
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of Cunene dam.403 The Angolan independence from the Portuguese remains the defining foreign 
policy moment for the regime. Not only did Nigeria provide financial and material assistance to 
Angola, it also extended huge political and diplomatic support to the MPLA-led government.404 
Consequently, the Murtala regime became a de facto spokesperson for the Angolan government 
within Africa, sponsoring delegates to several international meets to lobby support and 
recognition for the MPLA. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding continued to feature prominently as a 
conflict intervention mechanism for Nigeria, as evidenced in its involvement in the conflicts 
between Tanzania-Uganda, Western Sahara and Morocco, and in the Ethiopia-Somalia war.405 
Similarly, in Namibia, Nigeria supported the South West African Peoples’ Organisation 
(SWAPO) led by Sam Nujoma, against the other political parties sponsored by South Africa and 
the West to victory.406 Under the Murtala Obasanjo regime, the South African Relief Fund was 
launched, the SWAPO and Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe received increased support, with Nigeria 
donating about USD20m to Zimbabwean liberation movements, and equally sent military 
equipment to Mozambique to help the newly-independent country suppress the South African-
backed RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) guerrillas.407 
Murtala Mohammed was assassinated in the coup of 13 February 1976, and the succeeding 
Obasanjo regime sustained the foreign policy behaviour, among which were the nationalisation of 
a number of Western assets, particularly Barclays Bank and British Petroleum.408 Obasanjo 
handed over to a civilian government led by Shehu Shagari on October 1, 1980. The Shagari 
presidency kept to its predecessor’s anti-apartheid and decolonisation campaigns in Southern 
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Africa. Sanctions and seclusions were imposed on Pretoria, while Nigeria’s support for liberation 
movements in Southern Africa significantly rose to about $5 million in aid yearly.409 
In what appears a significant shift from Nigeria’s subscription to an Afro-centric foreign policy 
disposition, the Shagari administration deported those it classified as “aliens” (Ghanaians and 
citizens from other West African countries) to their countries.410 In sum, and as elsewhere argued, 
Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour under the Shagari administration, lacked the zeal and 
competence to keep up with the pace it had inherited.411 His administration’s foreign policy 
behaviour, was largely a “routine observance of existing relations and obligations”,412 an excuse 
given for its overthrow on 31 December, 1983 by the Muhammadu Buhari inspired coup. For the 
Buhari-Idiagbon regime, its foreign policy priority was to restore Nigeria’s tattered economy, and 
redirect it on the path of moral rectitude.413 Relying on Nigeria’s Afro-centric foreign policy 
commitment, the Buhari regime accorded state recognition to the Polisario government in 
Western Sahara (Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic), and “re-launched Nigeria’s deep 
commitment to the cause of freedom and liberation struggles particularly in South Africa”.414  
Economic diplomacy became a defining foreign policy behaviour for the regime, as it was during 
this period that quadripartite agreements involving Nigeria and its neighbours—Benin, Ghana 
and Togo was signed.415 While the regime tried to maintain an Africa-focused foreign policy 
approach as priority, it contradicted itself when it deported those it categorised “as illegal aliens” 
from Chad and Niger Republic to their countries.416 The regime’s decision to close down 
Nigeria’s borders, as a measure against smuggling and money laundering in the fight against 
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corruption, eventually led to its overthrow by the Sani Abacha-led, but Ibrahim Babangida-
motivated coup of 27 August, 1985.                   
Babangida’s foreign policy behaviour focused on an issue-based pursuit, reflecting a package of 
objectives and goals tied to the nation’s security and the well-being of Nigerians.417 The 
Technical Aid Corps (TAC) programme, Concert of Medium Powers initiative, the adoption of 
economic diplomacy as the regime’s foreign policy thrust, and the activation of the ECOWAS 
Protocol on Free Movement of Citizens under Babangida’s chairmanship testify to Babangida’s 
foreign policy towards Africa. The regime equally reversed its predecessor’s border-closure 
policy, and enhanced Nigeria’s role as the arrowhead of the subregional organisation through its 
intervention in Liberia.  
According to Shaw and Ihonvbere: 
Nigeria not only provided the bulk of the material and logistic support for ECOMOG operations but also the 
bulk of the personnel. Apart from the first Commander who was a Ghanaian, all subsequent Commanders 
were from the Nigerian military. That today Liberia is a united country owes much to the foresight and 
sacrifice of Nigeria … the Babangida regime gave ECOWAS institutional relevance by not only donating 
land for the building of the ECOWAS Secretariat but also contributed 4.5 million dollars towards its 
construction.418 
In all, the regime was credited with the following achievements. First, for reviving Nigeria’s 
active commitment to ECOWAS and encouraging the lifting of boundary closures and restoration 
of free movement between member-states. Second, for actively intervening in inter-African 
affairs and conflicts, especially in West Africa, and establishing and funding the Technical Aids 
Corps (TAC) initiative, which sends highly-trained Nigerian personnel at little or no cost to 
needy African states and other places. And, lastly, for its lead role in the formation of the Lagos 
Forum of Medium Powers.419 In keeping with Nigeria’s afro-centric foreign policy focus, the 
Babangida regime led 32 other countries in boycotting the Commonwealth games in Edinburgh 
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in 1986 in protest against Britain’s patronage of the regime in Pretoria, and made financial 
donations to major anti-apartheid movements in Southern Africa.  
For example, the sum of US$1.5 million in aid was given to the South West Africa People’s 
Organisation (SWAPO), while the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC) received donations of US$1 million and US$600,000 in 1989 respectively.420 
Babangida’s annulment of the 12 June, 1993 elections reversed the warm relations he had 
enjoyed from the international community, leading Nigeria to one of the darkest periods in its 
national history with the assumption of office of the Sani Abacha regime. Abacha’s foreign 
policy behaviour was shaped by the global tilt towards liberal democracy, and the international 
community’s stiff opposition to the palace coup which ousted Ernest Shonekan’s interim national 
government. 
Thus, his foreign policy behaviour was largely reactive and isolationist in orientation, a situation 
further compounded by the regime’s brutal execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others. The 
international community responded to Abacha in kind, with Nigeria’s traditional allies—Britain, 
United States, France, Germany, Canada and South Africa, withdrawing their diplomatic 
representations from the country, while the Commonwealth also suspended Nigeria’s 
membership.421  In response to the isolation from the West and its allies, Abacha turned to Asia 
and many fringe states across the world, thus further ostracising Nigeria from rest of the world. 
Abacha’s death left Nigeria in a lurch of international isolationism, and the succeeding regime of 
General Abdulsalami Abubakar appeared more concerned with rescuing Nigeria from the self-
inflicted international isolation than in perpetuating itself in power. 
Abubakar’s foreign policy behaviour was focused on the pursuance of a “policy of rejuvenation 
in a bid to redeem Nigeria’s image abroad, particularly on the human rights front”.422 The 
summary of Obasanjo’s foreign policy articulation in his second coming as civilian president was 
anchored on four major planks, which are to (1) reposition Nigeria as the leading nation in 
Africa; (2) ensure democratic consolidation and the promotion of political stability in Africa; (3) 
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intensify the drive for economic integration and cooperation of Africa; and (4) facilitate the 
peaceful resolution of conflict and African regional integration.423 
On the first plank, Obasanjo embarked on aggressive diplomatic shuttles employing his 
influential personality to attract recognition for the country in the international arena, thus 
attracting in the process, huge foreign direct investments (FDI). In furtherance of Obasanjo’s 
drive for democratic consolidation and political stability in Africa, Obasanjo was part of several 
international delegations set up by the AU and the UN to mediate in conflicts in Africa and other 
parts of the world. His administration also resisted undemocratic regime changes in Africa, as 
seen in the case of São Tomé and Príncipe, when President Fradique Mendez was ousted, while 
on a state visit to Nigeria in 2003.424  
A mediation team set up by Obasanjo eventually got Fradique Mendez reinstated. His 
administration also teamed up with other countries to ensure the restoration of democracy in 
Guinea-Bissau, following the sack of the Kumba Yala-led government.425 Economic integration 
and cooperation among African states featured prominently as the main foreign policy focus of 
the Obasanjo administration. The Nigerian-South African Bi-National Commission instituted in 
1999, Nigeria-Congo Joint Commission established in 2001, the transitioning of the OAU into 
the African Union (AU), and the formation of the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD), are all testament to Obasanjo’s pursuit of an economic diplomacy-themed foreign 
policy behaviour.  
On conflict intervention, Obasanjo favoured a peaceful approach to conflict resolution, in 
contrast to his regime’s aggressive foreign policy behaviour during his first stint in office (1976-
1979). Under Obasanjo’s watch, Liberia’s Charles Taylor was handed over to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the Nigerian army assumed an observer mission in Sierra Leone in 2003, 
the Mano River dispute between Liberia, Guinea and Sierra-Leone was resolved, and the 
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Constitutive Act of the African Union with the NEPAD as its economic variant was adopted by 
AU. Obasanjo was succeeded by Umaru Yar’ Adua on 29 May, 2007.  
The Yar’Adua administration adopted a citizen-diplomacy-styled foreign policy behaviour, with 
Africa remaining the corner-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, while the interests of Nigerians 
took pre-eminence over subregional, continental and global issues. These ideas were at their 
conception stage when Yar’ Adua died in office on May 5, 2010, and was succeeded by his 
deputy—Goodluck Jonathan. Except for Nigeria’s strong opposition to the undemocratic change 
of government in Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2011, the deployment of troops to Mali in 2012 and 
the construction of military clinics and barracks its army, and Nigeria’s recognition of 
Transitional National Council (TNC) in Libya, after Gadaffi’s ouster, Nigeria’s foreign policy 
behaviour suffered a terminal decline under the Jonathan presidency.  
Based on the forgoing, it is thought that a cursory overview of the personalised nature of 
Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour could be useful to the understanding of Nigeria’s conflict 
intervention roles in Africa.    
 
4.4. The personalised nature of Nigeria’s foreign policy   
I have tonight been advised by the Council of Ministers that they had come to the unanimous decision to 
voluntarily hand over the administration of the country to the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic with 
immediate effect. All Ministers are assured of their personal safety by the new administration. I will now 
call on the General Officer Commanding, Major-Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi to make a statement on the Policy of the 
New Administration.426 
The above excerpt by the then Acting President of Nigeria, Orizu Nwafor, marked the beginning 
of what later became the military incursion into the murky waters of Nigeria’s politics. In the 
end, the era spanned 33 years (15 January 1966 to 28 May 1999) in between which Nigeria had a 
civilian interregnum between 1 October 1979 and 31 December 1983. In terms of foreign policy 
articulation and execution, much of the events which panned out during this era were largely a 
product of individual leadership idiosyncrasies and ideological orientation, although each of the 
                                                          




regimes still moderately anchored their foreign policy actions on the constitutionally-backed and 
Africa-centred foreign policy orientation. 
Another factor which further evinces the personalised nature of foreign policy-making under the 
military is the interpretation of “national interest”, a concept defined by Krasner as “a set of 
societal goals perceived over time with a consistent ranking of importance, thus serving as a 
guideline for the conducting of a country’s foreign policy and its relationship with the external 
environment”.427 In Nigeria’s instance however, and more specifically under military rule, the 
interpretation of the concept is subject to the ideological/personal and leadership orientation of 
the “big man” in office. Foreign policy decision-making under the military was totally at variance 
with constitutionalism by virtue of the fusion of the executive and the legislative arms of 
government under one central authority.428 
This arrangement created a situation where the head of state wielded absolute powers by virtue of 
being the commander-in-chief (C-in-C), and the highest-ranking officer/general whose decisions 
are final, and any deviation from such orders by the subordinates was punishable by court-
martial.429 From 1966 to 1999, the military ran its show in Nigeria through a command structure 
and totalitarian decision-making body couched under different appellations. The command 
structure was called the Supreme Military Council (SMC) under the regimes of Generals Aguiyi 
Ironsi, Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Mohammed, Olusegun Obasanjo and Muhammadu Buhari 
(January 1984-August 1985).430 
The succeeding Ibrahim Babangida regime preferred a change in nomenclature and adopted the 
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) before changing it to the National Defence Council 
(NDC) towards the end of his regime. Generals Sani Abacha and Abdul-Salami Abubakar 
preferred the term Provisional Ruling Council (PRC).431 Regardless of these name changes, one 
                                                          
427 Krasner, S. (1978). Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
Princeton University Press.  
428 Fawole, W. A. (2003).  Nigeria’s External Relations and Foreign Policy under Military Rule (1966-1999), OAU 
Press, p.12. 
429 Garba, J. (1991). Diplomatic Soldiering. Spectrum Books Ltd. 
430 Fawole, W. A. (2003).  Nigeria’s External Relations and Foreign Policy under Military Rule (1966-1999) Ile Ife, 
Nigeria: OAU Press Ltd, p.12. 




major constant in their foreign policy decision-making is that the absolute will of the individual 
in power always prevailed—a phenomenon Fawole argued as a consequence of the military’s 
hierarchical structure, discipline and espirit de corps.432 This explains how the Yakubu Gowon 
regime (1966-1975) was able to articulate a tripartite foreign policy posture on (1) African 
continental issues, (2) a domestic regional policy, and (3) a global level policy.433  
On the continental front, the Gowon regime, premising its action on the violation of Nigeria’s 
commitment to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, severed 
diplomatic relations with African countries such as Gabon, Côte d”Ivoire, Tanzania, Zambia, the 
Israeli, Portuguese and French governments over their recognition of, and support given to, the 
secessionist Biafra group434 during Nigeria’s 1967-1970 civil war.435 Gowon did not also mince 
words on his regime’s intention to turn the heat on the backers of the remaining vestiges of 
colonisation in Africa, including apartheid South Africa.  
Gowon had warned: 
Let no one deceive himself that South Africa is spending $540million for defense purposes and seeking to 
acquire nuclear capability only to come to terms with independent Africa and grant the right of self-
determination to her African population. South Africa is growing an octopus. It is reaching beyond its 
territories. It is exporting its racist policies. It is being used by the imperialists’ powers to regain their 
foothold on Africa.436 
To curb Pretoria’s apartheid-motivated hegemonic tendencies, and as shown below, Gowon 
increased Nigeria’s strategic and financial support to liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa.437 
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Table 4.2: Nigeria’s contribution to the OAU liberation committee from 1963 to 
1966 and 1970 to 1973 
 









It is also worth noting that Gowon operated a highly-personalised foreign policy, as evidenced in 
a number of decisions the regime took. These includes: the (aborted) decision to dispatch 
Nigerian troops to Niger in 1972 to forestall a coup against his friend, President Hamani Diori; 
the sponsoring of numerous Technical Aid Schemes to the countries under the ACP grouping; the 
support Nigeria gave to the creation of ECOWAS; the regime’s politics of oil diplomacy, where 
oil was sold at concessionary rates to countries sympathetic to the Nigerian cause during its civil 
war; the concession of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon in 1975; the road projects executed in 
Benin Republic; the sugar factory constructed in Senegal, among others.439 
Continuing Gowon’s legacy, but exhibiting a more aggressive posture towards Western 
imperialism, Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making, under Murtala/Obasanjo, was equally at 
his behest, with occasional insignificant inputs from his major advisers in his ruling council. This 
development explains how a strong-willed and self-opinionated ruler like General Murtala 
Mohammed was unilaterally able to recognise the MPLA in 1975, without recourse to the views 
of his colleagues at the SMC.440 The same also goes for the Olusegun Obasanjo regime, which 
single-handedly nationalised the assets of British Petroleum (BP) in 1979, and declined visiting 
Britain during his regime in protest against Britain’s continuous denial of independence to 
Rhodesia.441 
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For Muhammadu Buhari, closing Nigeria’s borders against fellow West Africans, described as 
illegal aliens from neighbouring Chad in 1985, remains the most important exemplification of the 
personalised nature of foreign policy decision-making. Under his watch, Nigeria’s borders were 
closed, despite the repeated pleas by the governments of Niger and Chad, whose economic 
survival depended on cross-border transactions and commerce.442 His foreign policy rigidity was 
so pronounced that not even the offer of the chairmanship of ECOWAS to him could change his 
stance.443 The Babangida regime was equally not exempted from this personalised foreign policy 
decision-making pattern, in view of the way ECOWAS was made to function under his watch. As 
argued by Adebajo, Babangida, through the instrumentality of ECOWAS, sought to create for 
himself an image of “a fearless, brave and great leader” whose memory he hoped would remain 
indelible in Nigeria’s contemporary history.444 
Babangida employed the Nigerian Army as a platform to demonstrate to the international 
community that Nigeria had the capacity to maintain peace within its constituency.445 A further 
manifestation of his personalised foreign policy decision-making orientation was his decision to 
unilaterally register Nigeria as a member-country of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, 
despite wide protests from the Christian dominated South, and the constitutional description and 
recognition of Nigeria as a secular state.446 General Sani Abacha towed the Babangida path, but 
this time, disruptively. As Fawole argues, “not only was Abacha paranoid at home, he also 
suspected that there was an insidious international conspiracy against his regime”.447 Abacha saw 
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foreign policy-decision-making as a vital opportunity to “hit back” at his “foreign enemies” and 
an avenue to crudely act in defiance of international opinion about his regime.448   
Under Abacha, Nigeria effectively became a pariah state and was expelled from the 
Commonwealth, in the light of his maximum rulership and the execution of the “Ogoni 9” in 
1995, despite a massive international plea for their release.449  The last trace of military rule in 
Nigeria was the Abdulsalami Abubakar regime which had a marginally different approach to 
foreign policy execution, maintaining a balance between personal ambition and utilitarianism. As 




This chapter reveals that there appears to be a nexus between Nigeria’s foreign policy principles 
and objectives, and the decisions taken by its leaders to intervene in conflicts in Africa, most of 
which have been tied to Nigeria’s age-long commitment to an African-centred foreign policy 
orientation. The chapter shows that while the substance of Nigeria’s foreign policy remained the 
same, Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour towards Africa varied from regime to regime 
depending on the orientations of the political leadership. In addition, the prevailing domestic 
(political, economic and socio-cultural realities) and international environment have also been 
identified as major determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour in the period under 
review. The chapter finds in the early years of Nigeria’s independence, the framers of its foreign 
policy exhibited a strong sense of collective identity, as evident in the support they gave to the 
United Nations Organisation (UNO) and the OAU. 
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Evidently, Nigeria’s leadership at that time sought to build bridges across the divide and 
arguably harboured no ambitious or hegemonic intentions. The chapter also notes there was a 
gradual shift from a conservative foreign policy orientation in the early stages of independence to 
a more assertive posture when the military took over in 1966, and that a number of Nigeria’s 
foreign policy objectives at independence were laden with ideological values which are not 
necessarily realist in orientation. As seen for example in its (foreign policy) provision which 
seeks to promote African unity, and all other forms of international cooperation conducive to the 
consolidation of universal peace, and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states, 
and is its desire to pursue the collective promotion of the values of cooperation and peaceful 
coexistence in Africa and maintain a principle of nonalignment in interaction with the rest of the 
world. 
Similarly, claims by Nigeria that it has a moral obligation to respect the territorial sovereignty of 
states, respect civilised rules of interaction in its engagement with the rest of the world, and a 
general commitment to internationally-agreed mechanisms of resolving conflicts, shows the 
inadequacy of a single approach in explaining Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour, as these 
commitments are built around the notion of collective identity. To a considerable extent, and as 
demonstrated in this chapter, individual leadership idiosyncrasies and ideological orientation of 
Nigeria’s past and present leadership, culminated in a personalised foreign policy behaviour with 
little or no evidence of a clear-cut guiding principle, as these behaviours were at the discretion of 
the ‘‘big man in Abuja’’. Under military rule, for example, a number of Nigeria’s conflict 
intervention roles in Africa, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, have been interpreted in 
some circles as hegemony-laden, which structural realism could explain. Yet, sustained attempts 
were made during this time to strengthen economic ties, and provide technical assistance to 
Nigeria’s contiguous states, and other states in Africa, and this is evidently antithetical to the 
dictates of structural realism.  
The chapter also evinces that Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour since its return to civil rule in 
1999, though assertive, has progressed towards a more identity-themed approach to conflict 
intervention, in contrast to what obtained during military rule. Since 1999, more attention has 
been paid to subregional and regional integration through the domestication of a number of 




institutionalisation of NEPAD is very apt in this regard. Perhaps a clear demonstration of this 
behavioural shift was the role played by Nigeria during the election crisis in the Gambia in 
January 2017, where it demonstrated an “unusual patience”, while the negotiations lasted. As 
evinced in this chapter, employing the eclectic approach—a combination of both structural 
realism and social constructivism approaches to interpret Nigeria’s foreign policy principles and 
objectives and foreign policy behaviour, has the potential to mitigate the analytic complexities 
that could arise if the chapter had relied on only one of the IR approaches. We will focus more 
on the analytic utility embedded in eclecticism in chapter eight of the study. Nigeria’s conflict 






















In chapter four the study examined Nigeria’s foreign policy from the perspective of its principles 
and objectives. Specific attempts were made to examine Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour 
towards Africa, and how the personalised nature of its foreign policy affects its conflict 
intervention roles. This chapter focuses on Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone with a view to 
ascertaining the extent to which the intervention aligns with its Africa-centred foreign policy as 
established in the previous chapter. This is achieved by assessing the causal factors and central 
issues which defined Sierra Leone’s civil war between 1991 and 1998, and Nigeria’s response, 
through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).  
Without necessarily conceding, our argument in this chapter is that structural realism helps us to 
appreciate the relative power pursuit of Nigeria’s leaders (although we will return to this in detail 
in chapter eight), in its country’s intervention role in Sierra Leone. At the same time, it is clear 
that structural realism can take us only so far, as Nigeria’s behaviour also illustrates that its 
commitment to African values and solidarity is more than just a smokescreen for the specific 
regional hegemonic interests that Nigerian leaderships have been pursuing. Of course, the waters 
are muddied from a constructivist perspective, that is—by the large role that the personal 
commercial interests of Nigeria’s Sani Abacha had in precipitating Nigeria’s intervention.  
This chapter is divided into five sections, together with this introduction. The second section 
focuses on the centrifugal and centripetal issues which led to the conflict in Sierra Leone. The 
third undertakes a retrospective appraisal of the role played by ECOWAS/ECOMOG in the 
conflict episode. In the fourth section, we examine the contending explanations for Nigeria’s 
involvement, in particular, whether its intervention was motivated by a humanitarian 
responsibility to protect the civilian population or certain personal interests. The fifth section 
offers its concluding remarks. We begin our discussion with a summary of the remote and 




5.2 The Sierra Leone civil war: causes and issues  
At independence in 1961, Sierra Leone had all the legal trappings of a functioning democratic 
state: a democratically-elected parliament by universal franchise, a relatively-independent 
judiciary, an executive and a parliament, and a relatively-efficient civil service.451 However, 
Sierra Leone’s promising future suffered a setback in 1967, after the general election when an 
army commander stepped in to prevent the opposition All People’s Congress (APC), which won 
the elections, from succeeding the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP).452 That singular 
act marked the beginning of the state-failure crisis of Sierra Leone, which peaked in 1991, and 
led to the outbreak of a civil war. By the time the war broke out, Sierra Leone had become a 
failed state where all vital social and political institutions had either collapsed or had ceased to 
function, and the economy had gone bankrupt through neo-patrimonial politics and kleptocracy. 
The civil war in Sierra Leone started as a spill over from the Liberian crisis which began in 1989, 
and two broad explanations have been advanced as to its remote cause—the long term and 
immediate causes.453 According to Zack-Williams, the long-term cause of the conflict was 
predicated on the feelings of alienation by Sierra Leoneans towards the uninterrupted spell of 
autocracy witnessed under the All People’s Congress (APC).454  The APC, under Siaka Stevens, 
unseated the Sierra Leone’s Liberation People’s Party (SLPP),455 but was prevented from 
assuming power, following a putsch led by Brigadier David Lasana.456  
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In May 1967, Major A.T. Juxon staged a coup (on behalf of Siaka Stevens) to oust Brigadier 
Lasana.457 Stevens’ return to power marked the beginning of Sierra Leone’s constitutional 
degeneration, the rise of personal rule, and economic decline.458 His regime was greeted by 
growing economic crisis and challenges from counter-hegemonic forces such as the labour and 
student unions on the polity.459 This produced an anti-theses of growing political 
authoritarianism and repression of the civilian population.460 Sierra Leone’s gradual descent into 
a failed state became more apparent when the regime lost the ability to impose discipline on the 
elite involved in the smuggling of its diamonds and gold.461  
Stevens’ governance failures, as Adebajo argues, “were exacerbated by an economic crisis 
brought about by political corruption and a difficult international economic climate. A rapacious 
Sierra Leonean political class and a parasitic Lebanese business clique, combined to loot the 
country’s diamond revenues, even as agricultural production collapsed”.462 This loss of legal 
sovereignty rattled the rank and file of the ruling APC, and forced Siaka Stevens to hand over 
power to his force commander, Major-General Joseph Seidu Momoh in 1985.463 Under Momoh, 
Sierra Leone’s economy further plummeted, while the government declared a state of economic 
emergency, and introduced stiffer anti-corruption measures, and plans to check illegal gold 
mining and diamond smuggling.464  
Momoh’s political relationship with the political elite in the APC worsened, after treason charges 
were brought against Francis Minah, who was subsequently executed, having been accused of 
planning to topple the Momoh-regime.465 Minah’s execution widened the belief held by leaders 
of the southern province that Momoh’s politics of divide-and-rule and ethnic favouritism was a 
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calculated attempt to deny them the presidency.466 The government also attempted to stifle public 
criticism by maintaining a hard-line posture to agitations from labour unions, and their leaders, 
among whom was Foday Sankoh—a rural itinerant photographer and student activist, who later 
led a rebel movement known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).467 Although Foday 
Sankoh’s RUF portrayed itself as a political movement promoting a better Sierra Leone, in 
reality the movement was no more than a group of thugs who killed, raped, looted and used the 
precious diamond mines as a means of exchange for arms and ammunitions.468 To most Sierra 
Leoneans, “the RUF was a movement whose method of revolutionary struggle served to alienate 
the larger society from its so called revolutionary agenda”.469  
The RUF, as Abdullah notes, defied all available typologies of guerrilla movements. It was 
neither a separatist uprising rooted in a specific demand, as in the case of Eritrea, or a reformist 
movement with a radical agenda superior to the regime it sought to overthrow.470 Nor did it 
possess the kind of leadership necessary to qualify as a warlord insurgency. Rather, it was a 
peculiar guerrilla movement without any significant national following or ethnic support.471 The 
notoriety of the group has been aptly captured by Ryan Lizza, when he described the RUF as “a 
group that would typically enter a village, round up children, with girls as young as ten getting 
raped, while the boys are forced to execute village elders and sometimes their own parents. Once 
the past was cut off from the children, they are hooked on speed”.472 By 1991, the RUF had 
captured most of the eastern part of the country and created a refugee crisis. People fled into the 
capital of Freetown and into other neighbouring countries.473 
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In March 1991, motivated by the desire to sack the Momoh regime, Foday Sankoh’s RUF 
successfully attacked the town of Bormalu, Kailahun district, in the south-eastern corner of 
Sierra Leone near its border with Liberia. On 29 April, 1992, a coup led by Captain Valentine 
Strasser ousted the Momoh regime on the pretext that the regime was incapable of dealing with 
the challenges posed by the Sankoh-led RUF. Like the Momoh regime, Strasser was unable to 
counter the RUF insurgency, despite the expansion of the army’s capacity to about 14,000 
soldiers and the recruitment of young Sierra Leoneans he had earlier described as the “lumpen 
youth”474 and thugs.475   
In a bid to counter Strasser’s renewed military offensive, Foday Sankoh’s RUF enlisted the 
support of Charles Taylor, a long-time ally he had known during their guerrilla warfare trainings 
in Libya, where the idea of challenging the APC rule was first mooted. 476 By then, Foday 
Sankoh had gained control of Sierra Leone’s major economic bases, particularly the Kono, 
Moyamba and Bonthe districts housing the diamond, bauxite, and rutile mines. Taylor wasted no 
time in acceding to Sankoh’s request, which he saw as an opportunity to extract his pound of 
flesh on the Momoh regime, who had earlier declined his request to use the north of Sierra Leone 
as a launch base for his armed insurgency during the Liberian civil war.477  
So for Charles Taylor, providing support for Foday Sankoh was a matter of personal interest, and 
an opportunity to expand his sphere of influence in a country he considers vital to the continuity 
of his reign of terror in Liberia. Scholars have therefore summarised the motivations behind 
Charles Taylor’s support for the RUF along the following lines: (1) force the withdrawal of 
Sierra Leone from ECOMOG, (2) help install his Revolutionary United Front (RUF) allies in 
power in Freetown, and by so doing, hope to (3) profit from the diamond trade in Sierra Leone.478 
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Furthermore, a deeply destabilised Sierra Leone, as Richards argue, would be in Taylor’s interest 
in economic terms, since the border region between Sierra Leone and Liberia was abundant in 
natural resources, including diamonds.479  
By November 1994, the RUF had successfully launched several “hit-and-run attacks all over the 
country and also established new forward camps”.480 The Strasser regime responded by reaching 
out to a South Africa-based mercenary group known as Executive Outcomes (EO) to help with 
the training of its army and the Kamajor militias.481 This effort achieved moderate success, as the 
mines were reconquered in August 1995, but it was not enough to stop a palace coup led by 
Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, Strasser’s Chief of Defence Staff, and the deputy head of the 
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from toppling him.482 The Bio regime caved in to 
international and local pressure, especially from the British and US ambassadors, who called for 
the restoration of democracy, while the Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace (SLWMP), 
remained defiant through its anti-military demonstrations, in the face of a strong military 
opposition by the Democratic Consultative Conference (Bintumani II).483  
Ahmed Tejan-Kabbah emerged victorious from the Presidential election held in February 1996, 
under the banner of the SLPP, even though voting did not take place in the north and eastern 
parts of the country.484 As it was with previous governments, Kabbah had no effective and loyal 
army that could challenge the RUF’s control of the diamond-rich zones they held.485 An attempt 
to resolve the crisis through the “Abidjan Accord” of 30 November 1996, brokered by Côte 
d’Ivoire, where a Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG), aimed at disarming the warring factions, 
withdrawing the South African mercenaries (Executive Outcomes), and repatriating all foreign 
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troops from Sierra Leone, achieved little or no result. This action led to the collapse of the 
agreement reached at the Abidjan Accord.486  
Responding to the breakdown of the Abidjan accord, the Nigerian government, acting under the 
auspices of the ECOWAS-Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), assumed full responsibility for 
Kabbah’s protection, particularly after the latter’s expulsion of EO, and increased the troops it 
stationed in Sierra Leone.487 Notwithstanding the increased security presence in Freetown, 
Kabbah’s government was toppled by Major Johnny Paul Koromah in a putsch known as “the 
Sobel Coup” on 25 May, 1997. A combination of five nations, led by Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, 
Côte d’Ivoire, and later Liberia, acting under the auspices of ECOWAS, imposed sanctions on 
the junta in Freetown, which the troops from Nigeria, Ghana, and Guinea were asked to 
implement.488 Similarly, the international community refused to recognise the Koromah junta, 
despite the Commonwealth’s invitation of the latter to its 1987 Edinburgh summit, while the 
OAU (as it then was) condemned the coup, and barred the junta from all its summits.489  
The Koromah regime responded by discontinuing talks with ECOWAS,490 (details of which are 
explained below), leading to the establishment of a sub-regional peacekeeping force—ECOMOG 
II-in Freetown, during which all ships and aircrafts movements were barred from entering the 
country while the United Nations Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on Sierra 
Leone in October 1997.491 There was also increased activity on the diplomatic front, with talks 
on a possible peaceful resolution of the conflict, held in Conakry, Guinea. Meanwhile, the 
Nigerian troops had begun their military assault on RUF, and sustained it until their expulsion in 
March 1998.492 The combination of both military and diplomatic efforts eventually led to the 
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Conakry agreement which restored Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to power on 22 April, 1998.493 The 
table below provides a summary of the other actors involved in the civil war. 
 
Table 5.1: The actors in the Sierra Leone civil war 
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Obvious from our explanations above is the indispensable role played by ECOWAS, through its 
conflict intervention mechanism, ECOMOG, in the conflict. The succeeding discussion assesses 
this role in detail. 
 
5.3 ECOWAS /ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone 
The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is the 
peacekeeping/intervention force of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), which was established in May 1975, as a sub-regional economic institution aimed 
at achieving an economically and politically stable and developing region. Upon its formation, 
ECOWAS was mandated with the task of forging economic integration among its member-
states. The journey towards the creation of a subregional security force began at an ECOWAS 
summit in Lomé in 1980, where the governments of Togo, Senegal, and Nigeria pushed for a 
common defence pact.495  
This development led to the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Mutual Assistance on 
Defence (MAD) at an ECOWAS summit in Freetown on 29 May, 1981, although the 
governments of Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali declined to ratify the protocol. The main 
thrust of the 1981 protocol was the promise of “mutual aid and assistance for defense” in the 
event of an externally instigated or supported armed threat or aggression against a member-state. 
The protocol subsequently called for the establishment of an Allied Armed Forces of the 
Community (AAFC), consisting of standby forces from ECOWAS states and other supporting 
institutions,496 but it was not until 1993 that the organisation revised its treaty to also 
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accommodate security matters,497 although, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was activated in 1990.  
ECOMOG, according to Maxwell Khobe, is a non-standing military force consisting of land, sea 
and air components, set up by member-states of ECOWAS to deal with the security problem that 
followed the collapse of the formal state structure in Liberia in 1990.498 The formation of 
ECOMOG is therefore believed to be a response to West Africa’s notoriety as a hotbed of 
political, economic and social agitation, and a means to counter the growth of insurgent and 
revolutionary movements often supported by economically-marginalised youths and estranged 
members of the elite.499  
At conception, the force was known as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC), 
which according to Article 4(b), provides for collective response where a member-state is a 
victim of internal armed conflict engineered and supported actively from outside, and which is 
likely to endanger the peace and security of other member-states.500 According to the Protocol, 
the AAFC would be used as follows: (1) where two member states are in conflict, the 
Community will interpose the Allied Armed Force of the Community (AAFC) between them as 
a peacekeeping force; (2) Where a member state is the victim of internal armed conflict 
supported from outside and its head of state has requested military assistance from the 
Community in writing, the AAFC will be sent to resolve the conflict as an intervention force.501  
Although the Protocol was invoked with respect to the Liberian crisis of 1989/90, the AAFC 
never materialised. Rather, a smaller group of ECOWAS member-states put together an 
intervention force known as ECOMOG.502 ECOMOG’s operational structure is categorised into 
three broad categories—intervention; peace enforcement; and peacekeeping.503 At the 
intervention stage, the mission involves combat action against insurgents or factions which resist 
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the authority of the de jure government. In the course of its peace-enforcement mission, 
ECOMOG monitors and enforces the provisions of the ceasefire. When these ceasefire 
agreements break down, ECOMOG missions change from intervention to peace enforcement.504  
Lastly, in the course of its peacekeeping missions, ECOMOG only intervenes when general 
anarchy has set in, with a primary mandate to protect the lives and properties of the civilian 
population by all means necessary. ECOMOG is thus perceived as a liberator by the larger 
society.505 It is within this context that the ECOMOG mandate in Sierra Leone can be 
understood.  ECOMOG’s voyage into Sierra Leone is believed to be in response to the ousting of 
the Kabbah regime by Major Johnny Paul Koromah in May 1997. The international community 
spoke loudly in condemnation of the coup. The O.AU, at its 33rd summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, 
called the action “a setback for Africa’s transition to democracy” and that “the development 
would not be welcome in Africa”.506 The UN similarly condemned the coup, noting that “Africa 
can no longer tolerate and accept as fait accompli, coups against elected governments, and the 
illegal seizure of power by military cliques”.507  
ECOWAS responded by moving hundreds of its troops in Liberia to bolster the skeletal 
ECOMOG force stationed at Lungi Airport, Freetown.508 Following the inability of the 
diplomatic moves led by Nigerian and British High commissioners to resolve the impasse, 
Nigerian naval vessels stationed off the coast of Freetown began shelling the capital on 2 June, 
1997,509 despite the strong opposition from Ghana, and Burkina Faso, who described the 
Nigerian action as unilateralist.510 However, that move resulted in heavy casualties and 
humiliation for the Nigerian forces, as the combined troops of RUF and AFRC, known as “The 
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People’s Army”, successfully repelled the attack, and took with them about 300 Nigerian troops 
as hostages.511  
Public opinion on the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone is divided. Some saw the 
ECOMOG troops as “as heroes, who prevented the takeover of their state by marauding, savage 
RUF rebels,” while others contended that ECOMOG was merely an imperial army of occupation 
which plundered their resources, impregnated their women, and failed to guarantee the security 
of their capital.512 Motivated by the desire to deflect these criticisms, Tom Ikimi, the Nigerian 
Minister Foreign Affairs launched a diplomatic offensive aimed at soliciting support for the 
Nigerian initiative. At the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Heads of government meeting 
that took place in Harare Zimbabwe (June 3, 1997), Nigeria’s Foreign Minister at the time, Tom 
Ikimi, denied that Nigeria was meddling in the internal affairs of Sierra Leone.  
Ikimi argued that:  
This is not interference. We at ECOWAS have always been interested in explosive situations that take 
place in our region which we see as endangering civilian lives and disturbing peace. Together with the 
international community we must not allow such a situation to continue. Nigeria is going to ensure that 
peace, stability and legitimate government are restored in Sierra Leone.513    
These calls later paid off, following the early reinstatement of the legitimate government of 
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the return of peace and security, and the resolution of the issues 
of refugees and displaced persons.514 In August 1997, ECOWAS foreign ministers formally 
mandated ECOMOG to “monitor the ceasefire, enforce sanctions and embargo, and secure peace 
in Sierra Leone”.515 That new Force, as Kabia notes, became known as ECOMOG II.516 The 
Force subsequently adopted a three-pronged strategy, namely, negotiation and dialogue, 
imposition of sanctions and enforcement of embargo, and the use of force, as its conflict-
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resolution mechanism in Sierra Leone.517 Appointed to drive this mechanism were the 
governments of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and, later, Liberia.518 With respect to 
negotiation and dialogue, the process started with meetings between ECOWAS representatives 
and the AFRC junta from July 17-18, 1997, and from July 29 -30, 1997. The talks later collapsed 
when the AFRC Chairman, Johnny Paul Koromah, announced a four-year timetable for the 
return of democracy and elections in Sierras Leone.519 The temporary setback notwithstanding, 
both parties were able to arrive at a comprehensive agreement known as the Conakry Accord in 
October 1997.520  
The accord among other things sought to: (1) reinstate the legitimate government of President 
Tejan Kabbah within a six–month period; (2) ensure immediate cessation of hostilities; (3) 
ensure the cooperation of the junta with ECOMOG in order to peacefully enforce the sanctions; 
(4) process the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants; (5) ease 
the provision of humanitarian assistance; (6) ensure the return of refugees and displaced persons; 
(7) provide immunities and guarantees to the leaders of the 25 May, 1997 coup; and (8) map out 
modalities for broadening the power base in Sierra Leone.521 The Conakry Accord soon hit 
another brick wall, when the junta reneged on the earlier agreed terms, and its additional demand 
that: (1) Foday Sankoh be unconditionally released, (2) that the Nigerian troops withdraw from 
ECOMOG, and (3) that the AFRC troops be exempted from DDR.522  
As a response, ECOWAS, rising from its 28-29th August meeting in Abuja, imposed “a general 
and total embargo on all supplies of petroleum products, arms, and military equipment to Sierra 
Leone, with the exception of humanitarian goods vetted by ECOMOG, and weapons and 
ammunitions meant for their use”.523 ECOWAS further campaigned vigorously within the 
international community, calling on member-states to respect and help enforce the sanctions.524 
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The UN responded through UNSCR 1132, and asked neutral states such as Kenya, Sweden, and 
Costa Rica to oversee the implementation of the sanctions.525 The question which arises from the 
forgoing is: to what extent did the sanctions change the existing situation? 
This becomes necessary given that the main essence of sanctions, as Oudraat argues, is its ability 
to deter warring parties from engaging in certain detrimental actions or compel them to reverse 
certain political or military acts.526 In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG did remarkably well in enforcing 
the blockade on arms and ammunition to the rebels, notwithstanding the lack of modern patrol 
and reconnaissance equipment.527 After initial lapses, which led to breaches of the embargo by a 
few vessels and aircraft using an old airstrip in Magburaka, northern Sierra Leone, ECOMOG, 
was able to prevent would-be sanction busters from entering the Freetown port, while its air 
patrol team intercepted arms supplies from Monrovia.528 However, this was not without 
incidents, as ECOMOG’s heavy-handed approach made the sanctions counter-productive, with 
allegations from human rights groups that the ECOMOG Force shelled vessels carrying food and 
other humanitarian aid.529  
In February 1998, the ECOMOG troops mounted Operation Stand Storm, in response to the 
AFRC-led attack on its Jui Garrison and ousted the Koromah regime, barely a week after the 
operation commenced.530 According to Kabia, the rapid success recorded by ECOMOG in Sierra 
Leone has been attributed to a number of factors.531 First, there was a massive civilian and rank 
and file military opposition to the Koromah led coup, thus the ECOMOG Force benefitted from 
sensitive intelligence report from state soldiers who acted as spies for the mission.532 Second, the 
civil defence force, especially the Kamajors were actively involved in the running the pro-
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Kabbah “Radio Democracy” on air, presenting programmes which did not only demoralise the 
ragtag “people’s army”, but also helped instil confidence in the civilian population.533 
Third, the AFRC fighters had lost the support of the civilian population due to their largely 
undisciplined and unprofessional conduct; hence the ECOMOG troops were able to infiltrate 
their camps through civilian moles.534 Lastly, the RUF and the Sierra Leone Liberation Army 
(SLA), suffered a clear breakdown of command structure, due to the “pleasure” they derived 
from inflicting gross human rights abuses on the civilian population, and the looting of state 
assets.535 Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was reinstated back to office in February 1998, barely one month 
after the Nigerian led-ECOMOG troops launched a major offensive against the AFRC soldiers 
and the RUF rebels. The succeeding discussion examines the motivating factors and contending 
explanations for Nigeria’s involvement in the conflict. 
  
5.4 Nigeria in Sierra Leone: exercising the responsibility to protect or protecting 
personal interest? 
Scholars are unanimous in their argument that Nigeria’s conflict intervention roles in Africa are 
intricately linked to its Africa-centred foreign policy orientation and the silent role of what Bolaji 
Akinyemi calls the concept of Pax Nigeriana.536  This Pax Nigeriana philosophy articulates how 
Nigeria’s demographic preponderance, its economic and natural endowments, and its staggering 
human resources have been utilised to provide leadership for Africa.537 To be sure, nearly all of 
Nigeria’s military leaders have regarded Nigeria as a benevolent hegemon, “big brother” and 
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“Giant of Africa,” with a manifest destiny and responsibility to provide security and help spread 
prosperity in Africa.538  
The reasons for this are not farfetched.  In the years when the military held sway, according to 
Alade Fawole, Nigeria’s external relations went through a series of twists and turns, depending 
on both the character of the regime in power at any point in time and the personal idiosyncrasies 
of the different leaders, thereby influencing the choices that the country made, and the strategies 
and methodologies adopted for accomplishing their set objectives.539 This philosophy perhaps 
informs Nigeria’s commanding role in its various peacekeeping and conflict interventions in 
West Africa, through the instrumentality of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), and its military component—ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) – and also 
as a launch pad for its emergence as a respected actor on the continental scene.540  
This explains Aluko’s contention that: 
…the main ideas behind Nigeria’s initiative are political, security, and economic considerations. For 
political reasons Nigeria wants an arrangement that will put an end to colonial divisions in West Africa. 
Furthermore, she believes that such a step will put an end to border disputes and will be an important 
contribution to African unity.541 
 
By implication, Nigeria believes that through economic unity, the West African subregion will 
get closer to political unity, and the enthronement of economic and political stability in member-
states will greatly enhance its regional security. Nigeria’s intervention role in West Africa under 
the auspices of ECOWAS has therefore been argued as firmly motivated by its desire to 
cooperate with its neighbours who had depended substantially on foreign powers during the 
war.542 In fact, it has been noted that “Frances’ role in providing ammunitions and relief supplies 
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to secessionist Biafra from neighbouring Francophone states such as Côte d’Ivoire, Benin 
Republic, and Gabon, prompted Nigeria to forge closer ties with its neighbours in order to 
prevent the superpowers from invading the country via other West African states”.543  
In Sierra Leone, the argument for and against Nigeria’s military operation has continued to 
feature prominently in West African military literature, years after the end of the operation. 
While some justified Nigeria’s intervention as part of her foreign policy obligations, others have 
decried it for having ulterior motives.544 A version argues that it was a response to an attack on a 
Nigerian base by Koromah’s soldiers on 6 February, 1998,545 while another contends that Nigeria 
was just waiting for an excuse to avenge the loss suffered by its troops during the 1997 coup 
which ousted the Kabbah government.546 Indeed, Mortimer,547 and Berman and Sams have 
summarised the reasons for Nigeria’s intervention along the following lines: (1) Nigeria’s 
parochial ambitions in West Africa; (2) its desire to protect President Tejan Kabbah’s regime in 
Freetown; (3) its desire to protect Gen. Lansana Conté’s regime in Conakry; (4) its bid to prevent 
an alliance of warlords in the three Mano River states of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea; and 
(5) its need for a strategic presence in West Africa, and General Abacha’s desire to avoid 
domestic instability and a threat to his regime by diverting his soldiers to another peacekeeping 
mission.548 
These arguments have been contested. For example, Adekeye Adebajo argues that the contention 
that Nigeria used ECOMOG as a vehicle for the pursuit of its parochial ambitions in West Africa 
remains largely unsubstantiated, as Nigeria’s intervention and commitment to the war was 
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drastically cut down by the regimes of Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar and Olusegun Obasanjo.549 
He argues further that a number of ECOWAS states, particularly, Guinea and Liberia, had at 
various times expressed their gratitude to Nigeria for the sacrifices and efforts made towards the 
restoration of stability to the subregion, and for rescuing both countries from the refugee crisis 
which they were struggling to contain.550 By implication, Adebajo’s argument is that Nigeria’s 
intervention role in Sierra Leone was motivated largely by a commitment to its Africa-centred 
foreign policy disposition, as enshrined in its constitution, and a reflection of its avowed 
commitment to the ECOWAS project as a foundation member.     
Similarly, the argument that Nigeria intervened in Sierra Leone because its leaders were 
championing Nigeria’s strategic interests through the Kabbah regime as stated by Mortimer551 
has also been contested. Critics contend that “Abuja” acted rather pragmatically in Sierra Leone 
by choosing to remain neutral in the regime change in the country between 1992 and 1995, 
despite the fact that Joseph Momoh was a personal friend and classmate of Nigeria’s Ibrahim 
Babangida.552 The Abacha regime, as they argue, chose to defend the Kabbah government 
because the latter wanted to break the diplomatic isolation it suffered following the execution of 
the “Ogoni 9”.553  
In other words, a structural realist would argue that Abacha had a personal interest to protect in 
Sierra Leone, which he disguised in the form of re-affirming Nigeria’s Afro-centric foreign 
policy posture in Africa. And not necessarily according to the constructivist logic that Nigeria’s 
intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone can be likened to its reciprocation and recognition of the 
historical, political and social identity Nigeria shares with Sierra Leone through ECOWAS. 
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Furthermore, the argument that Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone was partly motivated by 
its desire to protect the Conté regime in Conakry has also been faulted.554 Critics argue that 
despite having its troops in Sierra Leone all through the Momoh, Strasser and Bio regimes, 
Nigeria refrained from intervening in the coups, despite having the resources to do so.555 And 
that  there is no evidence to suggest that the planners of the 1996 coup attempt in Conakry.1 
would have been hostile to Nigeria or ECOMOG if they had succeeded.556  
Some scholars have equally advanced a “domino theory” argument as a major motivating factor 
for Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone.557 This argument is premised on the assumption that 
Nigeria was trying to contain Charles Taylor by preventing the RUF from taking power,558 and to 
also ensure that Guinea, and inevitably the control of the Mano River Basin,  did not fall under 
the control of the warlords.559 This explanation has been found to be inadequate owing to its 
inability to explain why Nigeria reached an accord with Charles Taylor in 1995 and with the 
RUF in Lomé in 1999.560   
Opponents of this viewpoint argue that, while Abacha decided on a pragmatic rapprochement 
with Taylor in 1995 in order to cut losses in Liberia, four years down the line, precisely in 1999, 
the Obasanjo government opted to make peace with the RUF to allow for a safe exit of Nigerian 
troops from what Adebajo describes as a “bottomless Sierra Leonean cesspit”.561 Both Obasanjo 
and Abacha, as they argue, wanted to rid themselves of an intervention that was becoming 
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increasingly unpopular at home in order to focus on the task of governance without distractions 
abroad.562 
Similarly, the argument made by Richards that Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone was 
premised on its desire to maintain a presence in West Africa, following concerns over the 
growing francophone influence in the region, has been disputed. 563 Critics argue that it would be 
unfair to equate Abacha’s autocracy-motivated personal interest with that of Nigeria, and that 
Abacha was mainly courting France to break the cycle of the Anglo-American-led diplomatic 
isolation he faced at that time.564 This motive, as Francois Soudan argues, explains Abacha’s 
meeting with President Chirac at a Franco-African summit in Burkina Faso in December 1996, 
his government’s award of about $8 billion worth of contracts to French firms in Nigeria, and the 
announcement of French as Nigeria’s second official language.565 
Some other accounts of Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone hold that Nigeria got involved 
because of the opportunities available to plunder the country’s diamonds by ECOMOG 
soldiers.566 In response to this notion, a dissenting school of thought has argued, albeit admittedly 
that while some elements of the ECOMOG contingent profited from the looted goods in Liberia 
and may have benefited from the economic resources in Sierra Leone, this can scarcely explain 
Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone.567 They note that, as it was the case in Liberia, Nigerian 
Generals had more opportunities to enrich themselves through corruption by staying close to the 
treasury in Abuja, than remaining in the diamond fields of Kono.568  
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They further contend that the allegation that some members of ECOMOG may have engaged in 
profiteering activities in Sierra Leone was made without any supporting evidence, and that such 
illicit activity is synonymous with most peacekeeping missions around the globe, and can 
therefore not be described as unique to Nigerian soldiers.569 Our final point for consideration is 
the explanation that Nigeria went to Sierra Leone because of the desire of the Abacha regime to 
divert 7000 battle-hardened Nigerian soldiers from the concluding ECOMOG mission in Liberia, 
in a bid to prevent them from fuelling instability in Nigeria.570 This argument, according to 
Adebajo, has been described as “quite simply unconvincing, lacking in logic, and stretching the 
bounds of logic, by assuming that Abacha could have predicted the coup in Freetown and timed 
the deployment of his troops accordingly”.571  
Adebajo contends further that, “since there is no evidence that Abacha possessed the gift of 
prophecy, it would seem more rational to assume that he was reacting to a situation that 
presented itself  rather than acting out of any strategic motivations”.572 The coup in Sierra Leone, 
as Adebajo argues, was not of Abacha’s making, and that if it had not occurred, he certainly 
would have recalled his soldiers to Nigeria, as Charles Taylor demanded then.573 Deducible from 
these explanations is that there appears to be no right or wrong explanation as to why Nigeria 
intervened in Sierra Leone, but, there are at least two common threads running through these 
narrations. First, Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone appears in line with a number of 
constructivist arguments that: people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of 
the meanings that the world gives it;574 and that it is the ideational framework of identity and 
interests creation that informs the output of the actor to the international system.575  
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By implication, an assessment of the contending arguments for and against Nigeria’s 
intervention suggests that the country intervened based on the shared identity it has with Sierra 
Leone through ECOMOG, and its desire to demonstrate its commitment to its Africa-centred 
foreign policy orientation, which sees Africa in general, and West Africa in particular has the 
basis of its identity. Second, while Nigeria’s interest via ECOMOG in Sierra Leone can be 
appreciated within the overall context of the country’s declared Afro-centric policy in general 
and its pursuit of sub-regional integration in particular, it must also be emphasised that the 
intervention was largely driven and motivated by the leadership idiosyncrasies of the Babangida 
and Abacha regimes, who saw the Sierra Leonean conflict episode as an avenue to “settle old 
scores”, and to test their popularity within the subregion through their relative power pursuits.  
By intervening in Sierra Leone therefore, Babangida and Abacha, using the Nigerian army as an 
instrument of foreign policy articulation, appears to have fulfilled the structural realist argument 
which focuses on how actors pursue their goals strategically to protect their national interests, 
regardless of preferences. For example, it has been argued that Nigeria’s Babangida expedited 
the processes leading to the formation of ECOMOG to protect Liberia’s Samuel Doe (who was 
his personal friend), and as a vehicle to project Nigeria’s influence throughout the region.576 
Thus, according to Osakwe, “with a settlement in Liberia, Sierra Leone became the frontline of 
Nigeria’s regional security role, Nigeria’s Sani Abacha pursued the war to ensure the survival of 
Sierra Leone’s democratically elected government”. 577 However, it is imperative to note that the 
debate on if the need to protect the national interest was a primary consideration for Nigeria’s 
intervention in Sierra Leone is not a straight one.   
As Ufo Uzodike notes, the notion of what constitutes a country’s national interest is rarely ever 
static.578 What constitutes a country’s national interest, as he argues, is “what the sitting 
government says it is, especially if the interests can be linked to critical issue-areas such as 
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security, ‘bread and butter issues’ and national prosperity, because Sierra Leone and Nigeria are 
both members of ECOWAS.”579  
ECOWAS, as Uzodike notes: 
….was created in 1975 as an instrument for regional integration, which ostensibly would benefit the biggest 
economy within the region – Nigeria. Along the way, it became clear that such a grand scheme cannot be 
realized in a conflict-ridden environment. Hence, member countries sought collect security/defense 
arrangements, which resulted in non-aggression protocols (PNA and PMAD) in late 1970s and early 1980s 
along with 1992 agreement to deal with arms proliferation to stem rebellions and other criminal activities.580 
 
These instruments were bolstered with the establishment of ECOMOG, and it was largely driven 
by Nigeria as part of its commitment to regional integration, and the conviction that the initiative 
was in the national interest, with the sense that what is good for the region is good for Nigeria.581 
Consequently, Nigeria’s decision to intervene in Sierra Leone, according to Uzodike, can be 
argued as being in line with the national interest if one is to be consistent about the initiatives to 
secure peace, integrate the economies and ensure economic growth and regional prosperity.   
Beyond that, scores of Nigerians, as he mentions, were living and working in Sierra Leone at the 
time of the conflict, and the protection of their persons and property would (normally) be seen to 
be in the national interest.582 As aptly summed up by Uzodike, “one could quiver over the form of 
intervention, but Nigeria’s decision not to intervene would have had consequences of monumental 
proportion, and it would have been highly parochial and unfortunate, since Nigerians, by virtue of 
their teeming population and very mobile tendencies – are more widely represented across West 
Africa and the continent than any other population group”.583 
Evidence from the chapter also suggests that Nigeria’s motivation for intervening in Sierra Leone, 
as exemplified by the Abacha junta, raises a question mark on what the country’s true intentions 
in Sierra Leone were, and the desirability of such involvement being advanced moving forward . 
For example, some analysts have argued that the Abacha junta, “expended a needless amount of 









energy on trying to maintain its monopoly on the country while fending off every attempt by the 
international community to categorize it as a pariah state”.584 This partly explains why Nigeria 
contributed 2000 of the 13000 troops to the ECOMOG mission in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 
1998, and why it spent about $8 billion on both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean missions.585  
Given the conspicuous role Abacha played in Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone therefore, 
and, based on our findings from this chapter,  it may be worth considering the possible personal 
interests the former had at stake in Sierra Leone. First, Abacha’s decision to intervene in Sierra 
Leone was motivated largely by his desire to break his self-imposed diplomatic isolation by 
demonstrating his regimes’ indispensability to peacekeeping in a region where the West was keen 
to avoid being drawn into humanitarian intervention.586 Accordingly, by helping to restore Kabbah 
to power, Abacha has again brought to the fore the relative power pursuits of Nigerian leaders, 
which he carefully disguised in the form of being a lover of democracy, despite the reverse 
occurring at home (Nigeria).   
Abacha’s relative power pursuit was again demonstrated in Sierra Leone when he helped install 
Maada Bio in office, a move scholars have argued as a payback for Strasser’s decision to vote in 
favour of sanctions against Nigeria at the 1995 Commonwealth summit in Auckland, in the wake 
of his junta’s execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine others.587  Second, Abacha’s decision to bring 
Nigeria’s full weight to bear in Sierra Leone was based on his desire to protect his economic 
interest in Sierra Leone’s oil refinery, which had earlier been conceded to the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) by the Kabbah regime.588  Third, intervening in Sierra Leone for 
Abacha meant an avenue for the latter to relaunch his plummeting image that had been severely 
damaged by his government’s poor human rights record at home. Abacha therefore wanted to use 
the ECOMOG mission to ward off threats of severe international sanctions against his regime in 
the wake of the execution of the “Ogoni 9”.  
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Thus, by intervening in Sierra Leone, Abacha, (as Babangida did in Liberia) wanted to make a 
statement, by using the Nigerian Army to prove to the West African subregion, Africa, and indeed 
the rest of the world, that he was a capable leader of a country with the necessary resources and 
capability to maintain peace in his backyard (West Africa) as chair of ECOWAS. Finally, 
Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone shows that its foreign policy articulation, particularly under 
the Babangida and Abacha regimes, was largely an instrument for self-accomplishment, while the 
doctrine of what constitutes its national interest was subject to their leadership idiosyncrasies. 
Indeed, it would seem that Nigeria’s commitment to Afro-centrism during the period only 
mattered as long as it satisfied the “big man” in Abuja.  
A country’s foreign policy orientation and articulation becomes questionable when it serves to 
fulfil the wishes of a select few, and not the larger interest. This development arguably represents 
a sad commentary on Nigeria’s foreign policy focus over the years, as experience has shown that 
its intervention in conflicts within its subregion and on the continent had always been at the 
discretion of its “big man”. A classic example of the influential role of the “big man” in Nigeria’s 
foreign policy articulation is manifested in the event which occurred between 1983 and 1985 
during the Shehu Shagari and Buhari/Idiagbon governments. In those instances, Nigeria’s 
leadership credentials in West Africa was severely dented when it expelled from Nigeria about 
2.7 million West African citizens from Niger and Chad termed “illegal aliens”.589  
This development has been interpreted as signs of Nigeria’s weakening commitment, and an 
increasingly-lukewarm attitude to ECOWAS, despite the regime justifying it as an economic and 
security necessity.590 On a positive note, we have also seen how the leadership orientation of the 
head of state/government can be brought to bear on a country’s foreign policy articulation and 
execution. This was displayed in the lead role Nigeria assumed during the decolonisation and 
anti-apartheid struggles, which the regimes of Yakubu Gowon (1967-1975), Murtala 
Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo/Shehu Yar’Adua (1975-76 to 1980) spearheaded.  
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While the foreign policy pursuit of these regimes, to a large extent can be described as moderately 
altruistic, and nationalist in nature, those of the Babangida and Abacha regimes do not adequately 
qualify to be so defined. Despite both regimes’ foreign policy articulation being intrinsically 
related to Nigeria’s commitment to its Africa-centred foreign policy principle, its eventual 
articulation, particularly in conflict resolution within the West African subregion, leaves the 
impression of a hegemon trying to assert its authority on its “subjects.” This narrative played out 
again in Sierra Leone. Nigeria’s unilateral intervention, without recourse to the UN, according to 
Mortimer, provoked sharp reactions from its neighbours.591  
For example, Burkina Faso’s leader at that time, Blaise Compaoré, who had a strong interpersonal 
relationship with RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, and Charles Taylor, questioned Nigeria’s motives, 
asking: “just what might be the intentions of those who have employed force for the restoration of 
President Kabbah?”592 Complaining specifically about the activities of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, 
Compaoré noted that the Nigerian soldiers “conducted themselves quite simply as an army of 
occupation, and that ECOMOG was going well beyond the mandate that was entrusted to it”.593 
Similarly, Sud-Quotidien, a Senegalese newspaper in its editorial, questioned Nigeria’s “eternal 
quest for leadership”, and also criticised what it called Nigeria’s “opportunism” in transforming 
Liberia into ECOMOG II in Sierra Leone.594   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined Nigeria’s role in the Sierra Leone civil war between 1991 and 1998, 
including the causal factors responsible for the war, the various contending explanations for its 
outbreak, the major actors involved, and the role played by ECOMOG in the decade-long war. 
The chapter finds out that the tragedy of the situation in Sierra Leone can partly be traced to the 
country’s historical heritage which gave rise to a whole generation of young men and women 
who had developed a lifestyle of war and looting, built on a common cosmology of joint 
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experiences of social exclusion.595 The chapter finds that the conflict in Sierra Leone is 
inextricably linked to the decades of social alienation, an unending neo-patrimonial rule, and the 
seeds of hatred implanted into the society by Sierra Leone’s political elite.  
The second part of the chapter demonstrated that personalities do play an exceedingly large role 
in the evolution of Nigeria’s foreign policy. If there is one area in which both structural realism 
and social constructivism fall short, it is in dealing with the role of leadership and the 
idiosyncratic interests of leaders, as evidenced for example in Nigeria’s Ibrahim Babangida and 
Sani Abacha role in Sierra Leone. Findings from this chapter also validate our arguments on the 
contentious nature of humanitarian intervention, in particular unilateral intervention in chapter 
one. Here, we have seen how an ambitious Sani Abacha employed the concept to achieve largely 
personal goals. We will examine this in detail in chapter eight, when we theoretically interpret 
Nigeria’s role in Sierra Leone from both structural realist and social constructivist perspectives. 
For now, we turn our attention to chapter six, where the focus is on the essential elements 
embedded in South Africa’s foreign policy. 
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Chapter 6: South Africa’s Foreign Policy and its Conflict 
Intervention Behaviour in Africa 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we assessed Nigeria’s conflict intervention role in Sierra Leone between 
1991 and 1998. Issues such as the centripetal and centrifugal causes of the war, the underpinning 
philosophy behind Nigeria’s and ECOWAS’ intervention, and the extent to which the domestic 
political environment in Nigeria (at that time) influenced its intervention in the conflict formed 
the core of our consideration. However, our focus in this chapter is to replicate what we did in 
chapter four, where we assessed Nigeria’s foreign policy, and used same to provide an analytical 
background to its intervention in Sierra Leone as demonstrated in chapter four. Drawing 
references from this pattern, the core of this chapter is devoted to examining South Africa’s 
foreign policy and its conflict intervention behaviour in Africa, with a view to using it as a 
foundation upon which our assessment of South Africa’s intervention in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) in the next chapter is premised. In the final analysis, the central 
objective is to prepare the ground for an examination of the extent to which structural realism or 
constructivism accounts for Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict intervention behaviour in chapter 
seven. 
South Africa is a relative newcomer to international peacekeeping, commencing its contributions 
in 1998 with the deployment of personnel in what it claimed was a Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) intervention in Lesotho. South Africa’s first UN deployment 
came in 1999 through the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC), but its first major UN contribution came in 2004 when South African troops 
stationed in Burundi as part of the African Union (AU) mission there were reorganised to form 
the basis of the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB).596 Thus, with South Africa’s 
increasing role and importance in multilateral engagements, it became evident that the country’s 
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responsibility and participation in furthering Africa’s peace agenda would expand. Although 
South Africa’s intervention history in conflicts is relatively new, its efforts in this regard cannot 
be understated.  
For example, South Africa was among the first countries to deploy military forces in support of 
the Burundi peace process in 2003.597 In 2000, during the peacekeeping mission in the DRC, the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF) spearheaded efforts to stabilise the country's 
internal politics, embarked on major reconstruction and development of infrastructure, and 
trained DRC troops.598 South Africa has similarly been a major contributor to the United Nations 
and African Union peacekeeping mission efforts, and has deployed troops and military observers 
in several of such missions, including in DRC, Burundi, Darfur, and Nepal. South Africa boasts 
of a number of statistics as an intervening force.  
It has an armed forces strength of 62,100 officers in active service, has contributed about 2,173 
peacekeepers (MONUSCO: 1,333 [6 experts, 1,327 troops], UNAMID: 817 [10 experts, 807 
troops], UNMISS 23 police officers), to several international peacekeeping missions, (making it 
the 8th largest African contributor); and between 2010 and 2016, it has consistently spent an 
average of 1.20% of its GDP on defence.599Thus, from an ostracised position within the 
international community spanning over four decades (1948-1994), South Africa has risen from 
an isolated international status in 1994, to one of the most-reckoned-with in Africa. Conscious of 
this new status, South African leaders had often argued that the country cannot survive in 
isolation, as its economic development and security is linked to the continent’s stability. They 
note that when South Africa brings about peace in the continent, it creates an environment that is 
conducive to reconstruction and development in its region, and enhances the possibilities of 
faster economic development.600  
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Basically, two major factors account for South Africa’s re-emergence on the international scene: 
(1) the broadening of the democratic space, which has seen South Africa thrive as a major 
economy in Africa over the last 23 years (1994-2017), and (2) its foreign policy orientation and 
articulation which has made remarkable progress in its attempt to overcome the remaining 
vestiges of apartheid. This chapter reviews South Africa’s conflict intervention behaviour in 
Africa against the background of its foreign policy. To achieve this, the chapter focuses on how 
the principles and practice of South Africa’s foreign policy manifest in, and interact with, its 
conflict intervention behaviour.  
This is intended to provide an analytical background on South Africa’s intervention in the DRC 
in chapter six, and ultimately, the central purpose of the study: which is to determine whether 
structural realism or constructivism best accounts for Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict 
intervention behaviour in Africa. It is worth noting also that our examination of South Africa’s 
foreign policy and its conflict intervention behaviour in Africa is focused on post-apartheid 
South Africa. This is for two principal reasons. First, South Africa’s relevance as a major player 
within the committee of nations began after the demise of apartheid in 1994. Second, the timing 
of the events which shaped South Africa’s intervention in the DRC happened post-apartheid.  
Along with this introduction, this chapter is structured into five sections. The second section 
undertakes a retrospective appraisal of the defining characteristics of South Africa’s foreign 
policy. The third focuses on the personalised nature of foreign policy making in post-apartheid 
Africa. In the fourth section, South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour towards Africa is in focus, 
while the fifth contains our concluding remarks. We begin our discussion with appraisal of the 








6.2 The characteristics of South Africa’s foreign policy  
South Africa’s foreign policy has significantly left the realm of the apartheid era when the 
Pretoria regime was considered a pariah state with an aggressive foreign policy that was focused 
on protecting white minority rule in an increasingly hostile regional and international 
environment.601 By 1993, an initial glimpse of the would-be focus of South Africa’s post-
apartheid foreign policy had been made known by the African National Congress (ANC) in a 
pre-election discussion paper entitled, “Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa”.602 
The ANC’s position was hinged on the belief that “foreign policy belongs to the South African 
people”, and that the foreign policy of a post-apartheid South Africa would be determined by the 
“belief that our foreign relations must mirror our deep commitment to the consolidation of a 
democratic South Africa”.603 
This position, according to Nel and Wyk, was reiterated by the ANC in its 1991 policy 
conference, where it affirmed that “the foreign policy of a democratic South Africa will be 
primarily shaped by the nature of its domestic policies and objectives directed at serving the 
needs and interests of our people”.604 In 1994, former President Nelson Mandela announced an 
ethical foreign policy meant  to establish South Africa as a “model global citizen”, and also help 
transform South Africa from the preserve of a racist, unjust, and authoritarian regime to a non-
racial, just, prosperous and democratic nation.605 Scholars have therefore attempted to situate the 
principle on which democratic South Africa’s foreign policy is constructed. For example, 
Schoeman has argued that South Africa’s foreign policy focus during the Mandela years was 
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inspired by an Afro-centric orientation and pattern that is very visible in the design of its foreign 
policy.606 
Schoeman’s observation was informed by former President Mandela’s argument that “South 
Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we 
too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts”.607  The ANC’s 
adoption of an African aligned foreign policy orientation is not without antecedents, given its 
long history and struggle with the White supremacist regime. For example, its 1994 foreign 
policy perspective in a democratic South Africa argued that the country’s economic and political 
destiny is intrinsically tied to that of its coexistence and the consolidation of the African 
continent.608 This normative position, as advanced by the ANC, is that South Africa, all through 
its apartheid years, fell short of acceptable national and internal standards of foreign policy and 
international relations conduct.609 
Motivated by the need to depart from this norm, Mandela advanced the following values as the 
essential planks on which post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy rests: (1) a reflection of 
Africa’s interest in South Africa’s foreign policy choices, (2) the belief that the enthronement of 
democracy globally is crucial to finding a just and lasting solution to the myriad of problems 
confronting the human race, (3) the need to view the human rights discourse as inalienable, and 
as such beyond political, economic, social, and environmental debates in international relations, 
(4) the need to respect the sacrosanct nature of justice and international law in international 
relations, and as a guide in the conduct of relations between nations, (5) ensuring economic 
development is dependent on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an 
interdependent world, (6) the notion that peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and 
where this breaks down, internationally agreed and non-violent mechanisms, including effective 
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arms-control regimes, must be employed, and lastly, (7) a belief that South Africa’s foreign 
relations must mirror a deep commitment to the consolidation of its democracy.610 
Named in the DFA annual report document of 2003/2004, the following were similarly identified 
as central to what should constitute the basic tenets of the country’s foreign policy: (1) Foreign 
policy is an integral part of government policy, and it is aimed at promoting security and 
improving the quality of life of all South Africans, (2) a commitment to the African Renaissance 
project through the African Union, and its programme for Africa’s development, namely, the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development, (3) a commitment to economic development through 
regional integration and development in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), (4) interact with African partners as equals, 
(5) pursue friendly relations with all peoples and nations of the world, and (6) safeguard South 
Africa’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.611 
By 2004, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) redefined South Africa’s foreign policy focus 
to reflect a broad vision which focuses on supporting the country’s key strategic priorities, 
including the speeding up of its service-delivery process, stimulating economic growth and 
employment, combating crime and corruption, transforming the state and building a better 
Africa, and demonstrating a commitment to a just and better world.612 As contained in the DFA 
Strategic Plan March 2004, South Africa’s foreign policy was defined as “a multidimensional set 
of policies, principles, strategies, objectives and plans” which “cannot be easily packaged into a 
neatly prescribed formula”.613 The document further identifies the general orientation of South 
Africa’s foreign policy that serves to define South Africa’s national values.614 
Specifically, the following principles were identified as guidelines for the conduct of South 
Africa’s foreign relations: (1) a commitment to the promotion of human rights; (2) a commitment 
to the promotion of democracy; (3) a commitment to justice and international law in the conduct 
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of international relations between nations; (4) a commitment to international peace and to 
internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts; (5) a commitment to 
Africa in world affairs; and, (6) a commitment to economic development through regional and 
international cooperation in an interdependent (and globalized) world.615  These principles were 
later revised by the DFA in its Strategic Plan 2007-2010 to accommodate the following: (1) 
consolidating the African agenda, (2) strengthening South-South cooperation, (3) strengthening 
North-South cooperation, (4) ensuring South Africa’s participation in the global system of 
governance, and (5) strengthening bilateral political and economic relations with all countries of 
the world.616 
In 2011, the DFA was restructured to accommodate the changing dynamics of international 
politics, and was renamed the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). 
Thus, in line with its transformation objectives, DIRCO, in 2011, released a White paper on 
South Africa’s foreign policy to serve as a framework for moving forward the country’s foreign 
policy articulation. Titled “Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu”, the document 
sought to: (1) promote South Africa’s national interest in a complex and fast-changing world, (2) 
shape and strengthen its national identity, (3) cultivate a new sense of national pride and 
patriotism by addressing the injustices of its past, including those of race and gender, and (4) 
help bridge the divides within the South African society to ensure social cohesion and stability, 
and ultimately, the growth of its economy, and the development and upliftment of its people.617 
Essentially, the document reaffirmed that South Africa’s national interests remain the principal 
driver of its foreign policy and a major determinant of its manner of engagement and interaction 
with the rest of the world. The document claims that, “in pursuing our national interests, our 
decisions are informed by a desire for a just, humane and equitable world order of greater 
security, peace, dialogue and economic justice”, and that “as the country engages with its region, 
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continent and the international community, it seeks to build an environment in which it can 
realise its national socio-economic agenda as well as its political and security interests”.618 
While reflecting national interest, the document adds that South Africa’s foreign policy will 
continue to: (1) recognise that states are interdependent and promotes cooperation over 
competition and collaboration over confrontation, (2) remain committed to the spirit of 
internationalism, pan-Africanism, and South-South solidarity, (3) reject colonialism and other 
forms of oppression, (4) pursue the quest for the unity and economic, and political and social 
renewal of Africa, (5) promote poverty alleviation around the world, oppose structural 
inequality, and abuse of power in the global system, and lastly,  (6) pursue the enthronement of  
democracy within the international system of governance.619 Though a number of similarities 
exist between previous foreign policy documents and the 2011 White paper, the latter is however 
distinct in the sense that it moves away from the “universalistic role of bridge-building middle-
power that was associated with South Africa’s foreign policy under Mandela and Mbeki, and 
focuses more on a solid commitment to a narrow range of national interests above all else”. 620 
In effect, the 2011 Ubuntu-inspired foreign policy document portrays South Africa in a 
“sovereignist” light, and recognises it as a regional power, in contrast to the “middle-power 
bridge-builder image” it was painted in previous foreign policy documents.621 By interpretation, 
South Africa is demonstrating its readiness to help Africa shift away from the economic 
advantages of globalisation synonymous with bridge-building, through its strategy of issue 
entrepreneurship, to organising and mobilising the region to secure its national interests first and 
foremost.622 South Africa’s adoption of this stand was perhaps informed by the realisation that, 
making its national interests the central priority of its foreign policy focus, will afford it an 
opportunity to provide regional public goods, such as the provision of peacemaking and 
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peacekeeping resources, offer protection against foreign intervention, and representing Africa in 
global governance fora.623 
Since 2011, South Africa, at every opportunity, particularly at the UN, has continued to maintain 
its sovereignist approach to international politics, as reflected in its pattern of voting, where it 
had shown “an increasing hesitance to criticise states for behaviour that could be construed as 
breaches of human rights and other international liberal norms”.624 As Philip Nel contends, “this 
sovereignist turn did not originate with the Zuma presidency, but had gradually been gestating in 
the 2000s in contrast with South Africa’s early commitment to the promotion of human rights, 
which the Mandela presidency elevated to a specific aim of the new South Africa’s foreign 
policy”.625 
Though South Africa “continues to be quite consistent in voting for and promoting thematic 
human rights concerns in various UN bodies”, it is increasingly hesitant to support country-
specific resolutions that could be construed as interference in the domestic affairs of member 
states, or that manifest a broad interpretation of the interventionist terms of Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter. 626 In other words, South Africa has consistently put itself forward as a stickler for the 
respect for the rule of law, and as a defender of the African continent from Western imperialism 
disguised along the lines of the interventionist terms of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.  Inferable 
from the foregoing is that South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy behaviour appears to be 
defined along the lines of the leadership idiosyncrasies of the “big man” in Pretoria. This brings 
into relevance the need to examine the personalised nature of foreign making in post-apartheid 
South Africa. This is the focus our next discussion. 
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6.3 Personalised nature of foreign policy making in post-apartheid South Africa 
6.3.1 Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) 
On assumption of office as South Africa’s first post-apartheid leader, Mandela through the ANC 
did not mince words in declaring that South Africa will devote its resources to the 
accomplishment of democratic ideals throughout the world.627 As Thabo Mbeki, the then head of 
the ANC’s Department of International Affairs argues, “South Africa cannot escape its African 
destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces 
that have brought ruin to its various parts”.628 South Africa, as he adds, is inextricably part of 
southern Africa, and its destiny is linked to that of a region, which is much more than a mere 
geographical concept.629 
However, Mbeki’s attempt to describe South Africa’s foreign policy focus as Africa-centred has 
been disputed in the literature. Scholars have in fact argued that former President Mandela’s 
foreign policy style and articulation was particularly a contested territory within the diverse 
ranks of the ANC alliance.630 This class division, as Barber argues, was between the camps of the 
populists and ideologues and the pragmatists and neo-liberals.631 The reason for this, as Barber 
notes, is not unconnected with the perception in some quarters that the whole idea of the foreign 
policy principles outlined by the ANC in 1994 was founded on Western Liberal thought.632  
This discordant tune emanating from the ANC bloc, particularly between 1994 and 1999, and the 
post-revolutionary fervour associated with Mandela’s liberation policies, led to Barber’s 
assertion that there appears to be a normative and theoretical confusion about the articulation of 
South Africa’s foreign policy goals and objectives.633 Similarly, during this period, South Africa 
suffered from “a profusion of decision-making centres and actors, each equipped with separate 
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agendas and operating in competition with the others”.634 This competition for influence, as 
Barber notes, involved the president’s office, the vice-president’s office, senior party officials, 
the Departments of Foreign Affairs, and Defence. Others include: the Departments for/of: Safety 
and Security, Interior, Finance and Trade, the Diplomatic Corps and the Portfolio Committee on 
Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly.  
They all competed vigorously for the privilege of conducting the “new South African foreign 
relations”.635 This development eventually led to a situation where South Africa’s foreign policy 
became disaggregated, resulting in policy uncertainty both at home and abroad, with some 
scholars arguing that South Africa, during the Mandela administration, had no clear-cut foreign 
policy pattern.636 In the midst of these contestations, Mandela was believed to have opted for an 
idealist foreign policy approach to guide South Africa in the course of its engagement with 
Africa and the rest of the world.637 Under an idealist-motivated foreign policy approach, 
emphasis is placed on peacemaking, dispute settlement through peaceful means, advocating 
international security, and assuming that the conditions within a state can be projected onto 
international politics.638  
This idealist position, as van Wyk adds, also focuses on the importance of moral values, legal 
norms, internationalism and harmony of interests as foreign policy guidelines rather than the 
consideration of national interests and power.639 Mandela thus introduced a foreign policy 
approach based on new rules and norms and on a set of moral principles, which focused on a 
strong commitment to human rights, the promotion of democracy, and peace and security.640 
Others include—a strong commitment to international law, peace and disarmament, and the 
promotion of democracy.641 In terms of foreign policy articulation, Mandela maintained friendly 
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ties with countries and organisations that were sympathetic to its cause during the struggle. In 
achieving this, his government took South Africa’s global diplomatic presence to a new height, 
from 30 in 1994, to 124 in 1996, while its membership of international organisations swelled to 
45, as against the international isolation which enveloped the larger part of the apartheid 
regime.642 
Mandela’s foreign policy charm offensive created a new wave of international reception for the 
administration, particularly its re-admittance to a number of international bodies South Africa 
had earlier been expelled from. Under Mandela, South Africa participated in several international 
meets, including the Non Allied Movement, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Commonwealth.643 South 
Africa became a member of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the 
OAU, and featured prominently in promoting “good causes”, as observed in its cooperation with 
Canada and New Zealand to eliminate anti-personnel mines, and also hosting the rugby and 
cricket world cups.644 
In terms of peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa, Mandela favoured the promotion of 
peaceful change by negotiation, without involving the armed forces, other than as observers.645 
Together with the presidents of Zimbabwe and Botswana, and under the auspices of the SADC, 
Mandela helped quell a military putsch in Lesotho,646 and it was also commended for facilitating 
the peace talks which ended the civil war in Burundi.647 Nonetheless, this impressive attempt to 
reintegrate South Africa into the mainstream of international politics was not without challenges, 
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beginning with the stance taken by the Mandela government over the killing of the “Ogoni 9” by 
Nigeria’s Sani Abacha.648 
In what was initially seen as a laudable move, Mandela scored a first, when at his prompting, 
Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth, and his government recalled its High 
Commissioner in Abuja.649 Mandela further called on the West to boycott Nigeria’s oil and 
summoned an extraordinary meeting of the SADC where he called for a coordinated pressure on 
Nigeria.650 These efforts reportedly produced nothing as the West continued to buy Nigeria’s oil, 
and other African states had no appetite for confrontation. They saw Nigeria, not as an abuser of 
human rights, but as a continental leader, which had supported liberation struggles and was a 
major contributor to the OAU.651 The development degenerated into a significant diplomatic spat 
between Nigeria and South Africa, with the former referring to the latter as “horrific and 
terrible”, and as “a white state with a black head”.652  
Similarly on the economic front, there was contention on the genuine nature of Mandela’s 
commitment to an African-focused foreign policy given the statistics which emanated from an 
analysis of the country’s balance of trade.653 Although Pretoria had always maintained that its 
rapid expansion of trade relations with Africa is a success, given that in 1993, the total official 
trade with the rest of Africa was just above R8b, by 1999, it had risen to about R27b and R47b in 
2003.654 Also, between 1994 and 1999, the Mandela administration, at different times faced the 
challenge of defending the seeming inconsistency between the theory and actual practice of his 
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avowed commitment to South Africa’s foreign policy principle of “respect for human rights and 
democracy”.655 This much was evident, for example, in Mandela’s perceived outspoken support 
for leaders of decidedly undemocratic states, as in the case of Muammar Gadhaffi of Libya, 
Cuba’s Fidel Castro, and Indonesia’s Suharto, and the strong relations his administration 
maintained with China and Saudi Arabia.656 
His administration’s foreign policy style was also criticised for its inability to invent a credible 
role for South Africa in Africa, particularly after the 1998 intervention in Lesotho, its inability to 
reach a peaceful resolution in the DRC, when Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent troops in 
support of Laurent Kabila, and also for its failure to secure a brokering role in the Algerian civil 
war.657 Having rejected the offer of a second term in office, Mandela handed over to his deputy, 
Thabo Mbeki, in April 1999, and remained a father figure in South Africa and Africa until his 
death on 5 December, 2013. 
 
6.3.2 Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008) 
One of Mbeki’s first policy intervention was to restructure South Africa’s foreign policymaking 
and service-delivery machinery which had become fragmented, ineffective and too expensive to 
maintain.658 Mbeki was noted to have embarked on a major overhaul of the policy making and 
implementation machinery of the state. In the area of foreign policy, Mbeki, they argue, 
attempted to locate policymaking squarely within the president’s office, with the establishment 
of a Policy Coordination and Advisory Service (PCAS) with one of its five chief directorates 
drafted to oversee the international relations, and peace and security unit.659 Each of these chief 
directorates mirrors two sets of decision-making clusters. First, in the cabinet, a sectoral Cabinet 
Committee on International Relations, Peace and Security, which brings ministers and their staff 
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together and “allows for intensive and focused debates on difficult policy choices and the 
resolution of these issues by the relevant ministers before issues are taken to the full Cabinet”.660 
Second, there is also a cluster of directors whose functions have a bearing upon international 
relations, peace and security, and also ensure that the implementation of cabinet decisions takes 
place in a coordinated fashion.661 The essence of this restructuring in greater coordination is to 
centralise input into the foreign policy process and to make it even less accessible for the general 
public.662 It was after this restructuring that former President Thabo Mbeki launched a foreign 
policy approach which sought to build a South African society that could guarantee the 
protection of the fundamental rights of its people, through democratic means, and one which 
South Africans and the rest of Africa can be proud of.   
Arguably, the dominant feature of Mbeki’s approach to governance, and by extension the foreign 
policy articulation of his government, is the notion of Africa Renaissance (AR) which first came 
into public discourse in Chantilly, Virginia.663 Since then, the concept has grown to become a 
philosophy upon which South Africa’s engagement with the rest of the world during his 
presidency was premised.  As Mbeki noted:  
The new African world which the African Renaissance seeks to build is one of democracy, peace and 
stability, sustainable development and a better life for the people, non-racism and non-sexism, equality 
among the nations, and a just and democratic system of international governance. None of this will come 
about of its own [accord]. In as much as we liberated ourselves from colonialism through struggle, so will 
the African Renaissance agenda be victorious, although, there is a protracted struggle that we must wage. 
Yesterday is a foreign country - tomorrow belongs to us.664 
 
Mbeki’s African renaissance (AR) foreign policy approach is not without antecedents. As 
Rautenbach and Vrey note, Mbeki had always argued that, in addition to continental realities, 
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South Africa has a moral obligation to plough effort back into the continent.665 According to 
Mbeki, “Africa acted in solidarity with us, with the countries of Southern Africa sustaining great 
losses in terms of life and property through apartheid aggression; the peoples of our region and 
continent did not say that support for our struggle for freedom would be too costly for 
themselves”.666 Essentially, the concept of AR, as Taylor argues, revolve around five main areas 
of engagement with the African continent: cultural exchange, emancipation of women from 
patriarchy, youth mobilization, broadening of democracy, and advocating for a sustainable 
economic development.667 This scope has been revised to include: establishing and maintaining 
systems of good governance; introducing economic policies that would attract investment, 
reducing the intrusiveness of the state in the economy, establishing regional economic pacts, and 
improving education, healthcare, decent housing, clean water, and modern sanitation.668  
As Taylor contends, Mbeki, through the AR philosophy sought to place South Africa at the 
forefront of solving Africa’s problems through his advocacy of the renaissance concept and 
active diplomacy.669 This culminated in the birth of New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD) which, among other things, sought to promote good governance in Africa, and provide 
“African solutions” to “African problems”.670 Similarly, under the Mbeki leadership, South 
Africa, basking in the euphoria of its emergence as a middle power imposed on itself an 
international leadership role, which culminated in a distinct foreign policy, with multilateralism 
becoming one of its cornerstones.671   
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As Nel et al., observes, South Africa’s identity as an emerging middle power (during the 
Mandela and Mbeki administrations) displayed a characteristic multilateral diplomatic practice 
which included: 
(1) High levels of activism in multilateral institutions, an increasing use of these institutions 
to achieve broader foreign policy objectives, as well as an endorsement of multilateralism 
as the preferred institutional form of global interaction; 
(2) An attempt to revive and strengthen existing global and African multilateral institutions, 
especially those focusing on enhancing the interests of the developing world; and, 
(3) A concerted commitment and an attempt to introduce new norms and mechanisms to 
address both the concerns of developing states and Africa’s marginalisation. Examples 
are the Fancourt Commonwealth Declaration on Globalization and People-Centred 
Development (1999), the Berlin Declaration on Progressive Government (2000), as well 
as the SkaÈgen Declaration signed between the South African president and his Nordic 
counterparts (2000).672 
Other notable examples of Mbeki’s multilateral diplomacy approach are: South Africa’s chairing 
of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) between 1998 and 2001, the SADC, the Commonwealth 
(2000-2001) and the OAU (2002); and its status as a founding member and first chair of the 
African Union (AU) alongside the hosting of its first summit in July 2002.673 In the area of 
peacekeeping and promotion of peace and stability, the Mbeki government partnered with other 
states to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), the Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire and the Great Lakes region.674 This active 
participation in global affairs, as Nel et al. argue, shows that South Africa under Mbeki made use 
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of multilateralist diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument and as an expression of its desire as a 
reformist middle power to contribute actively to a new and collaborative global order.675 
The Mbeki administration also had a preference for negotiating an all-inclusive government in 
Africa, as evidenced in the establishment of the South African-DRC Bi-National Commission 
(BNC), and his role in the peace deal between Rwanda and Burundi, and resolving the dispute 
between the North and South Sudan.676 Offering a constructive explanation as a means of 
understanding South Africa’s foreign policy, van Wyk argues that Mbeki used South Africa’s 
middle-power status and ability to generate initiatives and enforce its leadership aspirations.677   
Under Mbeki, South Africa did not only style itself as a voice of the developing world and 
Africa, but it also initiated the New African Initiative (NAI), Millennium Partnership for African 
Development Programme (MAP) and NEPAD.  
South Africa also played a crucial part in the peace talks in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue; began 
working towards the creation of a Palestinian state, and through Nelson Mandela’s initiatives 
(which Mbeki sustained), has been active with regard to the independence of Timor Leste.678 
While Mbeki brought an ideological element into South Africa’s foreign policymaking, which 
Nathan identifies as “democratic; Africanist; and anti-imperialist”,679 he had a relatively poor 
commitment to, and respect for, “democratic” principles. Critics have argued that, for Mbeki, 
democracy and by extension, respect for human rights, only mattered when it suited his line of 
interest and ideological conviction, as exemplified by his condemnation of Mandela’s lobby 
against Nigeria during the “Ogoni 9 imbroglio”.680  
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Mbeki in fact accused the West of manipulating Mandela, and trying to expose him to ridicule, 
and noted that South Africa must not act alone, but in concert, as understanding was preferable to 
confrontation.681 Justifying his claim, Mbeki argued that the real power lies with rich states who 
purchase the oil and bank the vast finances involved, and that South Africa neither marketed the 
oil nor banked the cash. In effect, Mbeki was inadvertently stating that South Africa lacked the 
currency to intervene in conflicts as some critics would expect, given its unique historical 
experiences, and current state of its economy. With these assertions, as Barber contends, Mbeki 
succeeded in moving attention away from the abuse of human rights in Nigeria to criticism of the 
West.682  
There was the case of the state welcome given to the Deputy President of North Korea—an 
unreconstructed Marxist totalitarian state in March 2005 where the then Deputy President Jacob 
Zuma, expressed South Africa’s appreciation of its solidarity during the liberation struggle and 
called for stronger ties between the two states.683 Lastly, under Mbeki, Pretoria was accused of 
exploitation and neo-colonialism in Africa, as indicated by the trade figures suggesting that the 
market tilted in South Africa’s favour disproportionately.684 In 2000 for instance, South Africa’s 
imports from Africa totalled R4,340 million, compared with an export of R27,245 million, and 
by 2003, its imports had grown to R8,182 million, while its export had risen to R38,886 million. 
This implies that the balance of trade between South Africa and the rest of Africa tilted relatively 
disproportionately in favour of South Africa.  
This development had prompted some scholars to ask if South Africa can be regarded as a 
“Partner or hegemon?”, given what Mlambo calls economic policies that disadvantage its smaller 
neighbours, despite its promises of partnership, particularly the seeming trade imbalance 
between South Africa, Southern Africa and Africa.685  On 20 September 2008, with about nine 
months left in his second term, Mbeki announced his resignation after being recalled by the 
National Executive Committee of the ANC, over allegations of improper interference in the 
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workings of South Africa’s National Prosecution Authority (NPA), in its corruption case against 
his deputy, Jacob Zuma. 
 
6.3.3 Jacob Zuma (2009-2018) 
South Africa’s foreign policy under the Zuma presidency is best understood when located within 
a set of concentric circles686 which defines South Africa’s international priorities.687 Phrased as 
“pursuing Africa’s advancement and enhanced cooperation”, Zuma’s foreign policy objectives 
were couched under a series of sub-goals or sub-categories, namely: (a) closing the gap between 
domestic and foreign policy, (b) continued prioritisation of the African continent, (c) 
strengthening South–South relations, (d) strategic relations with strategic formations for the 
North, (e) participating in the global system of governance, and (f) strengthening political and 
economic relations.688 In terms of articulation, Zuma identified a commitment to “African 
Agenda”, South–South cooperation, North–South dialogue, and economic diplomacy, as core 
elements of his government’s foreign policy in its interaction with the rest of the world.689 
Like his predecessors, Zuma maintained a pro-Africanist foreign policy agenda, through its 
support for the strengthening of the AU and its institutions, particularly the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM), and its attempt to improve the political and economic integration of the 
SADC.690 This is evidenced in South Africa’s contribution to the AU and affiliates such as the 
African Court of Justice (ACJ), and the African Court of Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), 
African Central Bank (ACB), the African Monetary Fund (AMF), and the African Investment 
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Bank (AIB).691 On conflict intervention, Zuma tried to distance himself from Mbeki’s quiet 
diplomacy approach, albeit, in theory than actual practice, given that in the first year of his 
presidency, South Africa played a non-confrontational, accommodative and mediatory role in 
Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC.692  
Continentally, Zuma reaffirmed South Africa’s preference for a gradual and incremental 
approach which focused on regional organisations as building blocks in the march towards a 
larger African Union government contrary to Gadaffi’s United States of Africa (USAF) push.693 
Economic considerations became a central component of Zuma’s emerging foreign policy, as 
noted by Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperation: 
Among our main challenges in the pursuit of our foreign policy objectives is the alignment and 
coordination of South Africa’s economic diplomacy across all spheres of government; strengthening 
economic diplomatic capacity in our Missions; and improving efforts aimed at marketing the brand South 
Africa and Africa abroad.694 
The Zuma leadership conceived its national interests in terms of a developmental approach to 
domestic and internationally-focused policymaking,695 and as Nel argues, this became a 
distinctive trademark of the Zuma era in South African politics.696 On South–South cooperation, 
Zuma embraced multilateralism as an instrument of foreign policy articulation, and strengthened 
South Africa’s commitment to multilateral institutions such as IBSA, the Non Aligned 
Movement (NAM), the G77Plus China formation, and the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South 
Africa (BRICS) group.697 Notably, however, the Zuma administration has come under fire for 
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some foreign policy initiatives it has undertook, for example, in its South–South goals and stated 
national objectives, which scholars consider as not clearly explained.698 
Zuma has also been criticised for not demonstrating enough commitment to NEPAD, a 
development seen as a consequence of the battle of Polokwane, where Mbeki lost the African 
National Congress presidency in 2007.699 Zuma, as Landsberg argues, was silent on the issue, 
and his government appeared ambivalent about NEPAD’s future for domestic political reasons, 
as opposed to sound foreign policy motivations, despite having been a lead state in its 
formation.700 The next discussion examines South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour towards 
Africa. 
 
6.4 South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour towards Africa 
Under apartheid, particularly in the 1980s, South Africa was unable to make any significant 
impact and contribution to peace and security-related issues on the continent, given the highly-
militarised nature of the state itself. Rather, the apartheid regime played the reverse role, as it 
busied itself with a number of actions which were largely anti-peace. Pretoria, as Grundy argues, 
was fighting wars in Angola and Namibia, aggressively destabilising the Frontline States, and 
within its own borders systematic and violent official repression of the resistance movement 
became its defining characteristics.701 Within South Africa, a similar narrative played out as the 
apartheid regime in 1985, ostensibly faced with the fear of a major revolt by the Black majority, 
deployed over 32,000 troops in 96 of the country’s townships.702 
Similarly, between 1985 and 1988, over 5000 people were believed to have been killed in 
political violence in South Africa, while another 50,000 people were detained, and by the end of 
1988, 32 non-violent anti‐apartheid organisations had been banned.703 These developments 
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explain Rupert Taylor’s classification of South Africa during this period as “a terrorist state”, 
and why a police state (as the regime in Pretoria was at that time) could and was not expected to 
make any meaningful contribution to peace and security in Africa.704 By the time apartheid ended 
in 1994, an elated ANC was unequivocal of its determination to return South Africa to where it 
thought it belonged, as captured in the except below:  
The ending of apartheid was a joyous moment in the history of our continent. Africa sacrificed much 
during the course of our struggle. Our people – refugees and the liberation movement were offered food, 
shelter and facilities to enhance the common endeavour to put an end to racist tyranny and oppression. 
With fellow Africans we share a vision to transform our continent into an entity that is free, peaceful and 
vibrant.705 
South Africa’s intervention in conflicts is motivated by the country’s experience during 
apartheid, and compels it to engage in peace missions in order to alleviate the plight of other 
peoples who are trapped in similar conflicts.706 Essentially, South Africa’s consolidation of peace 
and democracy, which Tonheim and Swart describe as the “South African peace model”, is 
premised on a firm belief in non-violent conflict-resolution with dialogue and the inclusion of all 
belligerent factions as its main pillar.707 The intention, they argue, “is to get everyone to 
compromise and reach a consensus on how to facilitate inclusive transitional political 
arrangements as part of a peace agreement”.708 
The mechanism for its actualisation encompasses the following: (1) a broad-based national unity 
government involving the warring parties, and confidence-building measures and the reform of 
security forces, (2) provisions to address justice issues and a timetable for the drafting of a new 
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permanent constitution, and (3) the holding of democratic elections.709 This model has been 
tested over the years in the course of South Africa’s mediation in Burundi, DRC, Sudan, 
Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire. It has similarly been contended that South Africa’s conflict 
intervention role in Africa suggests that the country prefers to assume peacemaking roles, with 
limited military support where inevitable, than get involved in a holistic process of peace 
missions and peacebuilding.710 
This is against the expectation of observers who argue that South Africa should form the nucleus 
of the Southern African regional capability for third-party intervention or help to stabilise and 
prevent potential armed conflicts [in its sub region], as Nigeria does in West Africa. 
Consequently, with the exception of its brief military foray into Lesotho, they claim that Pretoria 
has partially failed to deliver on these ambitious and costly expectations, given its clear 
preference for the world of mediation and diplomacy.711 Lending credence to the above, 
Neethling observes further that South Africa’s intervention role in Africa focuses on the use of a 
diplomacy-based approach to encourage parties to cease hostilities and negotiate a peaceful 
settlement of their disputes while refraining from engaging in peace enforcement and 
peacebuilding.712 
This is the summary of the ideological ambition which drives South Africa’s intervention role in 
Africa since the demise of apartheid in 1994.  As a middle power, South Africa possesses the 
human and financial resources, and the military capacity, to function as a bridge between the 
West and Africa,713 and also serve as an interlocutor between the North and the South.714 The 
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reverse is however the case, as South Africa is yet to fully take advantage of this position to 
further this course as expected. It should be recalled that former President Mbeki had once noted 
that South Africa’s desire was to be a champion of “the invisible people of the world, where 
there would be a democratisation of the system of international relations and the availability of 
the space for the poor and the powerless within an unstoppable globalization process”.715 
Mbeki’s position was informed by the policy statement credited to the South African Department 
of Foreign Affairs that “the future of our country is inextricably linked to the future of the 
African continent, and that Africa remains the central area of focus in the conduct of our [South 
Africa’s] foreign policy”.716 A case in point in this regard is the support it gives to the African 
Union (AU), particularly the Peace and Security Council (PSC),717 which seeks to promote the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts and the encouragement of peacebuilding in Africa, and the 
Common African Defence and Security policy.718 This has seen South Africa, under President 
Mbeki, emerging as the first chairperson of the AU, and later the PSC, during which the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) initiative with peace and security as a cardinal 
objective was conceived.  
Similarly, South Africa, through tactful diplomacy, has helped in mediating in the crises in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. It equally provided financial and diplomatic support, 
indirectly through the AU, to mediators in a number West African countries, including Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast.719 In terms of peacekeeping, South Africa (between 1994 and 
2000) although focused more on nurturing its democracy,720 has attempted to make its presence 
felt on the international scene through its contribution to the UN and African Union (AU) peace 
missions, committing a total of 2020 troops to 14 peace missions.721 South Africa also went into 
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Lesotho in 1998 to reverse a coup attempt, and played a noteworthy interventionist role in 
Burundi, Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire.722 What the foregoing suggests is that South Africa gives the 
impression of being more comfortable acting as a “third party mediator”, albeit under the 
auspices of supra-national institutions like the SADC, AU, or the UN.  
However, South Africa’s voyage into international politics and its attempt to exert its authority in 
Africa is not without blemish. In instances where it had unilaterally intervened, as it did in 
Lesotho in 1998 and in Central African Republic (2013), it has received a backlash of 
condemnation. Another school of thought believes that South Africa’s conflict intervention roles 
in Africa cannot be divorced from the events which shaped the end of the Cold War, particularly 
the emergence of an all-out war between rival identity groups, whose systems were dismantled 
following the lifting of the hold on them by the two rival superpowers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union.723 Thus, South Africa, buoyed by an Africa-oriented foreign policy approach, as 
detailed in its 1994 ANC foreign policy document, conferred itself a “responsibility to protect” 
(R2P) African countries suffering from the consequences of the end of the Cold War.  
This “responsibility to protect” sits at the heart of internal and external debates about South 
African foreign policy and, as such, provides an invaluable lens to understand change and 
continuity in the country’s role in Africa and the wider international system since the end of 
white minority-rule in 1994.724 Motivated by the need to fulfil this self-imposed obligation, the 
Mandela Presidency kick-started South Africa’s intervention history in Africa with a political 
intervention in Burundi on humanitarian grounds.725 The humanitarian intervention was designed 
to remain consistent with the overall agenda of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), which was to serve as the vehicle for collectively addressing the 
continent’s lack of development through the promotion of political governance, regional 
                                                          
722 Ibid., p.239. 
723 ACCORD (2007). “South Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Burundi: Challenges and Opportunities for Future 
Peace Missions”. Occasional Paper Series, Volume 2(2), Pp.1-52. 
724 Verhoeven, H., Murthy, C.S.R., and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (2014). “Our identity is our currency: South 
Africa, the responsibility to protect and the logic of African intervention”. Conflict, Security & Development, 14(4), 
Pp.509-534. 
725 ACCORD (2007). “South Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Burundi: Challenges and Opportunities for Future 




integration and economic and corporate investment.726 Mandela employed the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA)727 instrument as a platform to make the peace process 
work, and ensured that the negotiations were completely inclusive.728 
Thus, in part, South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour in Burundi was non-confrontational, as it 
sought to build trust among the warring parties and confidence in the mediator. While diplomatic 
negotiation formed the bulk of South Africa’s intervention approach in Burundi, it also keyed 
into the larger African Union initiative which offered protection for returning political leaders in 
Burundi as demanded in the Arusha agreement. The SANDF was subsequently deployed as part 
of a one-year peace operation in Burundi in April 2003 – the African Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB), where South Africa served as one of the major troop-contributing countries (TCCs).729 
Basking in the euphoria of the relative success recorded in Burundi, the Mandela administration 
embarked on a diplomatic intervention mission in the war in Zaire/Congo in 1997, and 
subsequently committed to becoming a force for stability in its own subregion through regional 
integration and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).730 It is imperative to 
note however that South Africa’s non-confrontationist approach was challenged by the coup in 
Lesotho in 1998. In Lesotho, scholars have argued that South Africa’s intervention was 
motivated by its realist interests, particularly the need to defend Katse Dam, which was a major 
source of electricity supply to South Africa,731 despite Mandela’s avowed opposition to military 
intervention in conflicts in Africa based on principle.732 
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After Mandela’s exit in 1999, South Africa neither abandoned international activism nor its 
strong views about intervention, as the succeeding Mbeki administration prioritised foreign 
policy throughout his presidency, propagating an ‘‘African Renaissance philosophy’’ which he 
shared with his predecessor.733 The Mbeki government invested heavily in achieving an “African 
solutions to African problems’’, taking the lead in organising the continent around the AU and 
getting member-states to sign its Constitutive Act, which embraced a humanitarian 
interventionist logic, following the principle of “non-indifference” although South Africa’s 
subsequent intervention in the DRC under his presidency (1999-2005) appears not to bear full 
credence to this principle734 
Mbeki, as Verhoeven, et al. argue, developed “a Pan-African ‘right to intervene concept’ to 
tackle the conflict–underdevelopment–misrule orientation of the West towards Africa, and the 
‘Out of Africa’ pessimism of the international community”.735 Drawing inspiration from his 
“African Renaissance” philosophy, the Mbeki administration urged African leaders to adopt an 
agenda for security, development and intervention, as a matter of urgency and dignity, and to 
rely less on the international community, which persistently fails the continent.736 This 
philosophy perhaps explains South Africa’s quiet diplomacy approach to the electoral crises in 
Zimbabwe in 1998, and the lead role Mbeki played in the formation of a government of national 
unity which effectively restored normalcy to Zimbabwe. 
Mbeki’s African Renaissance ideology, particularly his “quiet diplomacy tactic” in Zimbabwe 
was greeted with strong criticism, with some arguing that “Pretoria’s unwillingness to solve the 
political crisis in neighbouring Zimbabwe revealed that the emperor wore no clothes”.737 Others 
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have asked: What good use was it to argue that the continent was turning a corner, if neither the 
AU nor South Africa were able nor willing to broker, and if necessary, to impose a durable 
political settlement in Zimbabwe? The image of Mbeki and Mugabe, shaking hands, as they 
contended, damaged Pretoria’s claims of a value-driven visionary policy.738 Mbeki was 
succeeded by Jacob Zuma in 2008, and his presidency marked a defining moment in South 
Africa’s intervention history in Africa, with South Africa’s intervention in the Central African 
Republic in 2013. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed South Africa’s foreign policymaking process and its conflict 
intervention behaviour since 1994. The chapter finds that there is an inextricable relationship 
between the leadership orientation of South Africa’s post-apartheid leaders, and its foreign 
policy formulation, articulation and implementation. The chapter established that South Africa’s 
engagement with the rest of Africa, particularly its Africa-inclined foreign policy orientation is a 
demonstration of its appreciation of the solidarity it got during its anti-apartheid struggles. This, 
to a large extent, explains how its post-apartheid leaders have responded to issues bordering on 
peace and security in Africa. For example, Mandela’s engagement with the rest of the continent 
can be argued as moderate and conservative in orientation. This explains the seeming foreign 
policy inactivity of the administration until 1997, when his deputy, Thabo Mbeki, began a major 
reform of South Africa’s foreign policy machinery.  
The Mbeki administration, as the chapter evinces, maintained an offensive foreign policy 
orientation, with a specific mission to make Africa an indivisible union through his African 
renaissance philosophy. Mbeki’s interpretation of democracy was a function of his personal 
conviction, and the existing interpersonal/inter-country relationship between South Africa and 
the state in question. Equally, the Jacob Zuma-led administration had a foreign policy orientation 
that was pinned largely to the ANC’s position, given his often institutional approach to foreign 
policy issues. A number of examples illustrate this point. The first is, South Africa’s stance on 
                                                          




the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, which enforced a no-fly zone 
on Libya. The second is his government’s decision to “look the other way”, by ensuring a safe 
passage for Omar al-Bashir out of South Africa, despite a High court order which demanded his 
arrest, in the wake of the ICC warrant on the former.   
In the second part of the chapter, we demonstrated that South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign 
policy, as articulated by its leaders, though institutionalised, remains largely personalised and 
subject to their leadership idiosyncrasies and this largely reflects in its unilateral conflict 
intervention roles in Africa. Given this realisation, it is evident that leadership idiosyncrasies 
play a significant role in South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention role in 
Africa. Similarly, and as this chapter has shown, there is evidence of ideological inconsistency in 
the foreign policy behaviour, and conflict intervention mechanisms of South Africa’s post-
apartheid leaders, as examined here. For example, despite the abundance of evidence in this 
chapter that South Africa’s foreign policy is themed along the notion of collective identity, 
influenced considerably by its apartheid history, a number of its leaders, particularly the Zuma 
administration, appear guilty of what structural realists would argue as relative power pursuit, 
often intended to suit their individual ambitions and personal interests. 
The lack of ideological consistency on the part of South Africa’s post-apartheid leaders, 
particularly in their foreign policy and conflict intervention behaviour, thus reinforces the 
validity of our central argument in chapter one, that it is only by examining its foreign policy 
from more than one IR perspective can one gain a fuller understanding of South Africa’s foreign 
policy behaviour and the underlying motivations for its conflict intervention roles in Africa.  
Findings from this chapter therefore highlight the relevance of an eclectic approach to the 
understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles. We 
shall return to this in chapter eight. In the interim, we turn our attention to South Africa’s role in 







Chapter 7: South Africa’s Conflict intervention Role in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (1997-2005) 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, we examined South Africa’s foreign policy and its conflict intervention 
behaviour in Africa. By examining the characteristics of South Africa’s foreign policy, the 
personalised nature of its foreign policymaking since the demise of apartheid in 1994, its conflict 
intervention history, and its foreign policy behaviour towards Africa, we demonstrated that there 
is an inextricable relationship between the leadership orientation of South Africa’s post-apartheid 
leaders and its foreign policy formulation, articulation and implementation. Consequently, the 
purpose of this chapter is to examine South Africa’s involvement in the DRC with a view to 
ascertaining the extent to which its conflict intervention behaviour in Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) aligns with its foreign policy objectives, as interpreted through the structural 
realist and the social constructivist perspectives employed here. This interpretation will be made 
in Chapter eight, once we have surveyed in the current chapter why and how South Africa 
became involved in the drawn-out, often messy domestic conflict in the DRC. We start by 
looking at the origins of the conflict.  
Located within the Great Lakes Region, which has been a theatre of conflict since the 1960s, 
DRC has seen the most intractable conflict in the region. The DRC is bordered by several 
countries, in the west by the Republic of the Congo, by Angola in the southwest, Zambia in the 
southeast; Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Burundi to the east, South Sudan to the northeast, 
and by Central Africa Republic to the northwest. The DRC is one of Africa’s richest in terms 
natural resource endowments, as it possesses 50 per cent of Africa’s forests, underscoring “its 
potential role as an economic power in central [Southern] Africa”.739 Natural resources provide 
the backbone of its economy, with mining as its single largest source of export income. Other 
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export commodities include wood products and coffee. The highest contributions to its gross 
domestic product (GDP) are agriculture (44.2 %), industry (22.6 %) and services (33.1 %).740 
The magnitude of the DRC’s informal economy exceeds its official economic activity, growing 
dramatically as economic and social conditions deteriorate, and as purchasing power drops.741 
Smuggling and other unofficial activities constitute the real economy of the DRC, and the 
“second-economy” activities are fully-institutionalised and in most respects, more rational and 
predictable than official trade and production activities.742 The second economy provides access 
to goods and services unavailable in the official economy and compensates for the deficiencies 
of the official system.743 For a larger part of the DRC’s statehood, corruption and misguided 
policy have fostered a clandestine economy in the country. Individuals and businesses in the 
formal sector operate with high costs under arbitrarily-enforced laws. As a consequence, the 
informal sector now dominates the economy.  
In terms of economic growth, the DRC’s growth forecast for 2017 was estimated at 3.5 per cent 
per annum, with a GDP market price estimate of about US$41.9 billion.744 These positive 
indicators notwithstanding, at least 63.6 per cent of the DRC population live below the poverty 
line, placing its people among the poorest on earth—a development attributable largely to poor 
institutional development during the colonial era and beyond.745 Similarly, the DRC is ranked 
176th out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index for 2016, and also home to about 
7.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.746 A number of reasons have been 
advanced to explain the DRC conflict. These include: the struggle for power, and international 
battle over resources,747 the disruptive actions by belligerent groups from neighbouring 
countries, and the region’s lack of security, ethnic prejudice, poor governance, and political 
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unscrupulousness.748 The DRC’s descent into decades of deteriorating political tension and civil 
war has been so intense that there has been a succession of peace interventions from the United 
Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
and other non-governmental organisations, bodies and individual countries. The Republic of 
South Africa led the conflict intervention team of the SADC between 1997 and 2005.  
Together with this introductory remark, the chapter is divided into five main sections. The 
second section appraises the causal factors of the DRC conflict from 1960 to 2005. The third 
focuses on the attempts made by the international community to resolve the impasse, with a 
specific emphasis on the Lusaka Peace Accord. The fourth section assesses the fit between South 
Africa’s foreign policy and its conflict intervention role in the DRC, with particular reference to 
the Sun City Accord of 19 April, 2002. The fifth section offers the chapter’s concluding 
thoughts. 
 
7.2 The origins of the DRC conflict  
In May 1960, national elections were held in the then Zaire, but the processes and its eventual 
outcome were shrouded in controversy. The Patrice Émery Lumumba-led Mouvement National 
Congolais (MNC) won the majority of votes, but the party soon disintegrated following its 
failure to effectively manage its post-independence and elections intra-party bickering. Arguably, 
this led to the MNC’s coalition with Joseph Kasavubu’s Bakongo Alliance, ostensibly to avert an 
electoral impasse and defuse the political tension at that time. The Congo’s high susceptibility to 
prolonged and negative impacts of conflict dates back to 1960, shortly after it gained 
independence. Since then, the Congo has been a battlefield, a development largely fuelled by 
ethnic tensions and animosity between the Banyarwanda and Congolese ethnic groups in North-
Kivu, after the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1960.749 
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By 1965, Zaire had effectively become a single-party state, under Lieutenant Colonel Mobutu,750 
who was also the Commander-in-Chief of Zaire’s armed forces. Faced with mounting protests 
and international criticism of his rule, Mobutu was forced to abandon Zaire’s one-party system 
for a multi-party system, while the country’s constitution was also created. As a consequence, a 
prolonged crisis instigated primarily by the tussle for power among  different ethnic clans led to 
the outbreak of its first civil war in 1960, destabilising in the process, the country’s nascent 
democracy. Barely a week after independence, the Force publique (the erstwhile armed wing of 
the Belgian military, which was later renamed Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), revolted.751 
This development led to violent confrontations between the Belgian colonial lords and the 
Congolese on one hand, and Congolese ethnic groups on the other.752 
Hostilities, sustained all through colonialism, fed into ethnic hatred and civil strife, with the 
Moise Tshombe-led separatists in Katanga proclaiming the secession of the province. The 
Belgians responded instantaneously by deploying ground troops to Katanga, “ostensibly to 
protect Belgian citizens and mining interests”.753 This development set the stage for subsequent 
foreign military interventions, which later became the defining characteristics of the DRC. 
Consequently, and as Nzongola-Ntalaja argued, external forces composed mainly of White 
mercenaries from apartheid Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa, France and the United 
States through the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC [July 1960-June 1964]), 
clandestinely backed Moise Tshombe’s efforts to cut out the mineral-rich Katanga province from 
the Congo.754 This development arguably marked the beginning of Congo’s seemingly intractable 
crisis, a crisis that has oscillated largely between covert and overt foreign interventions over the 
last five decades (1964-2016). 
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The DRC’s most recent conflict began in 1996, in the wake of the violence perpetuated by 
exiled Rwandan Hutu genocidaires, thus marking the commencement of the DRC’s “First World 
War”.755 A major political casualty of that crisis was “Emperor” Mobutu Sese Seko, who 
was overthrown when rebel forces loyal to Laurent-Desire Kabila entered the capital with the 
support of Ugandan and Rwandan forces. Laurent Kabila’s coup was characterised by hostilities 
and violence, and frequent incursions from Rwandan and Ugandan forces who had earlier 
pitched tents with a number of tribal forces.756 Laurent Kabila was later assassinated by his 
bodyguard in 2001, and was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila.  
One major explanation attributed to the DRC’s intractable conflict in particular, and the Great 
Lakes region as a whole, is deeply rooted in the colonial, political and economic system 
struggles which entangled the country shortly after independence.757 It has indeed been argued 
that the colonial explanation for the DRC crisis stems from its brutal colonial history dating back 
to the 1880s when King Leopold II of Belgium took personal control of the territory.758 King 
Leopold II saw the country as his personal fiefdom, and called it the Congo Free State (but 
ironically never went there himself). Indeed, it took about 75 years of colonial rule before 
Belgian overlords were forced to relinquish political rights to the people of Congo in 1960. 
However, the necessary economic rights were not there for the country to flourish. 
Following Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice Lumumba’s election as president and prime minister of 
the Congo respectively, the struggle for power led to a countrywide armed rebellion, made worse 
by secessionist movements in the Katanga province and the Southern Kasai, culminating in a 
declaration of independence from the new republic.759 That declaration plunged the Congo into a 
crisis of unimaginable proportions, as warring factions battled to fill the power vacuum created 
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by the exit of the Belgians. Ultimately, the struggle for power and control over mineral 
resources, which had been at the heart of the country’s problems since independence in 1960, 
dragged the Congo into the politics of the Cold War.760 Alarmed by the rising human cost of the 
war, the Lumumba and Kasavubu-led government requested military assistance from the United 
Nations Organisation (UNO) (as it then was) to protect the country from the hostility of resident 
Belgian troops and to re-establish state sovereignty.  
On 14 July, 1960, the UNO, through its Security Council Resolution 143, approved the 
deployment of Organization des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC).761 That intervention 
notwithstanding, the Congo’s political and economic stability worsened, claiming the life of 
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in January 1961. That development marked the beginning of 
the reign of terror of General Mobutu Sese Seko.  By the time ONUC ended its mandate in 1964, 
Lumumba had been assassinated in a coup d’état staged by Mobutu Sese Seko, with allegations 
of complicity on the part of the United States and its Cold War allies.762 
Mobutu later pronounced himself head of state and commander-in-chief of the Congo’s armed 
forces in 1965, following a successful revolution, which gave rise to the renaming of the 
Republic of Congo to Zaire. Until the early 1990s, Mobutu’s administration received huge 
support from the West, which provided the government with weapons, ammunition and military 
support, which the government used in suppressing the people and exploiting the economy for 
decades. Mobutu, as Akrou argues, became extremely wealthy by diverting state funds, 
misappropriating funds generated from state assets, bribing foreign diplomats and misusing 
foreign loans.763 Analysts have often pointed accusing fingers at the United States as the primary 
backer of Mobutu’s regime, ostensibly because of the latter’s desire to protect and secure its 
economic resources, and strategic interests in the region. For the US, Mobutu’s authoritarian rule 
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and disregard for the fundamental rights of his people meant little or nothing, as long as it did not 
pitch the country at opposing ends with the Soviet Union’s interests and influence in Africa.764 
It bears noting that one of the fundamental causes of the DRC conflict is what North et al. 
describes “as the discriminatory nature of the limited access society prevalent in most resource 
rich countries”.765 In a functioning limited-access society (such as the DRC), members of the 
dominant coalition include economic, political, religious, and educational leaders (elite) whose 
privileged positions create rent, which guarantees their cooperation with the dominant coalition 
and creates the organisations through which the goods and services produced by the population 
can be mobilised and redistributed.766 Under this arrangement, as North et al. contend, members 
of the dominant coalition (in the case of DRC—Mobutu Sese Seko and the ruling elite), the 
primary source of rents within the coalition is used to enforce arrangements within the 
organisations of the coalition members (the masses which they govern).767 
Arguing further, they note that it is the rent created by those exclusive privileges that binds the 
agreements between the organisations, limits access to enforcement of rules by the coalition, 
create rents, and shapes the interest of the players in the coalition (government).768 Essentially, 
the argument of North et al., when contrasted with the DRC, reminds us of a country that had 
been programmed to fail from conception by the Belgian colonial overlords. Indeed, on 
attainment of independence in 1960, evidence of state fragility—absence of law and order, weak 
governmental institutions and structures, and corruption, among others, were the defining 
characteristics of the newly-independent country. This development inarguably explains why a 
class system of the bourgeois and the proletariat became operationalised in the country in 1960, 
and ultimately, one of the underpinning motivations behind the Congolese civil war of 1960.  
Other accounts for the DRC’s state failure debacle holds that concerns and agitations over 
economic control and segregation believably led to ethnic tensions and feelings of deprivation 
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among the DRCs multi-diverse society. As Huggins et al. note, land disputes as conceived by 
most organisations especially at district levels, contribute considerably to the outburst of 
violence, impede on peace processes, and are seen as, “sustaining conflict, through the use of 
profits or political capital from natural resource extraction or redistribution for purchase of arms, 
or mobilization of human and diplomatic resources for war”.769 
The North Kivu province, for most of the DRC’s history, remained one of its most volatile 
provinces, and among the well-documented ethnicity-motivated conflicts was the Banyarwanda 
revolt against the Zairian population in Masisi district.770 According to historical accounts, 
Banyarwanda rose against the established local authority and called for the creation of an 
independent Rwandan state in North Kivu.771 The justification behind this quest for autonomy, as 
Reyntiens argues, was reiterated in a 1981 letter addressed to the United Nations Secretary 
General and signed by a group calling itself People of Rwandan origin in Zaire.772 The 
signatories requested permission to create a separate, independent state in North-Kivu, in the 
hope that the UN and OAU would recognise their self-determination. This quest for self-
determination and its subsequent intractability indeed underpins the cumbersome nature of 
conflict resolution, particularly when it becomes intertwined with an underlying identity of 
cultural crises.773 
Similarly, and about the same time that persecution and discrimination against the Banyarwanda 
people was ongoing, a number of other Zairian politicians, particularly those of the Hunde, saw 
their political power wane, following the choice of more Banyarwandas for party posts in Zaire’s 
ruling party—the Mouvement populaire de la révolution (MPR). Consequently, the debate over 
the nationality of Banyarwanda immigrants in Zaire became an important political trump card in 
the hands of those who wanted to exclude Rwandan representation in Zaire’s political process. 
This development was worsened by a 1981 citizenship law which repealed the Zairean 
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citizenship rights earlier granted to the Banyarwanda people living on Congolese territory at the 
time of independence.774 
As expected, the Banyarwanda people protested against the implementation of the law because 
of its retroactive nature, but many Zairians supported the law, and called for its full enforcement. 
This stance, more than anything else, added to the existing tension and conflict in Zaire, and laid 
the foundation for what would later become a complex peace process, with which MONUC  was 
encumbered. By 1989, a presidential order announcing the municipal elections in North Kivu 
had to be suspended until an identification operation and a population census was conducted, 
forcing the regional authorities to organise an identification operation, with the aim of 
delineating Zairians from non-Zairians in North Kivu.775 Violent protests spearheaded by the 
Banyarwanda people halted the operation and no census has been conducted since then, despite 
the official requirement that one be conducted prior to every municipal and national election.776 
This situation notwithstanding, Zairian and Banyarwanda political leaders alike hoped that the 
nationality question would be resolved permanently during the 1992 Conférence Nationale 
Souve-raine (CNS).777  
However, the CNS Commission on population, statistics and documentation, as Van Acker 
notes, upheld the 1981 nationality law and simply recommended that the law be put into 
application. No specific action has been taken since then.778 Consequently, ethnicity rather than 
political competence became a principal determinant in choosing delegates from North Kivu who 
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were to participate in the CNS. During preparations for the conference, an alliance between 
Hutu, Hunde and Nande politicians was forged, which successfully managed to exclude the Tutsi 
from participating in the conference.779 Eventually, the Hutu-Hunde alliance broke down and, 
from that moment, Hutu politicians in Kinshasa called on their constituents in North Kivu to defy 
the local administrative authorities. Similarly, cultural associations originally intended to 
encourage economic development began to play a more political role.  
By 1993, the Mutuelle Agricole des Virunga (MAGRIVI), the Hutu cultural association,780 had 
become political, and it helped organise civil disobedience in Zaire. These ethnic dissensions and 
Mobutu’s attempts to disenfranchise the Banyarwandas made Northern Kivu ungovernable and 
created an arena for several ethnic fights which incapacitated the country’s ability to adequately 
exploit the resources in the region.781 The government’s lack of will and capacity to deal with the 
Banyarwanda problem was further exposed with every renewed episode of violence, which as a 
consequence unrelentingly erased whichever possibilities of peaceful resolution of the conflict.782 
By the end of the Cold War, Mobutu’s regime was shackled by a growing opposition, 
international criticism and an economic crisis. The 1992 Sovereign National Conference 
representing various political parties on August 15, 1992 elected Etienne Tshisekedi wa 
Mulumba as Prime Minister for the transition783 (the first of its kind since Mobutu’s rise to 
power). Despite this, Mobutu still built up a rival government with its own prime minister. The 
removal from office of Etienne Tshisekedi in 1993, which was based on suspicions that he had 
put into circulation the new five million Zaire note, created further crisis. Ensuing from the crisis 
was the High Council of the Republic-Parliament of Transition (HCR-PT) in 1994, a merger of 
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both the Tshisekedi and Mobutu governments.784 The HCR-PT retained Mobutu as head of state 
and scheduled several failed presidential and legislative elections during the next two years 
(1995 and 1996).785  
Despite this 1994 consolidation of government, Zaire remained unstable, and the conflicts in the 
DRC since then are closely related to the incidents in neighbouring Rwanda. These conflicts 
have escalated with each attempt to resolve it, and these attempts have culminated in new 
trajectories and complications to the plot and build-up to the conflict. The conflicts in the Congo, 
whether in the Bas-Kongo region or in South Kivu, all have their origins in the 1981 citizenship 
law which disenfranchised a part of the population and stalled government attention from service 
delivery to fighting nationalist wars about who should be included or excluded from the 
enjoyment of Congolese resources. Tragically, the situation was one which foreign governments 
soon took advantage of and which led to what has since been given the pseudonym the First and 
Second Congolese wars. 
 
7.3 The first and second Congolese wars (1996-2003) 
The violence that erupted in the DRC in 1996 marked the first Congolese war. This violent 
outbreak dates back to the civil war which broke out in Burundi in 1993 and the Rwandan 
genocide between the Hutus and the Tutsis in 1994, leading to the influx of a large number of 
refugees into Zaire. In April 1994, Hutus acting through the instrumentality of ethnic militia—
Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi—launched genocide against the Tutsi minority population, 
leaving about 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus dead.786 In what was seen as a reprisal attack, 
forces loyal to the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which had never hidden its 
intention to gain control of Rwanda since the 1990s, with support from Uganda, invaded Rwanda 
arguably to avenge the massacre of the Tutsis.787 The RPF eventually defeated the Rwandan 
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army and the militia, and took control. However, the genocide and civil war forced about two 
million civilians to flee the country mainly towards Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi.788 
It should be mentioned that while in Zaire, Hutu refugee camps functioned as the base for the 
Interahamwe and the Rwandan army, from where incursions into Rwanda were made. Motivated 
by the desire to prevent further incursions into its territory, and to protect the Tutsi Congolese 
from further attacks by the Hutus, the newly-formed Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) entered 
Zaire in 1996.789 This development marked the beginning of Congo’s first war. This war was 
further aggravated by the support which Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s rebel movement—the Alliance 
des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL), enjoyed from Uganda, 
Angola and other anti-Mobutu Congolese revolutionary groups struggling for power. This 
struggle for power culminated in the ousting of the Mobutu led-government in May 1997, seven 
months after the war began.790 
By July 1998, Kabila’s relationship with his foreign supporters had begun to decline, as 
evidenced in his sacking and replacement of the Tutsis in his government with members of his 
Katanga clan, and his request for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. This development, as 
Kisangani argues, led to the abrupt end of military cooperation with Rwanda and Uganda, and 
subsequently to the instigation of an anti-Kabila revolution that started in August 1998.791 That 
revolution marked the beginning of the second DRC war. With the support of the Rwandan and 
Ugandan army and the Rwanda-backed rebel group, Rassemblement Congolaise pour la 
Démocratie (RCD, later on also called RCD-Goma) anti-Kabila groups advanced towards 
Kinshasa with the objective of ousting Kabila. However, owing to the intervention of Angolan, 
Zimbabwean and Namibian forces, Kabila was able to remain in power.792 
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This intervention forced the Rwandans and the RCD rebels to withdraw to the eastern part of the 
DRC from where they launched sustained attacks on state assets and government forces. 
Similarly, another rebel movement known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR) sprang up in Eastern Congo, with the support of the DRC government.793 The 
FLDR forces are composed primarily of key members of the Rwandan genocide, Hutu members 
of the former Rwandan army, as well as a mix of displaced Rwandan Hutus. The disintegration 
of the DRC intensified in February 1999 when Uganda backed the formation of a rebel group 
called the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), which gained control over the 
northern part of the DRC and ignited the Congo’s second intractable War. 
The bases of the widespread violence in the DRC in 1998, as Shah mentions, are multifaceted, 
given that it was instigated by sovereign state players that used rebel groups as an indirect means 
of achieving state goals. Summarily, the conflict involved at least seven African nations, apart 
from the number of insurgent groups within the DRC itself. It resulted in more than 5.4 million 
deaths, and has been labelled the world’s deadliest conflict since the Second World War.794  The 
complexity of the DRC conflict is what informs its description as Africa’s First World War, and 
has continued to defy various efforts made to resolve the conflict and broker peace among the 
belligerent factions. These ventures, as Oliver and Mokoena note, included the Frederick 
Chiluba-led effort to resolve the conflict, and the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Accord negotiated 
under the patronage of Southern African Development Community (SADC). Both mediations led 
to the establishment of two major arrangements - the UN Organisational Mission to the Congo 
(MONUC) and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD).795 
Regardless of these mediations, the DRC crisis continued unabated, with Kabila consistently 
refusing to cooperate with the UN, and also failing to acknowledge the provisions of the Lusaka 
agreement which requested that all parties, including government forces, enjoy the same status in 
the inter-Congolese dialogue. This increasingly contributed to the lack of peace and unstable 
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political peace processes. On January 16, 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated in a 
failed coup d’état and was succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila. Once in power, Joseph Kabila 
immediately embarked on the revitalisation of the national dialogue, which was launched in 
February 2001 in Sun City, South Africa.796 
As a consequence of this peace initiative, and by the end of 2003, troops from Angola, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, stationed in the north of DRC, as well as those from Rwandan and 
Ugandan in the East, had completed their withdrawal.797 On June 30, 2003, Kabila approved the 
formation of a transitional government—a decision believed by many to have unofficially 
terminated the DRC’s second war. Building on this political reconfiguration, the DRC in March 
2003 officially adopted a transitional constitution, and by July 30, 2006, it held its first free, 
democratic, multi-party elections in more than 40 years.798  
The first ballot of that election produced no clear winner, and Kabila was later confirmed as the 
DRC’s democratically-elected president after a second ballot. However, the eastern part of the 
DRC remained turbulent as former Interahamwe members feared a return to Rwanda and 
decided to stay in the forests of eastern Congo, where they terrorised the local population.799 
Similarly, the UN peacekeeping operation which had been deployed in the DRC from 1999 until 
the formation of the 2003 transition government failed to comprehensively end the DRC conflict. 
In the succeeding section, we examine the efforts made by the international community towards 
resolving the DRC crisis.   
 
7.4 The DRC crisis and the Lusaka ceasefire agreement (1999) 
For peace accords to be successful, there are a number of prerequisites and conditions to be met, 
particularly the indispensability of face-to-face negotiations between the warring parties and the 
mediators to meet, without which it may be difficult to find lasting and just solutions to any 
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conflict.800 This necessity is informed by Reiff’s contention that “intractable conflicts are seldom 
laden with ethnic or religious components, and that their resolutions are contingent on the nature 
of the government institutions and the power distribution among the communities within these 
states”.801 Consequently, identifying the main causes of the conflict and the issues involved, 
deducing the specific problems faced by the parties to the conflict, ascertaining the validity of the 
mechanisms through which the problems will be overcome, and planning how the agreements 
will be implemented are all necessary steps toward peace.  
In the DRC, therefore, the commitment of international players to the cause of helping the 
country arrive at a political and negotiated solution to the crisis has led to the signing of a 
number of agreements, including the Lusaka Agreement and the Sun City Accords, as the 
cornerstone of the DRC peace process. The Lusaka Peace accord was the first in the series of the 
international community’s attempt to resolve the DRC conflict. It was conveyed under the 
auspices of the SADC mediation committee which had representatives from the DRC, Namibia, 
Angola, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda as members, and the government of Zambia, 
and representatives of the OAU and the United Nations (UN), as witnesses. It should be noted 
that the conflict itself was caused primarily by Laurent Kabila’s decision to detach his 
government from Ugandan and Rwandan leaders who supported him to overthrow Mobutu. The 
conflict ended with a Ceasefire Agreement in Lusaka under SADC’s mediation.802  
According to Bouvier and Bomboko, the agreement was premised on an anticipated six-week-
long national dialogue involving armed and unarmed Congolese groups about the country’s 
future and interim government of the Congo as a corresponding process to the disarming of 
armed groups and the departure of foreign armies.803 Notwithstanding the cumbersome and 
difficult political climate under which the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of July 10, 1999 was 
negotiated, it marked the beginning of the resolution of the conflict and the institutionalisation of 
relative peace and stability. Signatories to the agreement included the DRC, Namibia, Angola, 
Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The government of Zambia, SADC and OAU, and 
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the United Nations (UN) signed the agreement as witnesses.804 The two main rebel movements– 
RCD and Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)–only endorsed the agreement on 1 and 
3 of August 1999, after initially refusing to sign—a gesture which threatened the prospects of the 
peace accord.805 
Essentially, the Lusaka Accord, as Lumumba-Kasongo observes, was negotiated under the 
auspices of the SADC, and it consisted of three main articles: the ceasefire component, security, 
and other general principles of the agreement. On the whole, the Agreement sought to address 
issues related to the cessation of hostilities; the release of hostages and exchange of prisoners; 
the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces on the ground; national dialogue; reinstatement of the 
state administration over the territory of the DRC; the establishment of joint-military commission 
(JMC); the United Nations peacekeeping mandate; the disarmament of the armed groups; the 
formation of the national army; the redeployment of the parties to defensive positions in conflict 
zones; and the stabilisation of the security situation along the common borders between the DRC 
and its neighbours.806 
According to the stipulations of Article 19 of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the DRC 
government, the armed opposition, RCD and MLC, and a number of other unarmed opposition 
groups, were expected to have the same status in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.807 As it would 
later turn out, Laurent Kabila was apparently dissatisfied with this arrangement and consistently 
refused to cooperate with the United Nations representatives, and the dialogue’s facilitator, 
Botswana’s former President, Masire Kabila eventually shut down the facilitator’s office in 
Kinshasa.808 Similarly, Kabila also attempted to make use of the politics of ethnicity and 
language characteristic of most African states, by accusing President Masire, an Anglophone, of 
favouring the Ugandans and Rwandans, and requesting that another facilitator, a Francophone, 
be appointed.809 Inarguably, Kabila’s uncooperative stance caused a considerable setback to the 
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Lusaka agreement, and it delayed the arrival of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that would have 
probably given birth to a “new political dispensation” in the Congo.810 
Kabila’s obstinate stance notwithstanding, the fullness and significance of the Lusaka peace 
Accord cannot be understated. First, the agreement was the most significant initiative at the time, 
considering the chaos the war had already created. For the first time in conflict mediation 
history, African states, through a sub- regional intervention—the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), attempted to set up a structure that can help resolve the crisis in the Great 
Lakes region. This step indicated a degree of hope for peace to be accomplished in the DRC after 
decades of war. For this to be achieved, a calendar for the implementation of the ceasefire 
agreement was presented in chapter three, specifying a total number of 270 days from the date it 
was signed. However, within the context of a complex conflict such as that of the Congo 
involving different parties with divergent interests and world views, the agreement faced 
persistent challenges that still causally relate to the reason for perpetual instability in Congo.  
The first challenge was the failure of the Congolese to implement the agreement, a factor 
attributed to the absence of leadership, especially as the success of the agreement depended 
entirely upon the cooperation of the parties involved. According to Gerrie Swart, the main 
shortcoming of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement may have been the entrusting of the signatories 
with too much responsibility with regard to disarmament, given the level of suspicion among 
them and the lack of political commitment to the task of ending the war through peaceful 
negotiations.811 None of the signatories fully fulfilled what they had pledged to do. Each 
suspected the other of insincerity, and used its suspicions to justify its own duplicity. Since the 
signatories themselves were the ones responsible for policing the agreement, and considering 
that there was no external guarantor to compel their compliance, the agreement quickly became 
fluid and gave way to new peace accords tailored to fill the lacuna in the Lusaka.812 
These factors obscured the peace process and made it impossible for the mandated United 
Nations observers, who were to oversee the disengagement of forces, to deploy forces to certain 
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parts of the country due to the continuation of hostilities.813 Prospects for a successful DDR also 
diminished with the persistence of increased security threats. These challenges to the agreement 
therefore led to the prolongation of the conflict, which remained a major obstacle to the 
attainment of sustainable peace in the DRC. The 270 days initially specified for the 
implementation of the agreement gradually relapsed into more than four years of brutal 
conflict.814 Faced with a potential stalemate in the peace process, the Congo began to fragment 
and the conflict continued to rage. More lives were lost and an estimated additional two million 
Congolese were displaced as a result of inaction.  
The violence fostered the growth of ethnic militarism and transformed the resource-blessed 
eastern region of the country into a patchwork of warlords’ fiefdoms. The territorial integrity of 
the Congo was threatened, and so were the foundations of nationhood which compromised the 
stability of its nine neighbours in the Great Lakes region. Consequently, the violence and 
humanitarian disaster that has erupted in the DRC since the signing of the Lusaka Agreement is 
mostly concentrated in the three eastern provinces, South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri, and still 
greatly impacts on the peace processes in the region. It is useful to note that, apart from the 
Lusaka peace process which was ongoing at that time, a number of other talks such as the April 
2000 Kampala disengagement were also initiated towards ending the crisis.  
However, just like the Lusaka Agreement, the talks equally fell short of expectations when it 
excluded important stakeholders from the peace process, particularly, the Forces for the Defence 
of Democracy (FDD),815 the Mai Mai816 and ALiR817 groups.818 The question to ask from the 
foregoing is what potential impact did the exclusion of these stakeholders from such talks have 
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on the efforts towards achieving peace and stability in the region? Did it not simply create 
another situation of more violence? These questions have become expedient in view of the 
DRC’s volatility, particularly in the eastern part of the Congo, where the country had been torn 
between a seemingly unending perpetration of human atrocities and a complex cluster of illegal 
exploitation and control of raw materials by armed and rebel groups.  
Indeed, the expulsion of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), despite its 
being a disputant, as well as stakeholder in the conflict, constituted a substantial impediment to 
the resolution efforts.819 The Lusaka agreement therefore demanded the withdrawal of all foreign 
armies from the DRC, the disarmament of “Interahamwe” forces in the DRC, and the creation of 
MONUC.820 Though other stakeholders like the MLC and the Goma RCD faction endorsed the 
agreement, fighting soon started between the Rwandan and Ugandan armies on Congolese soil as 
they struggled for land and resources. This struggle, as Lunn argues, later involved other RCD 
factions which had earlier opposed the RCD Goma’s endorsement; for example, the 
“Interahamwe” together with anti-RPF Hutu groups in eastern DRC joined and formed the 
FDLR that worked in close collaboration with the DRC government 
As espoused above, these issues explain why the Lusaka agreement achieved very little success, 
thus leading to the establishment of an inter-Congolese dialogue. The ICD, which was under the 
auspices of the OAU, sought to employ the use of political negotiations in ending the hostilities 
and addressing the concerns of Rwanda and Uganda, two states actively involved in the DRC 
conflict, but not often considered as key players the peace process should focus on. In the 
succeeding section, we will examine the role of South Africa in these talks as an intervening 
force, beginning with an appraisal of the relationship between its foreign policy and its role in 
the conflict.  
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7.5 Reappraising South Africa’s intervention in the DRC. 
South Africa, as Hendricks argues, has been at the forefront of Africa’s peace and security 
endeavours after 1994. It was able to quickly transform itself from international villain to Pan-
Africanist peacemaker and it has since played a role in both shaping and setting the normative 
agenda of the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) 
peace and security architectures.821 South Africa has equally been an active player in conflict-
management engagements, or what Van Nieuwkerk prefers to refer to as “Peace Diplomacy”.822 
South Africa’s decision to play this role is believed to be in tandem with her foreign policy, 
which according to Maite Nkoana-Mashabane is based on the “values and principles enshrined in 
our constitution, notably human dignity, the achievement of equity, the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms, non-racialism, non-sexism, democracy and respect for the rule of law”.823 
This explains why South Africa has been unequivocal about the place of Africa in its foreign 
policy objectives.824 At different times, South Africa has noted that its views on peace, security 
and development are inherently linked to that of Africa, and that its policies will remain “pan-
Africanist” and “Afro-centric”.825 South Africa sees its responsibility as transforming the “global 
system of governance from power-based to rule-based”, ending the marginalisation of the poor 
throughout the world, promoting the African agenda and being the “voice of the continent 
internationally”.826 South Africa’s assumption of these self-imposed responsibilities, going by 
constructivists’ logic, can be regarded as an expression of its identity, capable of being a causal 
factor in its own right, independently of the relative power pursuits, which equally play a role in 
South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour in Africa.  
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Scholars have argued that there are at least three major factors accounting for South Africa’s 
foreign policy focus on Africa.827 The first, according to Flemes, is South Africa’s recognition of 
the role Africa played during its anti-apartheid struggle, hence the need to make it a prime focus 
of future engagements, as a mark of appreciation of this role.828 The second factor, according to 
Sidiropoulos, is the evolving nature of conflict and security challenges, primarily, but not 
exclusively on the African continent.829 State collapse, migratory diseases, trafficking of arms, 
drugs, and people, ethnic violence, interstate warfare, crime and transnational terrorism, as she 
argues, combine in a conflict matrix, far more complex than that of the Cold War.830 The irony of 
this development, as Sidiropoulos asserts, is that “Africa is at once more peaceful and democratic 
and also more fragile and unstable than any previous point in recent history”.831 This explains 
why the South African government in its 1999 White Paper on its participation in international 
peace missions notes that “a radically altered post-Cold-War security environment has seen the 
transformation (or mutation) of classical peacekeeping operations into complex, 
multidimensional conflict management activities.”832 
The third factor shaping South Africa’s approach to conflict resolution is its unique experience in 
peaceful transformation from apartheid to democracy.833 And this experience explains why 
“South Africa provides the international community with a unique example of how a country, 
having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own 
conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development”.834 In 
effect, a state’s foreign policy is much more influenced by its history and experience than by 
structural features of anarchy or self-help.  The first, strengthening Africa’s regional institutions 
by proactively participating in activities which promotes sub-regional/regional integration and 
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development. The second aims to support the implementation of Africa’s socio-economic 
development programme such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); and 
the SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP).  
The third focuses on strengthening bilateral relations through effective structures for dialogue 
and cooperation. This includes support for peace, security, stability and post-conflict 
reconstruction initiatives and South Africa’s participation in the implementation Africa’s peace 
and security agenda and the management of peace missions.835 To be sure, South Africa’s desire 
to play an active role in African politics as part of an attempt to find “African solutions to 
African problems”, as advanced by Thabo Mbeki, is not without precedence. As early as 1994, 
South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), has affirmed its readiness to 
play this role when it stated that: 
The ending of apartheid was a joyous moment in the history of our continent. Africa sacrificed much 
during the course of our struggle. Our people – refugees and the liberation movement – were offered food, 
shelter and facilities to enhance the common endeavor to put an end to racist tyranny and oppression. With 
fellow Africans we share a vision to transform our continent into an entity that is free, peaceful and 
vibrant.836 
 
South Africa’s President, Jacob Zuma, has similarly noted that post-apartheid South Africa 
cannot exist in isolation, and needs to maintain stronger ties with Africa, given that its economic 
development and security is linked to the continent’s stability.837 South Africa’s continuing 
interaction with, and engagement in, Africa, according to Zuma, has the capacity to engender 
peace in the continent, create an environment conducive to reconstruction and development in 
our region, and provide possibilities for faster economic development.838 Indeed, South Africa 
has attempted to live up to this billing in Africa, as marked by its ranking among African 
contributors to UN peacekeeping missions around the world as at May 2017. 
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Table 7.1 South Africa’s contribution to global peace missions 
 
S/N Country  Police UNMEM Troops  Staff Officers Total 
 
1 Ethiopia     67 101 7944 117 8229 
2 Rwanda 1086   33 5049   88 6526 
3 Burkina Faso    427   14 2496   32 2969 
4 Senegal 1351     6 1458   32  2847 
5 Ghana  395   56 2229   71 2751 
6 Egypt  729   80 1799   60 2668 
7 Nigeria  372   48 1150   37 1607 
8 Morocco      0     5 1448   17 1470 
9 Togo  482   10   920   25 1437 
10 Chad    18      3  1396   16 1433 
11 Niger  180   19   974   16 1189 
12 South Africa    56   13 1079   34 1182 
13 Cameroon   385     9   750   12 1156 
14 Benin     229   13   700   20   962 
15 Malawi   86     4   862     6   958 
16 Zambia   128   39   750    22   939 
17 Guinea    45     9   850    11   939 
18 Burundi    19   12   747    22   800 
19 Congo  140     5   630    11   786 
20 Uganda    28     1   530      2   561 
Source.839  
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Inferable from the above is that South Africa has participated in numerous peacekeeping 
missions in Africa, including those in Darfur, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic 
(CAR), Lesotho, and Burundi. Most notable among its involvement in African conflicts is the 
role played by South Africa in the DRC, where the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) spearheaded efforts to stabilise the country’s internal politics, including the 
reconstruction and development of DRC’s security infrastructure and its troops. According to 
Lieutenant General Vusimuzi Masondo, the Chief of the South African Army, between 1997 and 
2015, the South African Army trained and provided a total of 8,413 members who are currently 
deployed in the DRC and the Darfur Region in Sudan as part of the United Nations and African 
Union mandated missions.840  
 
Similarly, the South African Army has continued to support these missions with personnel 
during rotation intervals. For example, 121 South African Infantry Battalion replaced the 5 South 
African Infantry Battalion in the DRC, as part of the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade 
credited with neutralising the M23 rebels.841 While South Africa may have contributed troops 
towards resolving the DRC crisis, its foreign policy behaviour at the beginning of the crisis was 
that of ambiguous neutrality.842 For example, the Mandela administration had opted for peace 
negotiations, and rejected Mugabe’s resolution to send a Southern African military contingent to 
rescue the Kabila regime.843 
South Africa’s position was heavily criticised by both Zimbabwe and Angola. Critics have 
argued that South Africa’s decision not to intervene in the conflict was motivated by alleged 
arms deal between it and Rwanda.844 Additional to this was Mandela’s determination to punish 
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Kabila for the latter’s reconsideration of the accord signed during the South African liberation 
struggle, which allowed South Africa’s mining companies to exploit the Congo’s minerals 
during the L’Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo (AFDL) regime.845 
In both the first and second Congolese wars, even though Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia used 
the SADC organ of politics, defence and security to intervene militarily on Kabila’s side, 
Mandela, as SADC chairperson, preferred a political solution.846 The South African deputy 
foreign minister, at the time, Aziz Pahad, stated thus: “we consistently maintain that there is no 
military solution possible, we need to bring a political solution to all the conflict on the African 
continent”.847  
When it eventually did, it was done through peacekeeping under the auspices of the AU and the 
UN. South Africa’s modus-operandi in  DRC thus consisted of  five major approaches: (1) 
negotiating peaceful agreements between the belligerents/warring-parties; (2) supporting the 
formation of inclusive transitional governments; (3) deploying peacekeepers to  crisis zones; (4) 
providing logistic support for the DRC’s attempt towards multi-party elections after a specified 
period; and (5) ensuring the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction/peacebuilding 
programmes that concentrate on rebuilding state institutions and infrastructure.848 These 
approaches were to be guided by the 1998 White Paper on South Africa’s participation in peace 
missions which affirmed that South Africa may provide civilian assistance, armed forces and 
police officers for common international efforts when properly authorized by international and 
domestic authorities to help in such missions.849  
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South Africa, as the White paper noted, “will continue to support the United Nations and, where 
relevant, the Organization of African Unity and the Southern African Development Community 
by making an appropriate contribution to international peace missions”.850 
As Malan notes, “in the case of the DRC, an appropriate contribution would mean the maximum 
contribution possible under the circumstances”.851 The White Paper, Malan argues, clearly states 
that, “in principle, the level and size of South Africa’s contribution to any particular peace 
mission will depend on how closely the mission relates to national interests and the type of 
demand that exists for South Africa’s contributions”.852 Thus, according to Malan, a stable and 
peaceful DRC remains a foreign policy priority for Pretoria, but for its contribution to be 
meaningful and visible, Pretoria must deploy a full range of efforts involving civilians, civilian 
police, and a significant military contingent.”853. In the next section, we will be examining the 
role played by South Africa towards the implementation of the Sun City Accord(s).   
 
 
7.6 South Africa and the Sun City Accord 
South Africa was, and remains, a key actor in conflict management in the DRC. It has played the 
roles of peacemaker, peacekeeper, peacebuilder and peace-enforcer.854 South Africa’s first entry 
into the DRC was in 1997 when it mediated in the conflict between Mobutu Sese Seko and 
Laurent Kabila, but the effort was constrained by the political status quo which favoured 
Kabila’s forces, over South Africa’s proposal of ‘‘an orderly transition’’. What followed rather 
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was the ban placed on opposition parties and rulership by decree.855 Motivated by the need to 
break the cycle of conflict which engulfed DRC, following Laurent Kabila’s assassination by his 
bodyguard, and his son’s (Joseph Kabila) assumption of office, the Organisation of African 
Unity ([OAU] now AU) appointed President Masire of Botswana to facilitate the dialogue in 
December 1999.856 
However, Masire’s intercession could only formally begin in 2001, thus coinciding with the re-
entry of South Africa into the mediation processes in the DRC.857 That process was driven by the 
Mbeki presidency in Sun City, between February 2002 and April 2002. The peace process, as 
Khadiagala, argues, led to the signing of an agreement between the DRC government and the 
Uganda-backed rebels, and it became known as Sun City 1, but it collapsed because the Rwanda-
backed rebels were excluded from the agreement.858 This was followed by an Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (ICD) which had two major purposes, which were to (1) produce a negotiated 
settlement to end the war in the DRC, and (2) to consolidate the democratisation process that had 
been disenchanted by Mobutu and Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s terms as president.859 
Kabila’s refusal to accept the implementation of the foregoing provision and his attempts at 
delaying the dialogue from commencing meant the talks eventually began in August 2001. On 
assumption of office in January 2001, Joseph Kabila took steps to revive the Lusaka process, and 
precisely on 4 May 2001, two weeks before the Security Council’s visit to the region, the Lusaka 
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agreement signatories met again in Lusaka and signed a declaration on the fundamental 
principles.860 This development set the stage for the commencement of talks in the Inter-
Congolese Dialogues, beginning with a preparatory meeting in Gaborone on 20–24 August 
2001.861 Representatives of all signatories to the Lusaka agreement and the Congolese non-
violent political opposition and civil society, and observers from the UN, OAU, SADC, 
European Union (EU) and the Joint Military Council (JMC), were in attendance.  
After some disagreements over who would participate in the talks and the venue, they agreed that 
the national dialogue would be held in Addis Ababa for six weeks beginning on 15 October, 
2001. The peace talks opened as planned at the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 
conference hall in Addis Ababa. Citing financial constraints as reasons for pruning the number of 
delegates, Ketumile Masire limited participation in the talks from the 330 representatives 
initially agreed in Gaborone to 80.862 This limited participation played into Kinshasa’s delay 
tactics, resulting in staging of a walk-out of the meetings in protest under the excuse of “limited 
attendance”. Similarly, the government in Kinshasa insisted that as a condition for its return to 
the negotiation table, the “Mai Mai” had to be included in the talks.863  
This condition was strongly rejected by the Congolese rebel groups which argued that only 
parties included in the Lusaka agreement should be invited to participate in the dialogue. 
Kinshasa’s objective, as the International Crisis group argued, was to weigh the talks in its 
favour by promoting the participation of groups it could easily manipulate.864 It took another four 
months for the stalemate to be resolved, and the national dialogue reopened in South Africa’s 
Sun City on 25 February 2002, though without the participation of one of the principal actors, the 
Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), which had initially complained that the 
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government was unfairly sending bogus civilian opposition parties. Eventually, all of the actors 
participated in the talks which lasted a total of 52 days.865 The ICD therefore had two phases: the 
ICD I – South Africa 2002; and the ICD II – the 2003 Final Act.866 
The first phase of the ICD commenced in Sun City, from February to April 2002 and it focused 
primarily on how an agreement on power-sharing among the different parties could be 
reached.867 The ICD commenced under the supervision of Masire and was later taken over by the 
then South African President, Thabo Mbeki. As a framework for peace in the Congo, the Sun 
City agreement was negotiated over a period of seven weeks, and the outcome was a partial 
agreement signed on 18 April 2002 between Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC and the government of 
Joseph Kabila.868 The agreement, signed by at least 70 per cent of the 366 delegates who 
participated in the ICD, allowed Joseph Kabila to retain power as President and Bemba, and 
three others to be his deputy.869 One of the major consequences of the agreement on the political 
calculus of the DRC was the collapse of the anti-Kabila coalition, the subsequent isolation of 
RCD and its chief ally—Rwanda.  
This development further emphasises the point that the organisation of a comprehensive army 
and the creation of a working group to develop a transnational constitution for the country 
remains sine qua non to the DRC’s quest for stability. This achievement was met with 
disapproval, and observers also partially blamed the failures of Sun City on the facilitator, who 
never quite understood the dynamics and underlying relationships between the negotiating 
parties, a shortcoming worsened by Masire’s inability to speak French. South Africa attempted to 
get the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD-Goma) and a coalition of civil 
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society groups to sign the agreement. Nevertheless, the seating preferences were disputed, and 
the dialogue failed to achieve even a general agreement among the key actors.  
This was because the RCD-Goma backed by Rwanda, along with several parties of the unarmed 
political opposition, including the Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social (UDPS) of the 
veteran Congolese politician and former prime minister, Etienne Tshisekedi, refused to sign the 
accord. This bred concerns about a return to violence, and in fact, distorted the prerequisite 
political will to reach a negotiated settlement and give peace and stability a place. The reasons 
for the refusal to sign the accord were partly due to the heavy pressure coming from Kabila’s 
government and disagreements over power-sharing during the transnational phase, as the 
agreement was rejected by the Rwanda-backed RCD-Goma and the political opposition, both of 
which were marginalised by this side deal.  
By marginalising RCD, the parties ignored the underlying objectives of Rwanda and its goal to 
establish a sphere of influence in eastern Congo through direct military occupation, proxy forces, 
or both, and focused instead on negotiating profitable government positions for themselves. 
Based on this, the parties themselves were to blame for the failures of Sun City. As noted in the 
UN integrated regional information network (IRIN) report, not much attention was paid to the 
continued violence in eastern DRC and the deal was limited between Kabila and the MLC, 
thereby failing to prescribe any real solutions to Congo’s problems.870 This situation was further 
complicated by the power-sharing agreement made by Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, who 
considered the deal an act of insubordination against participants of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement, and that it failed to address issues such as the disarmament, demobilisation, 
repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) of armed groups.871  
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The daunting effect of this misunderstanding on the peace efforts only became pronounced when 
President Masire remarked on leaving Sun City that “we are leaving Sun City without fully 
realizing all our goals”.872 Regardless of these shortcomings, the Sun City talks still had a 
number of useful outcomes, such as the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
– negotiated institutions that could potentially provide the basis for durable peace, rather than 
having to reinvent the wheel. These (negotiations) included the signing of a memorandum of 
understanding in July 2002 by presidents Kagame and Joseph Kabila to end the conflict between 
the DRC and Rwanda. The Sun City Accord approved a 90-day programme for the 
implementation of the agreement, under which Kabila would remain the interim president, with 
two vice-presidents from the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Gom (RCD-Goma) and Bemba’s 
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC).873 The failure of this new deal resulted in 
further negotiations which began in October 2002 in South Africa, which culminated in an all-
inclusive power-sharing agreement that was ratified in April 2003, thus marking the second 
phase of the ICD. 
During this second phase of the ICD that started on 2 April 2003, delegates hoped that it would 
be a historic “final act,” ending more than four years of war and setting up a government of 
national unity. The signing of this deal was aimed at restoring democracy and stability in the 
DRC. Significantly, the second phase of the ICD led to the establishment of a transitional 
government in which Joseph Kabila remained president, having four vice-presidents and 35 
ministers with their deputies.874 Parties renewed commitments to cease hostilities and embarked 
on the process of setting up an efficient and integrated army, just as the constitution and 
inclusive agreement were declared the only sources of power during the two-year transition to 
elections. Furthermore, the agreement also called for reunification, pacification, reconstruction, 
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restoration of territorial integrity and the re-establishment of the state’s authority throughout the 
country as well as transparent elections at all levels.875 
The Sun City Accord was designed to lay the foundation for a DRC with a unified, multi-party 
government, and a timeline for democratic elections, but as noted by former UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, the “real breakthrough” in the peace process will depend on its 
implementation.876 The question arising from this is: how successful or otherwise was the 
implementation process? Indeed, a very apt response to the question is contained in Neethling 
and Mokoena’s submission that the warring factions, which were very central to full 
implementation of the agreement, were reluctant to give up power, and this worsened 
considerably an already-tense security situation, thus eventually delaying the implementation of 
the agreement.877 
Despite the success recorded in the adoption of a constitution in 2005, and the two rounds of 
elections in July and October 2006, which retained Kabila as president, pockets of violence 
continued to trouble the peace process. For example, the newly-elected government did not 
extend its power beyond the borders of Kinshasa; human rights abuses continued to grow in the 
east, with increased violence, threats to human life, forceful displacements and rape of innocent 
civilians as strategies of war.878 As at the time of writing (2017), there remain at least three major 
centres of conflict in the DRC. The first is the North and South Kivu region where a significantly 
destabilised FDLR continues to threaten the Rwandan border. 
The second is the Banyarwanda region, where Rwanda is being accused of providing support to 
the RCD-Goma rebels against the government in Kinshasa, thus limiting MONUC’s ability to 
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contain the numerous militias and groups driving the Ituri conflict. The last is the Northern 
Katanga region, where the Mai Mai, created by Laurent-Désiré Kabila has slipped out of the 
control of Kinshasa. While acknowledging that the belligerent groups, non-armed opposition and 
the civil society participated in the negotiations, what remains unclear is how they intend 
creating an atmosphere in which their accomplishments toward democracy will be sustained in 
the long run.879 This uncertainty is evident in the longstanding ethnic violence between the Hutu 
and Tutsi-aligned forces, and has continued to fuel much of the conflict, with people on both 
sides fearing their annihilation as a race. Kinshasa continued to maintain close ties with Hutu-
aligned forces so as to expel the armies and proxy forces of Uganda and Rwanda. Also, while 
Uganda and Rwanda-aligned forces worked closely together to gain territory at the expense of 
Kinshasa, competition over access to resources created distrust in their relationship.  
This development explains the seeming inability of the varying peace agreements initiated by the 
international community in the DRC to bring about the desired stability in the country, thus 
making the prospects for peace increasingly elusive. It should be mentioned that, in the midst of 
all these conflicts, upheavals and negotiations, the UN intervention in the DRC has continued to 
provide humanitarian and logistic support to the DRC, particularly those in the eastern Congo, as 
well as providing training for its security agencies, and a number of its paramilitary agencies. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has generated two distinct conclusions concerning South Africa’s intervention in the 
DRC. The first reflects an appreciation of the insights gained from applying a constructivist 
understanding to its foreign policy behaviour, as its intervention demonstrates the country’s 
commitment to an African-first foreign policy orientation and its unspoken business interest in 
the DRC. In terms of the first conclusion, South Africa, through its intervention in the DRC, has 
                                                          







demonstrated its commitment to, and interest in, peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Africa. 
This development inarguably reflects the argument that the thesis has espoused in chapter six, 
that South Africa’s conflict intervention in Africa is a by-product of its commitment to 
international peace and mechanisms for conflict intervention, and its respect for the promotion of 
Africa’s interest in world affairs. This has been defined by South Africa in its plethora of foreign 
policy documents as its national interest, and the ground on which its foreign policy is premised. 
Foreign policy commitments like these are clearly antithetical to Realist constructs, and we shall 
explore this further in chapter eight. 
The second conclusion, as gleaned from available literature indicates that, following the end of 
the Cold War in 1989, there has been a general decline in the willingness of the West to 
intervene in conflicts pertaining to Africa. This apathy has undoubtedly imposed some level of 
responsibility on a number of emerging powers in the developing world to intervene. 
Consequently, middle powers in Africa, such as South Africa, have had an increasing level of 
(and also by self-design, imposed some of these) responsibilities on themselves. This scenario 
informs the role played by South Africa in the DRC, as its leadership saw the war as an 
opportunity to show the international community that it possesses the material and organisational 
resources to lead Africa. Realism, with its emphasis on relative material resources, provides a 
useful lens through which to appreciate this dimension of South Africa’s behaviour in this 
regard. 
Also, by its involvement in the DRC, South Africa has demonstrated a willingness to accept 
leadership responsibilities and its attendant consequences, and that it also has the capacity to 
mobilise its power and resources in the interest of public good.  It is imperative to note that the 
acceptance of responsibilities like these run contrary to what you would expect from a state 
whose foreign policy behaviour can be interpreted along realist lines, particularly a state with an 
intervention behaviour guided by self-interests. Lastly, South Africa’s involvement in the DRC 







evidenced in its preference for negotiations, despite the pressure mounted on it by Zimbabwe, 
Angola and Namibia to take sides with the Kabila regime. 
Furthermore, and as revealed in the course of this chapter, the essential factors which shaped the 
DRC’s crisis since its attainment of formal independence in 1960 stems from agitations over the 
distribution of national wealth, which initially was not part of the root causes of the conflict. This 
contributed immensely to the high intensity of the conflict in the east of the country, and it has 
remained a major threat to the DRC’s prospects for sustainable peace in the Kivu region. 
Undeniably, this development is not unconnected with one of the major causal factors of the 
Congo’s 1960 crisis, where the claim of a permanent purchase of land from customary chiefs 
(without any documents to attest to this) by the Banyarwandas eventually degenerated into what 
is now known as Africa’s first world war, remnants of which still abound.  
The chapter established and agrees with Huggins et al. in their contention that, “the limited 
access to land, exacerbated by unequal distribution and tenure insecurity consequently resulted 
into recurrent incidents of population displacement and succeeding re-distribution of land by the 
state”.880 It was equally observed in the course of the chapter that the ability of these opposition 
forces to oust Mobutu can also be attributed to Mobutu’s negligence to build state institutions 
and develop and train the army, a factor which caused the country to become dysfunctional, thus 
making it susceptible to intractable conflict.  
The chapter further established that the DRC’s security situation (in the period under study) 
remained unstable due to the support which the rebel forces operating in the eastern region 
enjoyed from multinational corporations who worked in the hugely-endowed region. As of late 
2017, the eastern part of the DRC continues to experience pockets of hostilities, which often 
leave millions of people displaced and insecure, thereby making prospects of peace in the DRC 
elusive. This, among others, reveals the intervention limitations faced by a regional leader which 
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South Africa has become. Despite its commitment to promoting peace, which relates to its self-
identification as an African nation with a peace-and-prosperity mission, and despite its 
preponderance in material resources, the success of South Africa’s intervention in the DRC 










Chapter 8: Analysing Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy 




8.1  Introduction 
At the beginning of the study, our task was to examine how structural realism and social 
constructivism could contribute to our understanding of Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict 
intervention role and foreign policy behaviour in Africa. In chapter two, we assessed the 
intervention debate in international politics, with a view to laying the foundation for a theoretical 
assessment of Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy and conflict intervention behaviour in 
Africa. In chapter three, the study identified the main features of structural realism and social 
constructivism, and indicated that the structural realist conception of statism, self-help and 
survival, and the constructivist focus on identity will serve as benchmarks for assessing Nigeria 
and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour towards Africa. 
Chapter four explored Nigeria’s intervention behaviour in Africa against the background of its 
foreign policy and argued that although the existing literature on Nigeria’s interventionary roles 
in Africa highlights a commitment to good African neighbourliness, there were clear attempts by 
Nigerian leaders to use its material preponderance in West Africa to fuel their personal 
leadership ambitions. Chapter five analysed the causal factors and central issues which defined 
Sierra Leone’s civil war between 1991 and 1998 by focusing on the major events which shaped 
the crisis, and how structural realism is useful in explaining its intervention role through the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In chapter six, we focused on South 
Africa’s foreign policy and its conflict intervention behaviour in Africa and used the same 
perspective as a basis on which our exploration of South Africa’s intervention in the DRC in 








Drawing on the findings from chapters one to seven, this chapter seeks to achieve two objectives: 
first, to comparatively appraise Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy and conflict 
intervention behaviour in Africa from the combined lenses of structural realism and social 
constructivism. Here, the central objective is to evaluate what structural realism and social 
constructivism tells us about both countries’ foreign policy behaviour and intervention roles in 
Africa. This takes us to the second goal of this chapter which is to highlight and demonstrate the 
relevance of the eclectic approach to the understanding and interpretation of Nigeria and South 
Africa’s foreign policy and intervention behaviour in Africa. The eclectic approach, in which 
both structural realism and social constructivism are used, helps to overcome the limitations of 
relying only on either of these international relations approaches to analyse Nigeria and South 
Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and intervention roles in Africa. We begin our discussion in 
this chapter with an assessment of what structural realism tells us about Nigeria and South 
Africa’s intervention roles in Africa. 
 
8.2 Structural Realism and Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour 
and intervention roles in Africa 
Notably, the discourse on structural realism, when situated within the debate on how much 
power a state should possess is divided along two lines: the defensive and offensive lines.881 
Defensive realists argue that it is unwise for states to try to maximise their share of world power 
because the pursuit of hegemony is foolhardy.882 Offensive realists maintain that it makes good 
strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible, and where inevitable, the pursuit of 
hegemony since the contention is not about the rightness or otherwise of conquest or domination, 
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but on the indispensability of power accumulation and control in ensuring a state’s survival.883 
Both schools of thought however agree that the quest for survival and the desire to protect state 
interest(s) remain cardinal objectives of state actors in international politics.884 Mearsheimer has 
adduced the following five suppositions about the international system as “simple structural 
realist explanations”885 as responsible for why states compete for power among themselves. 
The assumptions are that: 
1. Great powers are the main actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system 
due to the absence of a centralised authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above all 
states; 
2. States possess some offensive military capabilities which can be used to inflict harm on 
its neighbour, although these capabilities vary and change over time; 
3. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states and will ultimately want to 
know whether other states are determined to use force to alter the balance of power to 
their advantage (revisionist states)  or whether they are willing to maintain the prevailing 
order (status quo states); 
4. The main goal of states is survival. States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and 
the autonomy of their domestic political order, and; 
5. States, as rational actors, are capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximise 
their prospects for survival.886 
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However, none of these assumptions, when considered from a unilateral perspective, affirms 
“that states should or will compete for power. Rather, it is the combination of these assumptions 
that lead to a situation where states are preoccupied with the balance of power, and how to 
acquire powerful incentives to gain power at each other’s expense”.887 The above identification 
by Mearsheimer is what explains the notion of what Dunne and Schmidt summarised and 
expatiated as the “three S” of realism; Statism, Survival and Self-help—fundamental notions 
which considerably shape the level and manner of interaction at the international system. 888 With 
respect to Statism, it is claimed that a state prefers to see itself as the only actor on the 
international stage, and considers every other state as less important. 
This fact is reinforced by the belief that, in international politics, “great powers fear each other, 
due to the low level of trust among them, and the fear that another state might have the capability 
as well as the motive to attack them”.889 Self-help presupposes that co-existence in international 
politics is only achieved when a state is able to maintain a balance of power, and that limited 
cooperation is only feasible when a state stands to gain more than others.890 The concept of 
survival, the last of the “three S” in realism, focuses on the protection of the supreme national 
interest to which all political leaders must adhere.  
Entrenched in structural realism, therefore, is the emphasis placed on the notion and protection of 
the national interest, and its reference to it as a cardinal reason why states intervene in conflicts, 
which Abegunrin defines as “the means of providing the link between trying to understand 
international politics and the facts to be understood”.891 The foregoing implies that the size and 
vitality of an economy, leadership proficiency, military capability, the geographical location of a 
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state, and, more importantly, the structural balance of power in a specific arena is a potential 
explanatory logic that can be used in understanding the foreign policy behaviour of a nation. 
These characteristics support the claim in some quarters that as an IR approach, structural 
realism is a useful tool within which Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and 
conflict intervention role in Africa can be analysed.892  
Implicit in structural realism is the assumption that Nigeria and South Africa’s behaviour 
towards the external environment are anchored on the need to protect their national interests. 
Similarly, when considered from the point of view of their commitment to the promotion of 
Africa’s interest in world affairs, structural realism enables us to put into perspective the seeming 
correlation between their national interests and the motivations behind their intervention roles in 
the DRC (1997-2005) and in Sierra Leone (1991-1998). However, there are instances where the 
national interest of a nation could be at variance with its motive for intervening in a conflict, as 
the example of Nigeria in Liberia in 1990, and South Africa’s in the Central African Republic 
(CAR) in 2013 has shown.  
To understand how this conflict of interest evolves, Hans Morgenthau asks for example that, “we 
[should] put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign 
policy under certain circumstances, and we [should] ask ourselves what the rational alternatives 
are from which a statesman may choose”.893 According to Morgenthau, “it is the testing of this 
rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts 
of international politics and makes a theory of politics possible”.894 Deducible from 
Morgenthau’s explanation is that in taking the foreign policy decision of whether or not to 
intervene in conflicts, statesmen or actors are confronted with a difficult situation. Consequently, 
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Understanding what drives these decisions requires a consideration of the following structural 
realist assumptions as highlighted in chapter three. These are: 
1. The idea that a state’s behaviour can be explained rationally; 
2. The claim that a state’s behaviour is conditioned by its relative position in the (regional) 
balance of power; 
3. The argument that states seek power and calculate interests in terms of power, not 
relative to the nature of the international system, but relative to other significant actors in 
the system/sub-system.895 
In answering the question of whether a state’s behaviour can be rationally explained, the key 
determinant for Nigeria and South Africa can be found in the arguments on what constitutes 
rationality in intervention and foreign policy behaviour, as well as their conflict intervention 
roles in Africa. For Nigeria, its foreign policy orientation is not only deeply rooted in its 1960, 
1979, and 1999 constitutions,896 but also influenced by its leadership preferences and 
idiosyncrasies. A worthy example of the manifestation of leadership preferences in Nigeria’s 
foreign policy behaviour is the Gowon regimes’ severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, 
over the latter’s support for the secessionist ambition of Eastern Nigeria during its civil war of 
1967-1970.897  
Similarly, we have seen how General Babangida’s 898 desire to create an image of “a fearless, 
brave and great leader” whose memory he had hoped would remain indelible in Nigeria’s 
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contemporary history, became a motivating factor for Nigeria’s involvement and subsequent 
intervention in Liberia between 1990 and 1997.899 In response to the claim that a state’s 
behaviour is conditioned by its relative position in the balance of power, Robert Powell has 
offered a useful theoretical debate on why states strive to maintain a balance of power by all 
means necessary within their region. In his observation, Powell notes that the division between 
two of the most influential approaches to the study of international relations (neoliberal 
institutionalism and structural realism) is traceable to the importance attached to absolute and 
relative gains by both schools of thought.900 Neoliberal institutionalists focus primarily on the 
gains that states can achieve through participation in institutions, and these gains are conceived 
as absolute gains.901  
Rational actors, they assume, strive to maximise whatever they can get from interaction with 
others, irrespective of whether those gains are relatively more or less than others. Neoliberals 
thus claim that “whether cooperation results in a relative gain or loss is not very important to a 
state so long as it brings an absolute gain”. International relations is not a zero-sum game, 
neoliberals argue.902 Structural realists emphasise that the assessment of “relative gains” is what 
drives state behaviour, and that international politics indeed is a zero-sum activity. In light of 
this, states have to compete with each other to increase their relative positions of power, and it is 
the balance of power that brings stability to the system.903 Present allies, motivated by the pursuit 
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of greater relative gains, might thus turn out to be enemies in the future. The unwitting pursuit of 
cooperation may thus harm the state in its attempt to maximise its relative position.904 
In reality, states always monitor each other’s relative standing, even during the honeymoon 
period of bilateral relations. In line with this, and regardless of the absolute gains, a smaller 
relative gain can be regarded as a loss for states, because the real world is too complicated to be 
explained by absolute or relative gains alone.905 Thus, according to Powell, cooperation is 
feasible only when the cost of doing so is less than the cost of pursuing competition.  On the 
other hand, “when the cost of using force is sufficiently low that the use of force actually is at 
issue, cooperative outcomes that offer unequal absolute gains cannot be supported as part of an 
equilibrium even though the states’ preferences are defined only over their absolute level of 
economic welfare”.906 Realists tend to be pessimistic, therefore, and argue that it is much harder 
to achieve and maintain cooperation than assumed by liberals.907 
The concept of relative gain (or relative power), when operationalised in the context of Nigeria 
and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour in Africa, offers us some useful insights. Of course, 
one has to keep in mind that the theoretical conception of structural realism operates at a very 
high level of abstraction, complicating its application to explain the specific behaviour of 
specific states in specific contexts. Therefore, we also emphasise the importance of domestic 
factors such as leadership characteristics and domestic power struggles.  Nevertheless, the case 
studies examined in chapters four and six, suggest that the interventions of both South Africa and 
Nigeria were driven, at least partly, by the desire (of their leaderships) to enhance their nation’s 
relative power position vis a vis other actors.   
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In the case of Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone, Sani Abacha had a point to prove to an 
international community which had ostracised his government owing to its gross human rights 
violation and record at home. The Sierra Leonean intervention thus provided Abacha an 
opportunity to not only demonstrate to the rest of the world what Nigeria was capable of as a 
state with relative power and capabilities in its subregion, but also his relative power pursuit as a 
leader who had an ‘axe to grind’ with an international community which had written him off.  By 
the same token, South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho in 1998 does not bear the same weight as 
its intervention in the DRC (1997-2005). Again, the stakes appear different, and there was no 
dissenting opinion from any subregional power over the latter’s intervention in Lesotho.  
This essentially implies that South Africa had no competition in the exercise of its relative power 
over “little Lesotho,” both in terms of size and population. In the DRC however, South Africa 
appears to have a greater point to prove, in view of the relative interest shown in the conflict by 
equally powerful neighbours like Zimbabwe, Angola, and Botswana. Thus in the DRC, South 
Africa saw an avenue to announce to its neighbours in particular, and the international 
community that it was prepared to assume the regional leadership position that apartheid had 
denied it. Structural realists would thus argue that South Africa’s intervention in the DRC was a 
demonstration of its relative power and capabilities in a region where it had been considered 
missing in action.  
As Waltz noted, “in the anarchy of international politics, relative gain is more important than 
absolute gain”.908 Moreover, with respect to South African and Nigerian intervention, in terms of 
relative gains, only counterparts matter, just as boxers at different levels cannot compete in the 
same match. As highlighted above, and as structural realists tend to argue, Nigeria and South 
Africa could be seen as aspiring dominant powers in their regions, thus to make sure that they 
have more scope to pursue their interests, however these are defined.  
                                                          







Notably, such a pursuit of relative power dominance may lead to hubris, which might lead an 
aspiring regional hegemon to take on more than it can successfully handle, as in the case of 
South Africa in the DRC. Or it can make the aspiring state to act in ways that lead to resentment 
on the part of its neighbours, who themselves are concerned – if structural realism is correct – 
about their relative gains. To be successful “leaders”, aspiring regional hegemons need 
followers, and the unbridled pursuit of relative gains by the aspiring hegemon, in ignorance of, or 
in disregard for the interests of its neighbours, may undermine, as Nigeria’s Sani Abacha and 
Thabo Mbeki, as exemplified in our country case studies.  
In more general terms, structural realism also helps us to understand the evolution of South 
Africa’s foreign policy, particularly when viewed from the perspective of its engagements with 
the rest of the world. For example, the post-1994 South African leadership advanced the idea of 
carving for itself “an active and leading role” in developing and strengthening multilateral 
forums that would “empower the nations of the South.”909 A structural realist interpretation of 
the Mbeki administration’s foreign policy behaviour suggests that South Africa was trying to 
strengthen its relative power position in the region, by exploiting the potential created by its 
“special” normative position. 
By taking advantage of its normative standing in the world, something that post-apartheid South 
Africa is never tired of reiterating, Mbeki, and also the Zuma leadership, attempted to reinforce 
its leadership position in a sub-region where countries like Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Angola are 
also potential regional leaders. Of course, as we will point out below, one should not necessarily 
reduce South Africa’s normative claims to being instrument in a zero-sum power game. As 
constructivism points out, such normative factors can be seen as expressions of a deep-seated 
identity conception, which in turn, can shape the interests and behaviour of a state.  
                                                          








The instrumental use of normative claims was also evident in the Mbeki’s administration’s 
support for an “African renaissance styled philosophy”, and the maintenance of a foreign policy 
behaviour described by Landsberg as South Africa’s “quiet diplomacy of liberation”, during the 
Zimbabwe crisis of 2008.910 Mbeki’s leadership preference and idiosyncrasy was equally 
reflected in his perceived strong dose of anti-imperialism to South Africa’s affinity for the South, 
having classified the nations of the world as “the dominant and the dominated”, based on the 
unequal distribution of political, economic, military, technological and social power.911 Worth 
noting also is South Africa’s commitment (as evident under the Mandela, Mbeki, and Zuma 
administrations) to what Geldenhuys styled as “Southernism or Southern internationalism”.912  
For example, former President Zuma once noted that South Africa remains “indebted to 
countries and governments of the South for their support in the past.”913 This explains why past 
and successive ANC governments have always acknowledged this solidarity by: (1) bestowing 
state recognition on these foreign leaders, (2) exchanging top-level visits, and expanding 
economic and other bilateral ties, and (3) refusing to criticise their old allies for human rights 
violations and other undemocratic practices.914 While constructivists will argue that South 
Africa’s foreign policy behaviour as noted above highlights the identity-determining-interests 
character it exhibits in the course of its engagement with the rest of the world, structural realists 
will argue that such foreign policy behaviour is a calculated attempt by the South African 
leadership to maximise its relative power within a region which its apartheid past had denied it.  
In establishing a correlation between the notion that “states seek power and calculate interests in 
terms of power not relative to the nature of the international system, but relative to other 
                                                          
910 Landsberg, C. (2004). The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation. Jacana Media Ltd. 
911 Nathan, L. (2008). “Anti-Imperialism trumps Human Rights: South Africa’s Approach to the Darfur Conflict”, 
Crisis States Research Centre, Pp.6-8. 
912 Geldenhuys, D. (2012). “Political Culture in South African Foreign Policy”. International Journal of Humanities 
and Social Science, 2(18), Pp.33-34. 
913 Ibid., p.34. 







significant actors in the system/sub-system,”915 and the intervention roles of Nigeria and South 
Africa, emphasis is placed on the interplay between the primacy of the national interest and 
foreign policy articulation. Both countries have advanced the protection of the national interest 
as a cardinal objective of their foreign policy; but as structural realists point out, these interests 
are perceived in relative terms, not absolute ones.916 By making the protection of the national 
interest a key objective of their foreign policy therefore, Nigeria and South Africa are acting 
along the argument made by Waltz that, given the anarchic nature of the international system, 
there is no system-wide authority to serve as a peace enforcement agent.917  
This awareness subsequently confers on them the role of principal actors in the international 
system, allows them to “set the terms of the intercourse”, particularly the decision on when to (or 
not to) monopolise the “legitimate use of force” 918 within their territories, and bestows on them 
the authority to conduct their foreign policy in a “single voice”.919 While exercising this 
authority, it is important to mention that there is a high “possibility that force will be used by one 
or another of the parties, because, force is said to be the ultima ratio in politics. International 
politics force serves not only as the ultima ratio, but as the first and constant one”.920  A classic 
example in this regard is Nigeria’s response to the South African Armed Forces invasion of 
Southern Angola in 1988.921  
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Not only did Nigeria grant formal recognition to the “Movimento Popular de Libertação de 
Angola” (MPLA),922 it also provided military and technical support to the Forças Armadas 
Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA)923, and embarked on an aggressive and concerted 
diplomatic effort among OAU member states to support the MPLA government.924 
Consequently, and through Angola, Nigeria asserted its authority, and protected its interest in an 
international political environment which was polarised along the East and West. In what could 
pass as a structural realist explanation of Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour, Gowon925 in his 
good will message to Angola in 1975, had pledged Nigeria’s commitment to the total liberation 
of the whole of Africa.926 Nigeria, as Gowon argues, will not fold its hands to see the people of 
Angola subjugated, exploited, and recolonized by the racist and imperialist South Africa and its 
supporters.927  
Continuing further, Gowon added “our national interest has been made quite clear; which is the 
need for the liberation of Angola and Africa. The federal military government has made a 
determined effort to pursue what it considers the correct line of action, and it is gratifying to see 
the extent of national consensus and agreement on this subject”.928 The above, when considered 
from the standpoint of structural realism, suggests that intervening in Angola for Nigeria 
remained a continuation of its desire to project its relative power (through its support for the 
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MPLA) vis á vis other African contenders, such as apartheid South Africa, and against external 
rivals, such as the United States of America, Consequently, Nigeria’s involvement in Angola was 
considered not only a matter of necessity, but also an avenue for Nigeria to announce to the rest 
of the world (having just emerged from a civil war in 1967) that it still wielded sufficient 
leverage in African politics, as well as possessed the required wherewithal to confront any 
imperialist tendency and/or encroachment on Africa.  
Other than the Angolan case, Nigeria has equally intervened in a numerous conflicts in Africa in 
furtherance of its Afrocentric foreign policy drive, (and) and in demonstration of its commitment 
to African unity, most of which align with the structural realist “primacy of the national interest” 
explanation for intervening in conflicts. In Sierra Leone for example, a structural realist 
explanation of Nigeria’s role can be interpreted with a number of decisions taken by the Abacha 
junta. The first was Abacha’s decision to use the conflict to further his country’s Pax Nigeriana 
philosophy which essentially sought to advance Nigeria’s historic quest for hegemony in West 
Africa. Second, is the argument in some circles that Abacha employed the ECOMOG mission to 
ward off threats of severe international sanctions against his regime in the wake of the execution 
of the “Ogoni 9”.929  
Lastly, it has been argued that Abacha’s decision to intervene in Sierra Leone represents an 
attempt to break the diplomatic isolation imposed on his junta by the West. By intervening in 
Sierra Leone therefore, Abacha sought to achieve an important objective: demonstrate his 
regimes’ indispensability to peacekeeping in a region where the West was wary of being drawn 
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into humanitarian intervention, and by so doing, break the diplomatic isolation constricting his 
regime. Abacha’s decision to bring Nigeria’s full weight to bear in Sierra Leone was therefore 
based on his desire to protect his personal interest, and use the avenue to launder his plummeting 
image given his government’s poor human rights record at home.  
These motives highlight the centrality of interests in the structural realists’ explanation for 
intervening in a conflict. Bears mentioning that successive Nigerian governments had earlier 
advanced the crucial role which national interests play in its foreign policy articulation and 
intervention roles: 
...the style of the Nigerian Foreign policy today is therefore determined largely by these two 
unambiguously articulated factors: African solidarity and an unflinching adherence to the principles of non-
alignment. Nigeria’s new posturing has emerged as a realistic approach to the prevailing structure and 
condition of the international community.930 
Similarly, South Africa has demonstrated its willingness and readiness to exert its influence in 
the balance of power politics in Africa on a number of occasions. First, South Africa alongside 
Nigeria was, and is still, very instrumental to the gradual success recorded by the African Union 
to foster active economic integration through its New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD) initiative.931 The country was very pivotal in the processes which led to the signing of 
the Arusha Accord932 by the Tutsi and Hutu leadership in Burundi in 2000,933 and in the peace 
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keeping efforts in the DRC in 1997.934 Additionally, South Africa was instrumental to the 
political settlement of the Zimbabwean post-election violence of 2008,935 played a key role in the 
resolution of the constitutional crisis in Lesotho in 1998, where it deployed “boots” on the 
ground,936 and sent troops to Ivory Coast in 2003 in the wake of that country’s political unrest.937 
The utility of the application of structural realism to South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour, as 
noted above, thus helps us understand the country’s attempt at maximising its relative power as a 
regional hegemon ahead of rivals like Zimbabwe, Angola, and Zambia, who are equally 
members of the SADC.  
Ostensibly motivated by the need to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region, 
the South African government in 2004 also deployed limited troops to Sudan, as part of the 
African Union (AU) Peace monitors, 938 and to the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013. 
What these explications suggest is that when situated within the structural realist precinct of the 
pursuit of power and the calculation of interests in terms of power, South Africa, has 
demonstrated its resolve and desire, particularly within its sub-region, to remain relevant by 
being a key player in issues happening around its region. South Africa, through former President 
Mbeki, has never minced words about its leadership aspirations and the country’s readiness to be 
a major actor in African and world politics. 
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According to Mbeki, South Africa must not “allow the fact of the independence of each one of 
our countries to turn us into spectators when crimes against the people are being committed…We 
will have to proceed from the position that we are each our brothers and sisters’ keeper”.939A 
structural realist interpretation of Mbeki’s declaration as highlighted above, reminds us of the 
political statements statesmen make in an attempt to disguise their actual pursuit of power, 
whose end goal is to maximise the relative power of their states. Structural realism, as employed 
here, therefore makes us rightfully sceptical about the high moral claims of state leaders, and 
provides us with an opportunity to see their foreign policies for what these policies really are: 
attempts to increase their relative power in an anarchic world. However, eclecticism warns us 
that this may close our eyes to what social constructivism emphasises, that is, leaders may, at the 
same time, be expressing an identity conception which in its own right can shape how leaders 
perceive their state’s interests. 
Mbeki’s statement reflects a struggle to articulate an emerging identity conception of a state that 
emerged from a difficult past and is now confronted with expectations that it should play a 
leading normative role. But while structural realism alerts us that the pursuit of relative gains 
may be behind such normatively-clad role conceptions, constructivism warns that the reality of 
foreign policy cannot be reduced to the pursuit of relative power alone. Similarly, South Africa, 
through its Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), reaffirmed the present and future role it 
intends to play in Africa and on the international scene when it declared that “the future of South 
Africa is inextricably linked to the future of the African continent, and that Africa will continue 
to remain the central area of focus in the conduct of its foreign policy.940 
From the above, it appears evident that the overarching goal for South Africa is to remain a force 
to reckon with in Africa, by carving a niche and an image for itself, through the use of Africa as 
the cornerstone of its pursuit of relative power. By this, South Africa will most likely be a major 
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beneficiary of the popular maxim: “he who pays the piper dictates the tune”, and consequently 
strive to project its international standing and status in the comity of nations. However, a major 
shortcoming of the structural realist perspective is that it does not sufficiently explain other 
specific interests which a state actor protects, considers non-negotiable and willing to defend if 
and when threatened.  
These specific interests are what Waltz941 identified as: self-help which is aimed at ensuring the 
survival of the state, based on the pursuit of relative power in competition with contenders, and 
statism, and survival—three essential components on which the structural realism thesis is 
premised. However, before going into their specifics, it is useful to examine why structural 
realists consider the three assumptions of classical realism as insufficient in explaining a state’s 
behaviour. A plausible explanation for this has been given by Kenneth Waltz, when he argued 
that, “each state pursues its own interests in ways it judges best, and force is a means of 
achieving the external ends of states because there is no consistent, reliable process of 
reconciling the conflict of interests that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of 
anarchy”.942 
What the above suggests is that “even well-intentioned statesmen always find that they must use 
or threaten to use force to sustain their objectives.”943 By intervening in Sierra Leone (1991-
1998), and in the DRC (1997-2005) respectively, Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy 
behaviour, when situated within the framework of Waltz’s thesis on relative power, evinces that 
both countries employed a range of means, including the need to protect the national interest to 
pursue their relative power positions. These “interests” for Nigeria would be the need to fulfil its 
obligation(s) as a frontline state in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
by ensuring relative peace in Sierra Leone.  
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This “relative peace,” in the final analysis is expected to lead to greater security of the lives and 
property of Sierra Leoneans, facilitate economic development in the country, and by extension, 
the West African sub-region in line with the ECOWAS mandate. The same logic applies to 
South Africa, which by virtue of its standing (as a major bloc) in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) has a responsibility to ensure relative peace in the DRC, and 
to guarantee a favourable economic and political climate within the Southern African bloc. 
Regardless of the above, the real insight of structural realism is that, despite the high-sounding 
rhetoric state leaders use to justify their actions, their overarching interest is to maximise their 
relative power in an anarchic system, because it is a self-help system.  
This means that even humanitarian intervention, which could otherwise be seen as altruistic, 
must be understood in terms of its role in the pursuit of relative power. Indeed, in  Sierra Leone, 
between 1991 and 1998, it could be argued that Nigeria saw its intervention not only as an 
opportunity to establish its hegemonic presence within the sub-region, but also as an avenue to 
boost its popularity and reputation on the international scene, using the ECOWAS (the single 
structure of power in West Africa) as a premise. As argued in chapter five, Nigeria’s intervention 
in Sierra Leone appears motivated by three main factors—security, political, and economic 
considerations.  
From the security perspective, Nigeria’s intervention in the conflict was executed under the 
auspices of the activities of ECOMOG. As in other conflicts within the sub-region, Nigeria’s 
intervention in Sierra Leone, is deeply rooted in the guiding philosophy behind the formation of 
ECOWAS, particularly, the need to: (1) limit the ripple effects of the wars in both countries; (2) 
protect the West African people against mass atrocities; and (3) to relieve any humanitarian 
suffering in member countries.944 The Nigerian leadership had hoped to use the ECOWAS 
platform to expand its sphere of influence within West Africa. Nigeria believes that through 
                                                          








economic unity, the West African sub-region will get closer to political unity, and that the 
enthronement of economic and political stability in member states will greatly enhance its 
regional security.  
In Sierra Leone therefore, Nigeria utilised ECOMOG as a tool for responding to West Africa’s 
notoriety as a hotbed of political, economic and social agitation, and a means to counter the 
growth of insurgent and revolutionary movements often supported by economically marginalised 
youths and estranged members of the elite.945 In line with structural realist arguments, Nigeria 
has fulfilled two major principles identified by Taliaferro et al. and Gilpin as crucial to realism. 
The first is, the notion that human beings cannot survive as individuals, but rather as members of 
larger groups that command their loyalty and provide some measure of security from external 
enemies.946 ECOWAS, and more specifically, ECOMOG, represents this larger group, and its 
deployment to Sierra Leone was to provide some measure of security to member states who 
share borders with Sierra Leone.  
The second assumption, according to Gilpin, holds that “power is a necessary requirement for 
any group to secure its goals, regardless of whether those goals are universal domination or 
simply self-preservation”.947 Through ECOWAS, Nigeria galvanised support from member 
states, and translated it to power through the deployment of ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone, 
with a view to ensuring the collective existence of the institution. Similarly, Nigeria’s 
intervention in Sierra Leone confirms the argument by structural realists that, in taking the 
foreign policy decision of whether or not to intervene in a conflict, “ideology, form of 
government, peacefulness, or bellicosity” matters less in the scheme of things”, what does is the 
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“distribution of power capabilities” as a state can choose to intervene in a conflict in furtherance 
of its pursuit for relative power.948  
In Sierra Leone, Nigeria’s national interest was linked to the critical issue of guaranteeing 
security for its member states, and by extension, their prosperity through the enthronement of 
peace and stability because Sierra Leone, as well as Nigeria, is a member of ECOWAS.  The 
Sierra Leonean conflict episode thus presented Nigeria with an opportunity to help protect one of 
the primary motivations behind the establishment of ECOWAS—ensuring regional 
integration.949 Consequently, Nigeria’s decision to intervene in Sierra Leone, according to 
Uzodike, can be argued as being in line with the national interest, if one is to be consistent about 
the initiatives to secure peace, integrate the economies and ensure economic growth and regional 
prosperity.950  
However, it is instructive to note that despite Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone, being 
justifiable as a furtherance of Nigeria’s commitment to its Africa-centred foreign policy 
disposition, there were also several personal/economic interest explanations for its involvement 
in the conflict. For example, some scholars have noted that Abacha intervened in the conflict to 
protect his personal economic interest and bolster his plunging image occasioned by his 
draconian rule at home.951 Intervening in Sierra Leone for Abacha thus presented his junta with 
the platform to employ the Nigerian Army as an image-building and propaganda machine aimed 
at convincing the rest of the world, that as chair of the ECOWAS (at that time), Nigeria under his 
leadership had the resources and capability to maintain peace in West Africa. 952  
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Evidence from Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone suggests that its foreign policy articulation, 
particularly under the Babangida and Abacha regimes, became an instrument of self-
accomplishments, and the doctrine of what constitutes its national interest of pursuing the 
maximising of relative power was determined by leadership idiosyncrasy and personal 
interpretation of the President. Indeed, it would seem that Nigeria’s commitment to Afro-
centrism during this period only mattered as long as it satisfied the “big man” in Abuja. Despite 
both regimes’ foreign policy articulation intrinsically related to Nigeria’s commitment to its 
Africa-centred foreign policy principle, its eventual articulation, particularly in conflict 
resolution within the West African sub-region, leaves the impression of a hegemon trying to 
assert its authority on its subjects.  
A similar narrative played out in Sierra Leone. Nigeria’s unilateral intervention, without recourse 
to the UN, according to Mortimer, provoked sharp reactions from its neighbours, particularly 
from the leadership of countries which had strong interpersonal relationship with the RUF leader, 
Foday Sankoh.953 More than anything else, such overbearing influence arguably earned Nigeria 
the appellation of a hegemon, which imposed its will on the people of Sierra Leone by deploying 
its material preponderance and resources. On the contrary however, constructivists would argue 
that the motivation behind Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone was not necessarily aimed at 
furthering any hegemonic ambition. 
In doing so, they will argue that the mere fact that “anarchies (struggle for power) are necessarily 
self-help systems, where both central authority and collective security are absent”,954 as claimed 
by realists, does not suffice as a comprehensive explanation for Nigeria’s intervention. Rather, 
according to constructivists, self-help only serves as a means of regulating state behaviour and 
surviving the anarchy in the system because self-help is not seen as an institution that could be 
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regulated by interaction based on a states’ identity.955 On Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone 
therefore, constructivists will argue that the former intervened based on the collective identity 
existing between Nigeria and Sierra Leone as members of ECOWAS. To constructivists 
therefore, Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone serves to demonstrate their claim that identity 
and state-formation has a system self-regulating tendency and the ability to reduce process to 
dynamics of behavioural interaction among exogenously constituted actors.956  
It is this process, argued by Wendt as “capable of generating cooperative behaviour,”957 that led 
to the ECOWAS/ECOMOG joint intervention, even in an exogenously given self-help system as 
the Sierra Leone security dilemma suggested. Constructivists would thus conclude that if 
Nigeria’s intention was to further its hegemonic ambition in Sierra Leone, it would not 
necessarily have needed an intervention through ECOWAS; it could have done so as a unilateral 
actor, considering its relative power position in the sub-region. By interpretation, and according 
to constructivist logic, Nigeria’s decision to intervene through ECOWAS was borne out if its 
conviction that even though material strengths (hard power) still matter and the people 
(government) are still intentional actors (state actors), as realists claim,958 making ECOWAS the 
central unit of intervention shows that it is the ideational framework of identity and interests 
creation that informs the output of the actor to the international system.959  
In addition, South Africa has been unequivocal about the place of Africa in its foreign policy 
objectives, and its leadership have consistently argued that “its views on peace, security and 
development are inherently linked to that of Africa, and that its policies will remain “pan-
Africanist” and “Afro-centric”.960 South Africa’s intervention in the DRC conflict episode 
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appears consistent with this philosophy. South Africa’s involvement was premised mainly along 
two lines: ensuring internal political stability, and helping with the reconstruction and 
development of DRC’s security infrastructure and its troops. To achieve the first objective, a 
total of 6,000 troops was deployed, including another batch from 121 South African Infantry 
Battalion as part of the United Nations force intervention brigade.961 
From a structural realist perspective, South Africa’s intervention could be seen as an attempt to 
stake its claim to be the regional hegemon in Southern Africa. This pursuit of relative power 
includes the obligation to provide regional public goods, including stability, otherwise the claim 
to regional leadership has no validity.962 At inception, South Africa’s behaviour appears 
consistent with what structural realists would expect of an aspiring regional power, but as the 
intervention continued, a number of explicitly normative issues gained in importance. These 
echoes and reinforces the normative self-conception that South Africa has been cultivating since 
1994.   For example, at the beginning of the crisis, South Africa adopted an ambiguous neutrality 
posture for peaceful negotiations, as evident in its rejection of Mugabe’s decision to send a 
Southern African military contingent to rescue the Kabila regime.963  
Similarly, Mandela during the first and second Congolese wars, even though Zimbabwe, Angola 
and Namibia used the SADC organ of politics, and defence and security to intervene militarily 
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on Kabila’s side, Mandela, as SADC chairperson, preferred a political solution.964 South Africa’s 
foreign policy players had in fact maintained that “that there is no military solution possible, and 
that the focus must be on how to bring a political solution to conflicts in Africa”.965 More along 
these lines, South Africa’s self-conception of a nation built on peace, was reflected in the 
specific role it played in the peace negotiations. South Africa’s decision to play this role is 
believed to be in tandem with her foreign policy, which according to Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, 
is based on the “values and principles enshrined in our constitution, notably human dignity, the 
achievement of equity, the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism, non-
sexism, democracy and respect for the rule of law. 966  
South Africa’s recognition of this role was informed by a number of factors. First, a belief that 
South Africa is indebted to the rest of Africa, following the latter’s role in bringing an end to 
apartheid.967 Second is the evolving nature of conflicts and security challenges in Africa, and the 
need to help in ending the menace. Lastly is, South Africa’s unique experience in conflict 
management which led to its peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy.968 South Africa 
thus went into the DRC to fulfil one of its long standing foreign policy objectives—to contribute 
to peace, security, stability and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives in Africa.969  
Having consistently maintained that there was no military solution to the conflict, except a 
political solution,970 and despite its involvement in the AU and UN-led peacekeeping efforts, 
South Africa intervened in the DRC crisis in five critical areas: (1) negotiating peaceful 
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agreements between the belligerents/warring-parties through its involvement in the Lusaka and 
Sun City Accords ; (2) its support for the formation of inclusive transitional governments; (3) 
making peacekeepers available to support this transition process; (4) the logistic support it 
availed the electoral commission to ensure a smooth democratic process, and; (5) its commitment 
to the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction/peacebuilding programmes that concentrate 
on rebuilding state institutions and infrastructure in the DRC. 971  
South Africa’s intervention mechanism in the conflict, as highlighted above, was premised on its 
1998 White Paper document, which affirmed that it shall provide an appropriate contribution to 
multilateral intervention efforts globally, particularly under the auspices of supra-national 
institutions it is  signatory to.972  The 2008 White Paper notes further that “in principle, the level 
and size of South Africa’s contribution to any particular peace mission will depend on how 
closely the mission relates to national interests and the type of demand that exists for South 
Africa’s contributions”.973 In the DRC, therefore, an appropriate contribution, as Malan argues, 
meant “maximum contribution possible under the circumstance”.974  
Arguably, South Africa’s approach to the DRC conflict was essentially that of peacemaking, 
rather than a demonstration of its relative power preponderance through the use of force. By 
taking up the onerous task of negotiating peace among the warring parties, South Africa appears 
to have challenged the rationalist assumptions on the unchanging reality of international politics, 
in particular, the argument that anarchy is an inevitable feature of international reality, arguing 
instead that it is “what States Make of it”.975  In the DRC, South Africa’s role, and the outcome 
of its intervention, appears to have confirmed Wendt’s claim that “power politics,” (quest for the 
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control over natural resources in DRC) are social constructions given by nature, and are not static 
because they could be changed as a result of human practice, (as we saw in the negotiations and 
the accords which South Africa spearheaded), given the dynamic nature of social reality.976  
By opting for negotiations as a means of resolving the conflict, South Africa’s action seems to 
confirm the constructivists’ contention that self-help and power politics, “do not follow either 
logically or casually from anarchy, and if we the world finds itself in a self-help situation, it is 
due to process, not structure”.977 Remarkably, South Africa’s intervention in the DRC is, in 
itself, an expression of the type of identity it shares with the DRC (given its membership of the 
Southern African Development Community) and the extent to which such identity shaped the 
environment (Southern Africa sub-region) in which it operates as a major player.  Having just 
emerged from a “long sabbatical” in international politics due to apartheid, the DRC conflict 
episode provided a veritable platform for South Africa to announce to its neighbours and the rest 
of the world that it was no longer going to be business as usual, and that it was ready to occupy 
its place as a formidable force in Southern Africa politics, using the DRC conflict episode as a 
launch pad.   
For Nigeria, while it has arguably never imposed its will on others, despite the soft and hard 
power resources at its disposal, its foreign policy behaviour continues to be guided by the 
struggle for relative power at the international and regional level. This foreign policy posture was 
perhaps informed by its long history of military dictatorship (1966 and 1979 and 1983 to 1999), 
which saw Nigeria run by military fiat. It seems apparent therefore that the need to protect 
Nigeria and South Africa’s national interest in Sierra Leone and the DRC, and maintain a 
balance of power within the West African and Southern African sub-regions could pass as a 
structural realist explanation for Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict 
intervention roles in both conflict episodes. While the reasons mentioned above offer us some 
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insights into the usefulness of structural realism in understanding Nigeria and South Africa’s 
foreign policy behaviour and intervention roles in Sierra Leone and the DRC conflict episodes 
and, as we will see below, only provides a partial understanding. 
 
8.3 Constructivism, identity, and Nigerian and South African foreign policy 
behaviour and intervention role in Africa 
It is imperative to note that our exploration of the link between identity and Nigerian and South 
African foreign policy behaviour in this section is not a rehash of what has been said about both 
countries’ foreign policy behaviour in Africa, but to show how the interpretation of their 
interventions is not limited to structural realist insights alone. In particular, given the primacy 
that social constructivism places on identity and the social norms associated with it, we have to 
ask how an appreciation of the role of identity formation and identity affirmation can enrich our 
understanding of these states’ foreign policy behaviour in conflicts in Africa. In answering this 
question, we should keep in mind that, useful though it is, social constructivism may be more 
relevant in elucidating one state’s behaviour than another’s. 
Constructivism is useful in analysing South Africa’s foreign policy, given the large role that a 
self-conception of moral exceptionalism has played in its behaviour since the official demise of 
apartheid.978 In contrast to structural realism, which would tend to regard normative claims made 
by state leaders as instruments that they use to bolster and justify their pursuit of relative power 
(their actual interests), constructivists see identity as a causal force in its own right, determining 
the interests being pursued. In the case of South Africa, for instance, constructivists would argue 
that we have to take the normative claims of Mandela, Mbeki and others seriously, as they give 
us insights into the emerging self-conception of a nation. 
                                                          








Constructivism is important for other reasons as well. First, constructivism helps in explaining 
change, by focusing on the power of ideas (such as ideas, norms and values) in defining ranges 
of action and interaction. Second, by focusing on the importance of identity in international 
politics, constructivism highlights that states have interests beyond mere material power gains. 
And lastly, through its focus on the mutually reinforcing relationship between an actor’s 
interests, identity, and behaviour, constructivism contributes to a fuller understanding of the 
nature of international politics and the place of states in it. In the real world of international 
politics, beyond the parsimonious modelling that structural realism applies, ideational concerns 
and the construction of inter-subjectively shared meanings eventually constitute international 
relations as a social world.979 
In South Africa’s case, these constructivist premises are particularly relevant in trying to 
understand the country’s foreign policy post-apartheid.980 They noted that the context of “a 
double transition”981 within which the “new South Africa” emerged, has shaped the country into 
‘who it is, what it wants, and how it behaved”.982 Van Wyk argues, for example, that South 
Africa’s transition from a “pariah state” to democracy in April 1994, meant that lessons learnt 
from its chequered apartheid, will continue to shape the course of its interaction with the rest of 
the world.983 This realisation by South Africa appears to be in consonance with the 
constructivist’s argument that an actor shapes its own social context (of shared values and 
norms) in terms of its identity conception, which in turn shapes the interests and behaviour of 
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that same actor. These, through a feedback-loop, feeds back into the actor’s identity 
conception.984  
Analysts have noted that constructivism appears very useful in understanding South Africa’s 
post-apartheid foreign policy in the sense that its “double transition” created the context within 
which its norms, identity, interests, and interactions, were reconstructed.985 Naturally, the 
identity self-conception that emerged after the end of apartheid was heavily influenced by the 
sorrowful history of apartheid. The newly emerged identity conception was not necessarily fully 
formed from the outset, but is still a work in progress, and is still hotly contested by different 
interest groups in the new South Africa. 
Two examples to illustrate the above: (1) The notion of “moral exceptionalism” as reflected in a 
several documents, and specifically in the notion of “Ubuntu” as the leading normative core of 
South Africa’s public policy (2011 White Paper). (2) To give effect to a new post-apartheid self-
conception, a number of initiatives designed to align South Africa with new global realities were 
initiated, including the establishment of a South African National Defence Force (SANDF)—
composed largely of members of the “Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)”, the Azanian People’s 
Organisation (AZAPO), among others.986 The effect of the personnel transformation of the 
SANDF to reflect South Africa’s new identity has also meant that the central focus of the 
SANDF post-apartheid has to be prioritised. 
This among others, focused on the embracement of a more radical self-defence posture, renewed 
commitment to peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief operations,987 and the engagement of the 
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SANDF, as a tool for advancing its peace and security agenda in Africa.988 In Nigeria’s case, 
right from independence in 1960, successive Nigerian leaders have maintained the age-long 
belief that Nigeria holds a historic mission and manifest destiny to lead the rest of Africa on 
account of its huge socio-political and economic resources and importance to Africa.989 Nigeria’s 
identity is thus premised on its decolonisation struggles and its military-styled dictatorship which 
shaped its statehood shortly after independence in 1960.  
This development perhaps informs the active role Nigeria played in the Congo in 1960, when it 
deployed troops under the United Nations Organisation (UNO) supervised peace keeping 
mission, and its membership of supra-national institutions such as the OAU in 1967, and later 
ECOWAS in 1975. By joining these regional and international organisations, Nigeria has 
demonstrated a sense of collective identity by committing to, and identifying with sub regional, 
regional and international peacekeeping commitments, and has fulfilled the three basic functions 
which Tajfel ascribes to identity—tells you and others who you are and it also tells you who 
others are.990   
Hopf has helped shed more light on the identity-themed nature of Nigeria’s foreign policy 
behaviour, when he argued that the producer of an identity “is not in control of what it ultimately 
means to others, rather, it is the inter-subjective structure, which serves as the final arbiter of 
meaning”.991 Nigeria has an identity within the ECOWAS bloc which its leadership is not in 
control of, and which can only be measured by the level of support and reciprocity it garners 
from member states when a need for a common action arises. Put differently, and going by the 
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same logic of Hopf’s explanation, Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia, and Sierra Leone can be 
likened to its reciprocation and recognition of the historical, political and social identity Nigeria 
shares with these countries through the ECOWAS bloc.  
Also, Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour, by virtue of its role as a member of the Frontline states 
during decolonisation and anti-apartheid struggles in Africa, illustrates the constructivist 
argument that a state’s process of interaction within the international system is premised on the 
type of self-conceptualised identity the state has based on its historical experiences and the 
context the environment or realm it operates. In other words, by identifying with countries 
striving to break away from colonialism in Africa, and southern African countries battling 
apartheid, Nigeria discovered and displayed a sense of cross-national solidarity, shared 
aspiration, and a sense of collective identity with countries reeling under the shackles of 
oppression.  
Furthermore, as if to echo its very existence as a newly independent state that graduated from the 
shackles of colonialism, Nigeria became a champion of the right to self-determination and the 
sovereign equality of all African states. To the structural realist sceptic, this may look like just 
another ideological mask behind which Nigeria hides its power ambitions, but, clearly, more is at 
play here. Through actively pursuing the normative goal of self-determination, based on its own 
experience, Nigeria contributed to the precipitation and solidifying of a shared African identity, 
which gave birth, in turn, to specific national interests that are pursued internationally. Nigeria 
identified with other countries to adopt resolution “UNGA 1960”, which vigorously advocated 
the independence of countries reeling under colonialism at that time.  
Nigeria’s identification with these initiatives is a pointer to the collective identity-themed focus 
of its foreign policy behaviour at independence. And by extension, the raison d’tre for the 
financial support it gave to liberation movements such as: the African National Congress (ANC), 
the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola 







West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia.992 Equally, Nigeria’s support for, and 
membership of, several multilateral institutions such as the  United Nations (UN), 
Commonwealth of Nations, Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the African 
Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), World Bank, and 
African Development Bank (ADB), is testament to the role which identity plays in shaping its 
foreign policy behaviour.  
Nigeria’s membership of these institutions reaffirm its belief that distortions in the international 
system can be resolved through established mechanisms, as seen in the role it played in 
facilitating the institutionalisation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). By the same logic, the subscription of Nigeria 
to a foreign policy principle which recognises and respects the territorial sovereignty of states, 
respect civilised rules of interaction in its engagement with the rest of the world, and a general 
commitment to internationally-agreed mechanisms of resolving conflicts, suggests that structural 
realism as an IR approach cannot fully explain Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour, given that 
these commitments are built around the notion of collective identity. 
Similarly, Nigeria, as a foreign policy objective, believes in the promotion of international 
cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations, and in 
the elimination of discrimination in all manifestations. This collective-identity-themed 
philosophy has been reinforced in the numerous collaborative and cooperative engagements 
Nigeria has entered with governmental and non-governmental international organisations in 
seeking collective solutions to global problems. This is evident, for example, in its involvement  
in the enactment of the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence (1981), its 
sponsorship of the Technical Aid Corps (TAC),993 the activation of the ECOWAS Protocol on 
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Free Movement of Citizens, (1986-1988), the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention (1999), Protocol on democracy and good governance (2001), and the plan of 
action for the implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security 
and Development (PCASED) in year 2002.  
For South Africa, the relevant literature suggests that South Africa’s foreign policy orientation 
since the demise of apartheid in 1994 has been premised on the need to create a new identity for 
itself in its engagement with the rest of the world.994 For example, Van Wyk, has explained the 
consistency of South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy behaviour along: Wendts’ claim that 
‘‘state identity are constructed and not made’’; Kratochwil’s emphasis on the place of ‘‘norm 
and rules’’ in international relations, and; Onuf’s argument that ‘‘words often make the 
world’’.995 At the same time, though, a sub-strand of this literature to which the current study 
also belongs, emphasises that we need both a constructivist and a realist perspective to do full 
justice to what is going on in South Africa’s foreign policy. 
Serrão and Bischoff, for instance, argue that while identity remains crucial to understanding 
South Africa’s foreign policy, a focus on identity alone does not sufficiently explain its foreign 
policy behaviour, and that a mixed focus, incorporating insights from both constructivist and 
materialist-based theories of IR, is necessary.996 Basking in the euphoria of the international 
goodwill which greeted the demise of apartheid in 1994, South Africa, under Nelson Mandela 
adopted a universalism-styled foreign policy posture which saw it constructing itself as a friend 
to all and enemy to none, irrespective of each country’s’ ideological stance.997 This posture led to 
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concerted efforts by the country’s leadership to reconstruct a new national and international 
identity for itself through its interactions with the international community.  
Van Wyk narrates how South Africa’s identity transformation aligns with Wendt’s argument that 
a state identity is made through interaction and not merely given.998 Van Wyk set out by drawing 
an analogy between the essential roles a state’s identity performs on the international level, and 
how South Africa’s identity transformation has measured up in this regard.999 As Van Wyk 
noted, by remerging as a champion of human rights and a voice of the South, South Africa 
demonstrates one of the core functions of identity—telling you and others who you are,1000 by 
refocusing its foreign policy from a hitherto protectionist orientation under apartheid, towards 
achieving domestic growth and a better life for all South Africans, thus fulfilling the foreign 
policy driving force role, which a state identity performs.1001 
 Equally, South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour, through its self-proclaimed responsibility to 
promote an “agenda of the South”, “a rules-based international trading regime”, and its active 
engagement in international peace and security issues, has demonstrated what its motivations, 
intentions, preferences, and consequent interactions are within the international community, and 
this remains a core function of what a state identity does.1002 Similarly, South Africa’s 
multilateral foreign policy approach, and its emergence as a middle power, have led it to actively 
identify with various initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), and the Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa Cooperation (BRICS), and confirmed its foreign policy 
consistency with predictable patterns of behaviour, actions and interactions often identified with 
a states’ identity.1003 South Africa, like other states whose foreign policy behaviour aligns with 
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constructivist thinking, has over the years constructed for itself multiple identities, synonymous 
to the essential underpinnings of corporate, social and collective types of identity. 
In terms of corporate identity, which refers to the reflection of a state’s resources, beliefs, norms, 
and human capital in its interactions with the rest of the world, scholars have argued that South 
Africa has demonstrated this by effectively reconstructing its foreign policy and foreign relations 
in a way that represents the different beliefs of its diverse society, operating in a context of 
increasing global economic interdependence and by engaging more with global actors and 
institutions since the demise of apartheid.1004 This move led to the recognition of South Africa as 
an international actor—a status further consolidated by Mandela’s iconic stature and presidency.  
To project this newly-found image, South Africa adopted multilateralism as a tool for 
relaunching itself within the international community, and its foreign policy articulation.1005   
Understanding the correlation between social identity (defined by Wendt as a set of meanings a 
state attributes to itself while taking the perspectives of the other into account,1006) and South 
Africa’s foreign policy behaviour requires an acknowledgement of the pivotal role which 
national interests play in its foreign policy articulation. South Africa’s national interest suggests 
that its interests define situations, and inform the way it acts and reacts within the international 
community based on the meaning it ascribes to objects, other actors, and the actions and 
interactions taking place among them.1007 For South Africa, the meaning of social identity, its 
roles and foreign relations, as Van Wyk contends, is to achieve a better life for all.1008 This 
ambition has been reiterated by its foreign policy decision makers, where its erstwhile Foreign 
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Affairs Minister, Nkosasana Dlamini–Zuma remarked that the key objective of the Department is 
“to achieve a better life for South African and a better world for humanity”.1009  
This view was re-echoed in the DFA’s “strategic plan for 2002-2005 report”, where the 
Department noted that “beyond Africa, it is the desire of South Africa to contribute towards the 
creation of a more equitable and humane world for all of human kind”.1010  To achieve this, 
South Africa undertook a number of remarkable changes in its foreign policy to accommodate its 
post-1994 identity via its Department of Foreign affairs (now DIRCO) as the implementation 
machinery. These changes included:  (1) promoting a positive image of/for South Africa through 
the Thabo Mbeki-led International Marketing Council (IMC) initiative,1011 and (2) identifying 
itself as an “equal” and as a partner of African states through the implementation of its 
commitments, obligations, interests, contributions and benefits of other African states as 
evidenced in the leadership it has provided in New Partnership for Africa Development 
(NEPAD), the Millennium African Plan, the White Paper on South Africa’s foreign policy, titled 
“Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu among others”.1012 
Understandably, South Africa’s attempt towards a foreign policy role conception and redirection 
appears to be in fulfilment of the social identity role played by a state’s’ foreign policy, 
described by Holsti as “the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to 
their state, and the functions, if any, their state perform on a continuing basis in the international 
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system”.1013  To be sure, it has been argued that a state’s role reflects its claim on the 
international system,1014 and that any foreign policy change rests on a redefinition of a state’s 
role.1015 For South Africa, its new role definition has helped in explaining its foreign policy 
preferences, its self-image and the image the world had/has of it, its expectations, definitions of 
specific situations and the available options it has [to respond to any developing situation].1016 
Consequently, South Africa (post-1994) has reappraised its role prescription and conception 
within the international community to align with the general expectations of the international 
community after the demise of apartheid. At the heart of this role change is a move towards 
greater African solidarity and assuming responsibility. Some of these notable role changes, 
according to Barber, have seen South Africa: (1) adopt an aggressive image rebuilding measure 
which has helped in improving its relationship with the rest of the world; (2) become a middle 
power with an ability to consistently generate successful initiatives at regional, bilateral and 
multi-lateral levels, as evidenced in its personnel landmine and bloody diamond campaigns, 
otherwise known as the Kimberly and Ottawa process, and its voluntary nuclear 
disarmament.1017  
While the concept of a “middle power” is quite problematic, as we will point out in the 
concluding chapter, we might allow it to pass for the time being as a conceptual “marker” of the 
way in which South Africa’s self-conception changed after 1994. Similarly, and as a 
consequence of its imposed and self-imposed international leadership responsibilities, scholars 
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have identified the significant impact which South Africa’s embracement of a multilateralism-
styled foreign policy approach has had on its new identity. According to Nel, Taylor and Van der 
Westhuizen, South Africa’s identity as an emerging middle power has featured the following 
characteristics in its foreign policy behaviour: 
(1) A concerted commitment and an attempt to introduce new norms and mechanisms to 
address both the concerns of developing states and Africa’s marginalisation. These 
attempts include its commitments to: the Fancourt Commonwealth Declaration on 
Globalisation and People-Centred Development (1999), the Berlin Declaration on 
Progressive Government (2000), and the Skagen Declaration signed between the 
former President Thabo Mbeki and the Norwegian government in 2000; 
(2) A conscious attempt to revive and strengthen global and African multilateral 
institutions, especially those focused on enhancing the interests of the developing 
world; 
(3) Its hosting of numerous meetings of multilateral organisations—United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1996, Non-Allied Movement 
(NAM), in 1998 the World Conference on HIV/AIDS in 2000, and the World 
Conference Against Racism (WACR) in 2001 among others; 
(4) Its role in promoting peace and stability in Sierra Leone, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan, the 
DRC, the Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire and the Great Lakes region, and; 
(5) Its status as a founding member, and first chair of the African Union (AU) and 
hosting its first summit in 2002.1018 
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Understanding the synergy between South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and Wendt’s notion 
of collective identity requires a summation of the meaning of the concept. According to Wendt, 
social identity generates collective interests.1019 To exercise a collective identity, the interests of 
“the collective” is raised significantly higher than the interests of the state, or blurred to enable 
the overall interest take prominence in the course of interaction. South Africa’s interest as a 
sovereign state is wilfully surrendered in the interest of the SADC, when a conflict of interest 
arises, in order to give room for a collective decision to be taken. For South Africa, much of its 
attempts at reintegrating itself into the international community has been premised on the 
ideological stand of the African National Congress.1020  
Indeed, the seeming collective identity-themed nature of South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour 
has been expressed largely in terms of African solidarity in many of its conflict intervention roles 
in Africa. This is evidenced in former President Nelson Mandela-led negotiations on Burundi in 
1999, and later President Jacob Zuma, who took over as facilitator for the ceasefire 
negotiations.1021 These negotiations eventually led to what became known as the Arusha Peace 
and Reconciliation Agreement, which was a regional initiative.1022South Africa has equally 
demonstrated a sense of collective identity in its intervention in the DRC, both as a peacekeeper, 
and as the lead negotiator in the Sun City Accords, which was a sub-regional initiative.1023 
South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour in this conflict episode thus reminds us of Zehfuss’ 
contention that “in the exercise of a collective identity, and depending on how identities and 
interests are defined, collective identification with other actors is based on feelings and 
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expressions of solidarity, community, loyalty, and concern for other’s welfare and fate”.1024 In 
expressing this African solidarity however, scholars have argued that South African foreign 
policy decision makers are equally aware of its attendant risks.1025 The danger in such an 
expression, as former President Thabo Mbeki noted, is the tendency to fall victim of collective 
punishment should an unacceptable behaviour of one or more countries within the bloc be 
misrepresented as collective.1026 
Regardless of this possibility however, South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour reflects the 
dynamics of collective, intersubjective meaning/identity formation, as highlighted by Wendt.1027 
Nearly all of South Africa’s foreign policy documents between 1994 and 2011 have re-stated the 
country’s desire to lead, act, and reflect Africa’s position in its international engagement.  From 
Mbeki’s pursuit of an African renaissance initiative, along with former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo of Nigeria, which led to the establishment of the New Partnership for African 
Development Agenda (NEPAD), in tandem with its ideological, but aggressive push for an 
“African solutions to Africa Problems” agenda, South Africa continues to demonstrate its resolve 
to identify with the interests of others in pushing for Africa’s progress. 
Implicit in this is that, in the very development and affirmation of South Africa’s identity, the 
sub-theme of the pursuit of relative power, as emphasised by social constructivism, plays a role. 
This justifies why it is insufficient to rely on only one of structural realism or social 
constructivism in explaining both countries’ foreign policy behaviour. Indeed, a notable indicator 
of South Africa’s use of collective identity as a foreign policy behaviour tool is the enshrinement 
of the “consolidation of an African agenda”, as a foreign policy priority, its commitment to 
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African renaissance through the African Union as well as its commitment to economic 
development through regional integration and development in the Southern African 
Development Community, and its frontline role in the subregional Southern African Customs 
Union.1028  
First, by introducing a strong focus on Africa and the South, and promoting the cause of the 
developing world as a central feature of its foreign policy, South Africa has given power and 
meanings to its identity by using its commitment to rules and norms as instruments of 
navigation. While the bulk of South Africa’s interaction within the comity of nations has been 
shaped by the new identity imposed on it post-1994, most of its foreign policy behaviour/actions 
within the international community appear guided by its observance of rules and norms, thus 
giving meaning to its actions.1029 
Similarly, South Africa’s prioritisation of the  promotion of the security and quality of life of all 
South Africans, as a cardinal objective of its foreign policy, its commitment to international 
responsibilities and obligations through its promotion of democracy, its efforts to undo human 
rights abuses perpetuated by the apartheid regime, its expression of solidarity for Africa by being 
a mediator in  several peace talks on the continent, its Africa-focused foreign policy orientation, 
among others, bear witness to the fact that, like any other states, the country’s identity underlies 
its motivations, intentions, actions and interactions.1030  
Consequently, South Africa’s behaviour is based on the meaning its leadership/foreign policy 
decision-makers ascribe to objects, actions and interactions among them.1031 These interests are 
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then articulated as foreign policy behaviour, and as the basis of/for its actions and interactions 
within the international community, and constructed with other actors in a way that enables 
South Africa to maintain its identity.1032 The succeeding section examines the utility of the 
application of the eclectic approach in assessing Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy 
behaviour, and conflict intervention roles in Africa. 
 
8.4 The utility of the eclectic approach in assessing Nigeria and South Africa’s 
foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in Africa 
Based on our discussions above, and in line with the overall objective of this thesis, it has 
become imperative to ask: of what value is the application of the eclectic approach to the 
understanding and interpretation of Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy and intervention 
behaviour in Africa to the discourse? As a response, and as this chapter and the chapters on 
Nigeria’s and South Africa’s foreign policy in addition to the case study chapters have 
demonstrated, it is obvious that neither structural realism nor constructivism, singularly and/nor 
comprehensively, explains both countries’ roles in these conflicts, and a multi-perspective, 
eclectic approach is necessary. It shall be recalled that, in defining an eclectic approach, we 
adopted Graham Allison’s state decision-making model of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis which 
employed two or more theoretical perspectives to illuminate different dimensions of the complex 
process of decision-making.1033 
Drawing references from Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein’s thesis on analytical eclecticism, and 
Albert Domson-Lindsay’s debate on Parsimony and Eclecticism, we contended that the adoption 
of analytic eclecticism to the study of Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour in 
Africa has the potential to elicit a number of reactions. First, it will enable students of the foreign 
policy of African states to appreciate the complex nature of foreign policy decision-making from 
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a more nuanced and wider perspective, rather than focusing on the theoretical turf-wars which 
have become too prevalent in the discipline of International Relations.  
Second, analytic eclecticism addresses issues that have a wider scope than the narrow confines of 
specific research approaches and can, in principle, “incorporate more of the complexity and 
messiness of particular real-world situations”.1034 Third, by constructing substantial arguments to 
trace various dimensions of a complex event, eclecticism drops the excessive reliance on 
“parsimony” which has come to be an almost unassailable precondition for “scientific” analysis 
in appreciation of the different types of causal mechanisms involved in real-world social 
situations.1035 
Relatedly, the eclectic approach also helped to bring to the fore, a wider variety of perspectives 
on a complex phenomenon such as foreign policy, particularly the relative merits of the different 
theoretical approaches employed. Taking cognisance of the merits embedded in analytic 
eclecticism therefore, the study aligned with Albert Domson-Lindsay’s submission “that the 
analytic eclecticism approach is useful in understudying Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign 
policy behaviour and intervention roles in Africa because it ensures that a scholarly endeavour is 
sufficiently close to the experience of real world actors, and leads to deeper insights into a state’s 
foreign policy behaviour and the problems associated with it”.1036 To achieve this, we focused on 
two IR approaches—structural realism and social constructivism—which have featured 
prominently in the literature on Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policies,1037 and been used to 
                                                          
1034 Ibid., p.412. 
1035 Sil, R. and Katzenstein, P. (2008). “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring 
Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions”. Perspectives on Politics, p.412. 
1036 Ibid., p.370. 
1037 Most of our discussions on structural realism focused on the works of Morgenthau, H. (1956a). Politics among 
Nations, New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Waltz, K. (1959). Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New 
York: Columbia University Press; Keohane, R.O. (Ed.) (1986b) Neorealism and its Critics.  New York: Columbia 
University Press; and, Mearsheimer, J. (2007). “Structural Realism. In Dunne, T. Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (Ed.). 
International Relations Theories: Disciplines and Diversity. Oxford University Press. On Social Constructivism, we 
examined Alexander Wendt’ 1992 thesis, “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power 







examine both countries’ intervention roles in the Sierra Leone (1991-1998) and the DRC (1997-
2005) conflict episodes.  
As the rest of the study evinced, testing Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour in 
Africa against the strength of the essential arguments embedded in structural realism and social 
constructivism has helped to highlight a number of issues, which would have remained 
unnoticed, if the study had applied a singular IR approach in interpreting their foreign policy 
behaviour. As demonstrated in chapter three where the focus was on the theoretical issues 
embedded in structural realism and social constructivism, singularly applying structural realism 
as the study’s IR approach, would only have given us an empirical point of view of the world, 
thus foreclosing the opportunity to view Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and 
conflict intervention roles from a normative context.  
The same narrative would have played out if the study had employed social constructivism as a 
singular IR approach, given the focus of constructivism on deep-seated identity, and how it 
shapes the interests and foreign policy behaviour of states, and the normative claims in its 
foreign policy objectives and conflict intervention behaviour. Similarly, if the study had relied on 
the application of structural realism as its sole IR approach, there is the proclivity to lead readers 
into believing that Nigeria and South Africa’s roles in Sierra Leone and the DRC were fuelled 
largely by relative power pursuits. This is despite the study suggesting that their foreign policy 
behaviour and conflict intervention roles in the conflicts were partly motivated by the need to 
maintain a balance of power within their subregions by means of self-help, as structural realists 
will argue. It is nevertheless impossible to neglect the possibility that their interventions could 
have been largely motivated by their identities as African actors, the sense of solidarity they 
shared with other African states during decolonisation and anti-apartheid struggles, and the 
existing values and bonds that they share with their contiguous states.  
It is thus clear that adopting either of the approaches in the interpretation of Nigeria and South 







currents behind aspects of the behaviour. This development, more than anything else, provides a 
compelling justification for the adoption of the eclectic mode of theorising in this study. To be 
sure, and as demonstrated in chapters four and five, combining both approaches to interpret 
Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy has significantly helped in enriching our 
understanding of how national interests and national identity shape a state’s foreign policy 
behaviour. By our application of structural realism to Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy 
behaviour in Africa and conflict intervention roles in Sierra Leone and the DRC, we have seen 
how its focus on the primacy of the national interests can be a motivating factor for a state to 
intervene in conflicts. 
On the other hand, we also saw how a state can utilise the “need to protect the national interest,” 
as an excuse to strengthen its relative power position in its region, as Nigeria’s Sani Abacha 
demonstrated in Sierra Leone and South Africa acted in the DRC under the guise of being its 
“brother’s keeper”. At the same time, our application of social constructivism to both countries’ 
conflict intervention roles in Africa have broadened our perspective on how shared “identity” 
that is, a set of shared meanings which is socially-constructed within a society, an guide a state in 
its interaction with others across national borders. In Sierra Leone for example, we saw how 
Nigeria’s subscription to collective regional identity shaped its involvement in the crisis through 
ECOWAS, given that both Sierra Leone and Nigeria are both members of ECOWAS. South 
Africa’s involvement in the DRC conflict episode also follows the same logic. Apart  from the 
‘‘type identity’’ which South Africa and the DRC share through SADC, South Africa’s 
intervention in the conflict was guided largely by its unique experience of conflict management 
during apartheid. An exclusive application of either structural realism or social constructivism 
would have proven insufficient in exposing these realities. 
The utility of the eclectic approach in the study was equally evident in chapter five of the study, 
where the focus was on Nigeria’s foreign policy, and its conflict intervention behaviour in 
Africa. For example, and through a combination of both approaches, we saw how social 







particularly when it led decolonisation and anti-apartheid struggles and provided support to 
liberation movements in Africa, through the Organisation of African Unity’s Liberation 
Committee and the frontline states. By constructivist interpretation, Nigerian leaders sought to 
build bridges across the divide in a manner devoid of any hegemonic intentions at independence 
in 1960.  
This foreign policy behaviour leads us to the constructivist explanation of the role of collective 
identity in bridge building and fostering mutual cooperation among state actors when a common 
goal is at stake. This is clearly antithetical to the structural realist claims about statism, self-help 
and survival. Social constructivism thus becomes useful in explaining Nigeria’s foreign policy 
behaviour at independence. Obviously, these revelations would have been hidden if a singular IR 
approach had been employed. In the fifth chapter where we assessed Nigeria’s intervention role 
in Sierra Leone and the extent to which its intervention aligns with Nigeria’s Africa-centred 
foreign policy, the application of an eclectic approach also availed us the opportunity to view 
Nigeria’s role in the conflict from a constructivist point of view.  
While a substantial amount of evidence points to a structural realist motivation for Nigeria’s 
intervention in the conflict, given Abacha’s desire to negotiate some sort of international 
relevance for his junta, a constructivist perspective on the rationale for Nigeria’s intervention 
tells a different story. Constructivists will argue that Nigeria’s intervention in the conflict had 
little to do with Abacha’s personal ambitions, but more with the need to protect the “shared 
identity” between Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and ECOWAS.  In chapters six and seven, we saw how 
the identity-determining-interests dynamic of South Africa’s foreign policy and its foreign policy 
behaviour reflect a strong identity-based commitment to the interests of the South. While 
constructivism, particularly the notion of identity, comprehensively addresses the normative 
features of South Africa’s foreign policy, and its self-imposed responsibility in the management 
of conflicts in Africa, it falls short in explaining the hegemonic tendencies exhibited in its 







It also fails to address the significant role structural realism plays in how South Africa positions 
itself in regional and world politics against (a) contenders in Africa and (b) the imperialist world 
out there. Adopting one of the theories at the expense of the other would have denied us the 
opportunity to understand some of the leadership dynamics at play here. Hence, there is need for 





This chapter has attempted to answer the central questions posed at the beginning of the study 
which is to comparatively evaluate Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy and conflict 
intervention behaviour in Africa from the combined lenses of structural realism and social 
constructivism, and to demonstrate the relevance of the eclectic approach in the understanding 
and interpretation of Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy and intervention behaviour in 
Africa. To achieve the purpose, the chapter drew a parallel between the essential features of 
structural realism and Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and intervention roles 
in Africa. Similar attempts were made to examine the lessons which constructivism and identity 
teach us about Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and intervention role in 
Africa.  
The chapter concluded by bringing out the utility embedded in the application of the eclectic 
approach to the study of Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour in Sierra Leone and 
the DRC in particular, and in Africa as a collective. Our discussion in this chapter has led to a 
number of important findings. The first is that Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy can be 
explained along both structural realist and social constructivist lines. Second, that the analytical 
weight of both approaches in explaining their conflict intervention roles and foreign policy 
behaviour differs. And third, to bridge this gap, and offer a more nuanced perspective of the 







eclectic approach is required.  Overall, we have illustrated the benefits of not restricting oneself 
to only one theoretical perspective in trying to get a grip on the complexity of real-life foreign-
policy decision making.  
That does not mean, however, that the two perspectives employed here are the only relevant 
ones, or that they, when taken together, fully explain Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy 
behaviour. As suggested above, there is clearly room for paying more focused attention to the 
role of leadership attributes as important intervening or conditioning variables. As the foreign-
policy analysis literature suggests, the importance of leadership attributes is itself dependent on a 
number of factors. In the case of Nigeria, this is obvious in the personalized nature of its foreign 
policy behaviour under military rule, where the definition of its national interest was contingent 
on the interpretation of the “Big Man” in Abuja, his/her ideological and leadership orientation, 
and his/her ability to employ Nigeria’s “Imperial Presidency” to achieve personal goals.  
For South Africa, it is a function of its apartheid past and the struggles against it. It might well be 
that the relatively young and poorly institutionalised nature of foreign-policy decision making in 
Nigeria and South Africa creates the scope for leadership attributes to play a larger role than 
would otherwise have been the case. Much work remains to be done in this respect. 
Before drawing the curtain on our discussion on the utility of the eclectic approach in analysing 
Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy and intervention behaviour in Africa, let us briefly 
examine two other debates which could be of interest to scholars of African politics and the 
international relations discipline. These are the reference to South Africa and Nigeria as middle 
powers in the literature, and how South Africa’s abandonment of its nuclear weapon programme 
can be explained along structural realist and social constructivist lines.  
There are contending arguments for and against the categorization of Nigeria and South Africa 
as middle power states given the origin of this term in a structural-realist conception of power 







there is a problematique of definition, scepticism,1038 and lack of consensus on what the term 
‘middle power’ means.1039 This polarization is usually along two lines. Those who view the 
concept as a ‘dead end’ and irreducibly incoherent,1040 and those who argue that it has the 
capacity for innovation and adaption in the face of faltering unipolarity, and useful in explaining 
common patterns in foreign policy strategies.1041  
A particular problem, according to Jordaan, is the question of the wide range of states considered 
to be middle powers.1042 As Hurrell comments, this group are too diverse and common patterns 
of behaviour among these states are too difficult to identify for the concept to have much use.1043 
As such, “identifying empirical examples of middle powers is as hazardous as trying to develop 
a precise conceptualisation of middle powers”.1044 By the same token, an empirical approach to 
categorising middle powers in the international system contains “numerous methodological 
difficulties which have led to its being progressively abandoned on the scientific level”.1045  
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The concept had more or less become “an ideology of foreign policy wielded by would be 
middle powers to characterise their foreign policy aims and content”.1046 Scholars have in fact 
noted that almost all discussions about middle powers begin with the disclaimer that the field is 
conceptually confused and theoretically contested.1047 Some have called for the dismissal of the 
concept altogether arguing that there has been a misconception of the roles played by “middle 
powers” in world affairs.1048 Others argue that the absence of a special recognition of middle 
powers in the United Nations, and the lack of an agreed list, definition or description of what 
constitutes being a middle power, diminishes the relevance of the concept in international 
politics.1049  
This problematique of definition notwithstanding, Adam Chapnik has provided us with what is 
arguably a useful definition of what a middle power implies. According to him, a middle power 
refers to “a state actor which has limited influence on deciding the distribution of power in a 
given regional system, but is capable of deploying a variety of sources of power to change the 
position of great powers, and defend its own position on matters related to national or regional 
security that directly affect it”.1050 While countries like Canada and Australia have been 
traditionally referred as middle powers, recent scholarship, however, has been less circumspect 
in the application of the term.1051  
To the list of states traditionally regarded as middle powers (e.g., Australia, Canada, the 
Netherlands and Sweden), have been added Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, 
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Colombia, Iran, Nigeria, Taiwan, Chile, India and Vietnam.1052 This lack of definitional 
consensus notwithstanding, Bernard Wood has identified five roles a state is expected to perform 
to be considered as a middle power at regional and global levels.1053 These include functioning: 
1. as a ‘regional or sub-regional leader’ (for example, South Africa and Nigeria in 
SADC or SADC); 
2. as a ‘functional leader’, taking a lead on an issue (or issues) that the middle power 
has expertise in, or heightened relevant capacity (Nigeria as a major exporter of 
crude oil and South Africa as a lead producer of gold and platinum); 
3. as ‘stabiliser’, mediating between or counterbalancing powers that threaten to 
destabilise a given situation (for example, Australia’s role in the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992);  
4. as a ‘free rider’ or ‘status seeker’, acquiring kudos by allying with a big power, and;  
5. being a ‘good multilateral citizen’, i.e. supporting actions such as United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.   
According to Allan Patience, a major shortcoming of Wood’s conceptualisation is the “difficulty 
in identifying a bloc of states that conform to even a few of his roles”. While “some states 
manage some of these roles some of the time, there is no consistent pattern of behaviour in these 
roles by states that could be readily identified as sustained middle power activity in regional or 
global affairs”.1054 Building on the inherent weakness in Wood’s conceptualisation, Cooper, 
Higgott, and Nossal, point out four other categories where a middle power should belong.1055 
The first, ‘geographic’—i.e. a state located between two great powers or power blocs, an ‘in-
between’ state like Turkey in relation to the European Union and the Islamic states.  
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Second, a ‘normative’ middle power, which acts as an honest broker or trusted mediator in 
regional or global crises. The third is a ‘positional’ middle power—a state whose power is 
relative to both great and small states. The fourth is what they refer to as a ‘behavioural’ middle 
power—a state that is able to engage successfully in ‘niche diplomacy’ in order to avert or 
ameliorate crises.1056 They note that the ‘behavioural’ middle power may act as a catalyst or an 
entrepreneur in regional or global matters, and “take the lead in gathering followers around it, or 
act as a facilitator, convenor, organiser and host of formative meetings, who sets priorities for 
future activity and draw up rhetorical declarations and manifestos, or as a manager, “with a 
heavy emphasis on institution-building”.1057  
Deducible from the foregoing, is a persuasive attempt to accept middle powers as stabilizers, 
however, as Eduard Jordaan points out, this effort has been “undone by the wide range of middle 
power responses to hegemony, more specifically, by the responses of many emerging middle 
powers”.1058 The distinguishing feature between traditional and emerging middle powers has to 
be made. The former is often supportive of the existing hegemonic order,1059 or what Welsh calls 
“middle power conservativism—that is, the desire for stability and the preservation of the status 
quo.”1060 Emerging middle powers on the other hand seek a ‘reformist’, rather than fundamental 
or radical change, that is consistent with, and supportive of the current international order and its 
liberal character.1061 
A preliminary application of these role conceptions on Nigeria and South Africa’s status in 
Africa evinces a number of points. First, when situated within the context of Bernard Wood’s 
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expectations of what a middle power is,1062 Nigeria and South Africa tick the box as a sub-
regional regional or power given their leadership role in Africa. Second, as a functional leader, 
both countries’ have a heightened relevant capacity in a commodity that can affect the global 
economic order (i.e. a conflict in Nigeria and South Africa can affect the global price of crude oil 
and gold and platinum respectively). Third, both countries have the capacity to act as stabilizers 
within their subregion—Nigeria through ECOWAS in West Africa and South Africa, through 
SADC in Southern Africa.    
Considered from the status seeker point of view, both countries fail the test in this regard. As a 
matter of fact, they both have a pedigree of offering strong resistance to the West in view of their 
decolonization and anti-apartheid struggles, and their membership of the non-aligned movement 
during the Cold War era.  When situated within the “being a good multilateral citizen” 
expectation according to Wood, Nigeria and South Africa’s qualification as one is not in doubt, 
given their history of supporting multilateral institutions, particularly the UN, AU, ECOWAS, 
SADC, among others.  
The dilemma in considering Nigeria and South Africa as middle powers, following Wood’s 
indices ideally is that, there can be no exceptions in terms of meeting these conditions.  
Therefore, since both countries do not appear to fulfil the entire conditions, the basis of their 
consideration as middle powers falls flat on the surface. Similarly, situating Nigeria and South 
Africa’s status in Africa within the context of Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal’s categorisation of 
what constitutes a middle power is also worth considering. The first is the “geographic location 
condition,” which expects middle powers to be located between two great powers—neither 
Nigeria nor South Africa meets this condition, unlike the case of Turkey in relation to the 
European Union and Islamic States.  
                                                          








Second is the being a ‘normative’ middle power expectation, i.e. having the capacity to act as an 
honest broker or trusted mediator in regional or global crises. Clearly, both countries do have the 
capacity to deliver on this task, at least within their respective subregions. The third, according to 
Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal talks about being a ‘positional’ middle power. That is, a state whose 
power is relative to both great and small states. Arguably, Nigeria and South Africa do not 
qualify in this regard. While both countries may be considered powerful in relation to the states 
within their subregions, the same argument does not hold when they are contrasted against 
competing powers in Africa like Egypt or Algeria, or within the international community. 
The fourth and final expectation is that a middle power will have a demonstrated or behavioural 
capacity to act as a catalyst or an entrepreneur in regional or global matters. By their formative 
role in the institutionalisation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
Nigeria and South Africa inarguably fit the description of a middle power in this regard. 
However, as it was with our earlier application of Wood’s middle power criterion1063, Nigeria 
and South Africa also do not meet the full range of criteria suggested by Cooper, Higgott, and 
Nossal’s: Remember, none of these conditions can be excluded, and none must be unmet for a 
state to be classified as a middle power.    
The purpose of this thesis was not to try and explain all aspects of Nigeria and South Africa’s 
foreign policies. However, for the utility of the eclectic approach to be accepted, it must be 
shown that this approach is indeed applicable and flexible enough to explain major events in the 
unfolding of the foreign policies of the two countries. One such major event is of course South 
Africa’s decision in 1989 to abandon its nuclear arms programme, with which it started in 1977. 
Both the origin and the abandonment of this programme is perfectly understandable from a 
structural realist perspective. But constructivism adds another dimension to the explanation that 
enriches our understanding of the abandonment episode, at least. 
                                                          







Explaining South Africa’s abandonment of its nuclear weapon programme along structural 
realist and social constructivist terms requires a brief narration of the events leading to 
conception of the idea. There is a general consensus in the literature on the motivation behind 
Pretoria’s decision to develop a nuclear weapons program in 1977. As structural realism 
emphasises, state behaviour is a function of the structural position of an actor in a specific region 
or context. By 1977, apartheid South Africa’s relative power position in Southern Africa was 
dramatically weakened by the revolution in Portugal that ended Portuguese colonial control over 
Angola and Mozambique. In both these newly independent countries, Soviet (and in Angola, also 
Cuban) supported governments took control, exacerbating the extreme threat perception that has 
been developing in Pretoria since the 1960s.  
The Soweto language riots, and a rising tide of domestic opposition to apartheid, fed into the 
calculation of the apartheid leadership of its declining regional power position. Similar to the 
strategic calculation that today plays such an important role in the foreign policy of North Korea, 
South Africa bet its survival on a deterrence that it believed could and would not be matched in 
the region. As de Villiers et al. note, Pretoria was apprehensive of a Soviet expansionist threat to 
southern Africa, which included a build-up of Cuban forces in Angola starting in 1975, and the 
imminent independence of neighbouring Zimbabwe under an actively antiapartheid regime.1064 
These events, as they observed, augmented the minority government's fear of encirclement.1065 
At conception, the programme was structured along three phases.1066 Phase 1 called for strategic 
ambiguity: internationally, the government would neither confirm nor deny whether it possessed 
a nuclear weapons capability.1067 If the country were threatened militarily, Phase 2 required 
South Africa covertly to reveal its nuclear capability to leading Western governments, 
principally the United States.1068 Under the third phase, Pretoria was to publicly disclose its 
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nuclear arsenal, either by official acknowledgement or an underground nuclear test, if the 
international community fails to act to protect South Africa’s borders if the country came under 
attack.1069  
By the time South Africa’s nuclear programme commenced, its relationship with the rest of the 
world had started to rapidly deteriorate. For example, by the late 1970s, its participation in the 
U.N. General Assembly and its specialized agencies had already been suspended; the Security 
Council had imposed a mandatory weapons embargo and voluntary oil embargo on the 
country.1070 By 1989, when it became obvious that the Soviet Union under Michael Gorbachev 
was seeking a cheap way out from the numerous regional conflicts that it was involved in the 
developing world, South Africa’s threat perception changed dramatically. It should also be 
remembered that by then, secret and not-so-secret talks between the apartheid leadership and the 
ANC were well developed, leading to the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. Hence, a structural 
realist will argue that South Africa’s behaviour in 1977 and in 1989 was both driven by changing 
structural conditions, and calculations about the utility (or declining utility in the case of 1989) of 
nuclear weapons.  
None of this implies that structural realists will necessary say that the 1977 decision was a wise 
decision. Rather, the structural realist will try and understand behaviour before it is evaluated. 
Liberman suggests three probable contributory factors to this eventual nuclear disarmament.1071 
The first, the end of security threats, second, the change in South Africa to a more outward-
looking leadership in 1989, and the third, the unacceptable expense of the nuclear weapons 
program. Liberman argues that given the leadership change from the nationalist-militarist 
president P.W. Botha to the more liberal, democratic F.W. de Klerk and seeks to evaluate Etel 
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Solingen's proposition that transition from statist leaders to economic liberalizers lessens support 
for expensive nuclear weapons program.1072 
To the list of probable motivations for the disarmament, according to Purkitt et al., is the high 
levels of pressure that the United States exerted on the South African political leadership from 
1987 to 1989, which was based on fears that a transition to a regime led by the African National 
Congress (ANC) might bring with it nuclear proliferation.1073 By then, the United States had 
issued a demarche to the de Klerk government based on fears of chemical and biological weapon 
proliferation.1074 The last is the pressure from the South African Defense Force (SADF), which 
argued that the nuclear weapons and missile programs were sapping defense budget funds that 
military leaders felt they needed to modernize South Africa's conventional forces.  
A preliminary summary of these explanations point out a number of realities. First, Pretoria’s 
decision to resort to nuclear weapons development can be argued as consistent with the doctrine 
of “self-help”, as structural realists persuades us to believe. Second, by resorting to self-help as a 
response to its relative international isolation, at that time, South Africa’s foreign policy 
behaviour arguably validates the structural realists’ argument that  “states seek power and 
calculate interests in terms of power, not relative to the nature of the international system, but 
relative to other significant actors in the system/sub-system”.1075  
Third, since the main goal of states is to survive in a hostile environment as realists claim, 
Pretoria sees its nuclear ambition as a way of maintaining its territorial integrity and the 
autonomy of its domestic political order.  Lastly, Pretoria’s nuclear programme represents the 
best defence strategy it could use in maximising its prospects for survival, as structural realist 
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would argue. While structural realism can take us a long way down the road of explaining South 
Africa’s behaviour, constructivism adds an important extra dimension without which our 
analysis will be all the poorer. Constructivists would argue that South Africa’s decision to 
voluntarily discontinue its nuclear program was a powerful expression of a new identity that was 
slowly gestating in decision-making circles in South Africa.  
As the old self-understanding of Pretoria as being the last bulwark in Southern Africa against 
Soviet expansion lost its credibility, the apartheid leadership were desperately looking for 
symbolic actions that would tip the scale of international opinion again back into its favour. This 
symbolic action, despite its obvious strategic goals, meshed very well with the new identity that 
the ANC leadership under Nelson Mandela would eventually develop into a full blown pro-


















Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
 
9.1 Restatement of research question, objectives and methodology 
At the beginning of the study, the principal aim of the research was to examine the extent to 
which two distinct international relations approaches explain Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign 
policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in Africa, using their interventions in Sierra 
Leone (1991-1998) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), respectively. The research 
design for the study was structured to generate empirical insights deduced from an exploration of 
the explanatory potential of structural realism and social constructivism, using Nigeria and South 
Africa as objects of analysis. To achieve this, analytic eclecticism—a deployment and 
combination of two theoretical approaches: structural realism and social constructivism to the 
study of both countries’ foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in Africa was 
adopted.  
The study used the qualitative approach, based on two overall assumptions. The first, an 
ontological assumption that Nigeria and South Africa are unified regional actors with discernible 
single foreign policies. The second – an epistemological assumption that both countries’ foreign 
policy behaviour, their intervention roles in Sierra Leone and the DRC, and the meaning 
attributed to these behaviour and its significance are accessible to us as observers. These two 
assumptions were operationalised, and the research design put into effect, through a theory-
guided content analysis of published materials on Nigeria and South Africa’s conflict 
intervention and foreign policy behaviour in Sierra Leone and the DRC, and several other 
conflict episodes. 
By employing the qualitative research methodology approach, and engaging relevant literature 
on Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in Africa 
on a content analysis basis, the study generated some useful interpretative insights that the 







equally afforded the researcher the analytical platform to understand and interpret the variations 
in Nigeria and South Africa foreign policies, and how their historical experiences shaped their 
interventions in the Sierra Leone and the DRC conflict episodes.  
 
9.2 Key findings 
Some findings were made in line with the overall research question of the study as highlighted 
above. In chapter three, where the focus was on the essential issues embedded in structural 
realism and social constructivism, an overwhelming nexus was found between national interests 
by state actors and material structures such as power, and how a state’s foreign policy is 
constructed and how its actual behaviour is shaped. Perhaps, the earliest clue of the relevance of 
the eclectic approach to the study of Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and 
conflict intervention roles in Africa was signalled in the second section of chapter three. The 
chapter established that, contrary to the claim made by realists that the struggle for power, and 
the protection of the national interest(s) through the pursuit of relative gains determine(s) the 
pattern of behaviour and interaction of states and the creation of anarchy, constructivism argues 
that the interests are products of those identities, and it is the social constitution of interests 
which defines the way an actor’s interests and identities are influenced in the course of 
interactions with the rest of the world.  
Chapter four affirmed that Nigeria’s conflict intervention roles in Africa is a direct consequence 
of its age-long commitment to African-centred foreign policy orientation, as spelt out in its 
foreign policy principles and objectives. The usefulness of interpreting Nigeria’s foreign policy 
along structural realist lines was equally brought to the fore in chapter four which demonstrated 
how the leadership idiosyncrasies and the ideological orientation of Nigeria’s leaders influence 
its foreign policy behaviour. Findings from the chapter also reveal that, since Nigeria’s return to 
civil rule in 1999, its foreign policy behaviour, while remaining assertive, has favoured a more 







the chapter made a more compelling argument for the relevance of analytic eclecticism in the 
analysis of Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in Africa. The 
single most important finding of chapter five was highlighting Nigeria’s relative power pursuit in 
its subregion, but also more broadly in Africa. This is well highlighted by a structural realist 
reading which highlights that, under the auspices of ECOWAS, Nigeria’s Sani Abacha engaged 
in intervention as he was reeling under the harsh effects of international sanctions and diplomatic 
isolation.  
Chapter six assessed South Africa’s foreign post-apartheid foreign policymaking process and 
found that South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour is strongly themed along the lines of a self-
imposed normative identity—a key focus of social constructivism. At the same time, though, the 
use of structural realist concepts highlight the fact that it was (and still is) the pursuit of relative 
gains against potential regional, African, and global rivals, that entice South Africa into 
interventions that overstretch its capacity. South Africa’s engagement in the DRC, as we 
interrogated in chapter seven, strikingly underlines this. The success of South Africa’s 
normatively driven desire to promote peace, which relates to its self-identification as an African 
nation born from peace and “Ubuntu”, ultimately depends on factors over which it has little 
control.  
This outcome is not surprising from a structural realist point of view, though, as it ultimately 
reflects that South Africa may be less powerful than a naive observation of South African 
resources (and South African decision makers themselves) may assume. The most important 
finding of the study came in chapter eight where the strengths and limitations of both structural 
realism and social constructivism, when singularly applied to Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign 
policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in Sierra Leone and the DRC, were tested.  
Despite the admittance that Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy can be explained along 
both structural realist and social constructivist lines, the chapter strongly finds that an eclectic IR 
approach remains a sine qua non in achieving a more nuanced understanding of the motivations 







Findings from the study also evinced a number of similarities and differences between Nigeria 
and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles in Africa. Similarity 
wise, our experience here has shown that both countries have tendencies for relative power 
pursuit, as evident in their intervention approaches in our conflict case studies. Second, there is 
no denying the fact that they are both committed to an Africa focused foreign policy orientation 
and agenda—our analyses in chapters four and six on their foreign policy and intervention roles 
in Africa lends credence to this assertion.  
Third, through the analytical lens of social constructivism, the study has clearly demonstrated the 
shared identity Nigeria and South Africa have with their contiguous states. Lastly, and as 
demonstrated in chapters five and seven on Nigeria and South Africa’s intervention role in Sierra 
Leone and the DRC, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the leadership of both countries 
often use their foreign policy orientation to achieve personal agenda/ambition. The examples of 
Sani Abacha in Sierra Leone, Ibrahim Babangida in Liberia,  Kgalema Petrus Motlanthe in 
Lesotho, Jacob Zuma in the Central African Republic, and Thabo Mbeki in Zimbabwe points to 
this direction. 
Regardless of this similarities however, it has to be acknowledged that the historical experiences, 
i.e. Nigeria’s history with military rule, and South Africa’s with apartheid does have an 
impactful role in the conception, articulation, and implementation of their foreign policy 
objectives, including its resultant behaviour, hence the relevance of the eclectic approach as we 










9.3 Looking forward 
As our arguments from chapters one to eight of this study suggest, the complex nature of foreign 
policy discourses and what constitutes the notion of intervention makes it relatively impossible 
to deploy a singular IR approach to interpret the foreign policy and conflict intervention 
behaviour of African states. Therefore, what this study has done, is to demonstrate the 
inadequacies of exclusive use of either of the two most relevant IR approaches in international 
relations—structural realism and social constructivism—in effectively explaining Nigeria and 
South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and conflict intervention roles. Drawing references from 
our arguments on the utility of analytic eclecticism in chapter eight, this study has arguably 
helped to highlight the indispensability of the eclectic mode of theorising in discourses that seek 
to explain the foreign policy of behaviours of Nigeria and South Africa as state actors with 
unique historical peculiarities as well as socio-economic and political allegiances. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, this thesis deliberately avoided liberalism, and in particular 
liberal-institutionalism as an explanatory framework. This was done not in disrespect for the 
potential contributions of liberalism, as highlighted by Domson-Lindsay.1076 However, I am of 
opinion that, as far as South Africa and Nigeria’s conflict intervention roles are concerned, 
liberalism does not add anything substantial to our understanding that is not already 
accommodated by structural realism and constructivism. For instance, it might be argued that the 
choice of the two regional powers to work through regional organisations to provide the public 
good of conflict intervention reflects the significance of liberalism. However, as this thesis made 
clear, the commitment by South Africa and Nigeria to the provision of a valued public good such 
as conflict intervention is premised on their specific identity conceptions as African actors. 
In the case of South Africa, the experience of a peaceful transition has added an additional 
identity component that is relevant in this regard. We do not require liberalism to point that out. 
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Similarly, the choice to act through regional institutions reflects both an identity commitment to 
Africa, but also a recognition of the relative regional power positions of these two actors. As 
structural realism helps us to understand (more than liberalism can), being embedded in a 
specific structural context provide both incentives, but also constraints. Nigeria and South 
Africa’s behaviour is thus a function of the structural distribution of power and resources, more 
than it reflects a commitment to institutions per se. It also bears considering that neither of the 
two powers deliberately act to sustain the global liberal order. In fact, and especially in the case 
of South Africa, they have explicitly committed themselves to changing this order for the sake of 
improving the relative position of the Global South. Also, as the analysis in chapters five and six 
has shown, the provision of public goods—a significant component of the liberalist school of 
thought, can equally be explained by structural realism and constructivism.  
For instance, we saw how a structural realist interpretation of Nigeria and South Africa’s 
intervention in the Sierra Leone and the DRC conflict episodes, highlighted the regional public 
goods provision capacity of the pursuit of relative power. Similarly, our exploration of the 
constructivist notion of identity has also shown that because ‘identity’ precede interests, public 
goods are bound to follow in the course of its demonstration. Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign 
policy and intervention behaviour, as analysed in our case studies, do not pass the revue of 
another important assumption of the liberalist school—a commitment to international liberal, 
given both countries’ non-committal to a liberal economic order.  
Since structural realism and social constructivism accommodates the core explanatory weight 
(provision of public goods) which liberalism brings to bear on Nigeria and South Africa’s 
foreign policy and intervention behaviour, it makes less analytic sense to consider the former in 
the same light, as the latter. Having said that, it is imperative to add that the application of an 
eclectic approach to the study of Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and 
conflict intervention roles in Africa, is not without its limitations. Both approaches eclectically 
used here appear inadequate in explaining the role of leadership idiosyncrasies in shaping the 







As our discussion in the chapters on Nigeria’s conflict intervention role in Sierra Leone and 
South Africa’s in the DRC has shown, neither of both approaches have any explanation for the 
personal/commercial interests motivations behind Abacha’s full support for Maada Bio’s 
ascendance to power. The same way both approaches appear inadequate in explaining 
Kgalema Petrus Motlanthe’s decision to invade Lesotho in 1998, or Jacob Zuma’s decision to 
invade the CAR in 2013, particularly when there was no obvious threat to South Africa’s 
national interest(s) on both occasions. We suggested in chapter six that there is an inextricable 
relationship between the orientation of South Africa’s leaders, and the country’s foreign policy 
behaviour, articulation and implementation. 
One way to reformulate this is to say that a key determinant factor of how South Africa sees the 
rest of the world is how its leadership recalls and responds to the level of support it got from 
regional supporters during its anti-apartheid struggle. Similarly, chapters four and five highlight 
the many ways in which leadership idiosyncrasies acted as conditioning or intervening variables 
shaping Nigerian foreign policy. Equally worth noting is the failure of structural realism and 
social constructivism as eclectically applied here, to comprehensively explain the some of the 
idealistic/idealism orientation embedded in Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy is founded. 
For example, structural realism and social constructivism fail to explain Nigeria’s commitment 
to a foreign policy principle of non-alignment and a just world order, and Nigeria and South 
Africa’s Afro-centric foreign policy behaviour. 
This raises a number of questions that have to be pursued in subsequent research. The first 
question is: To what extent is both structural realism and social constructivism capable of 
dealing adequately with the intervening variable of leadership idiosyncrasies? Here, we do not 
have the space to pursue this question in any detail, but it would seem to be a question that is 
especially pertinent in the case of African states, where the institutions of foreign and security 
policy making are of relatively recent origin. In addition, the vacillation between military and 
civilian rule in the case of Nigeria obviously creates the conditions under which such intervening 







of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma are stark, and it would be surprising if these 
did not lead to significant variety in their interpretations of South Africa’s identity, the debt that 
South Africa owes the rest of the continent, and of the nature of the relative gains that South 
Africa should pursue. 
The second, and related question has to do with the limits of the eclectic approach as 
conceptualised and applied here. The main insight of this thesis is that the foreign policy of 
African states in general, and the political/foreign behaviours of specific actors are too 
complicated to be fully explained by a single IR approach. But this raises the question of how 
many approaches should then be employed, if it is true that one approach is insufficient? Should 
we simply add more and more perspectives to get fuller and fuller view with each step? Taking a 
first stab at an answer, one can say that such a multiplying strategy is not true to the spirit of 
scholarly eclecticism, which is to pursue multi-perspective enlightenment within the bounds of 
parsimony and reasonableness.  
There is no reason to assume that each and every possible theoretical approach will be able to 
contribute substantively. It was argued in the introduction that liberalism, for instance, could be 
ruled out on prima facie grounds. This may also be true of other approaches. Post-colonialism, to 
take another example, may contribute to our understanding of broader patterns of power and 
influence in global affairs. But it has not proven its potential in the field of foreign policy 
analysis. Again, we would have some reasons to rule it out. However, as the reference to 
leadership idiosyncrasies above suggests, there does seem to be room to add perspectives to 
structural realism and constructivism in an attempt to make sense of foreign policy on the 
African continent. What the epistemological outer limit of such a multi-perspective eclectic 
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